 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 1 of 314	Rev. 02

FOR INTERNAL USE ONLY:

This document is the property of TotalEnergies EP Italy and shall not be reproduced in any form. Copies provided by TotalEnergies EP Italy shall only be disclosed or provided to third parties insofar as relevant for the operations of TotalEnergies EP Italy and the information provided in this document shall be used for no other purpose than that of these operations.


The content of this document will be regularly updated by TotalEnergies EP Italy, and the validated version will be published on its CMS site. Consequently, the validity of hard copies of this document must be verified prior to its use against the version on the TotalEnergies EP Italy's CMS site.

INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE

Rev ##	Date	Main modifications
00	01/01/2017	First issue.
01	14/09/2020	Review for Production Phase.
02	15/12/2021	Update as per first OC Seveso audit findings (P.4-R.13-R.15).


Prepared by	Reviewed by	Checked by	Approved by
A. Carbone IMS Coordinator	F. Ferrucci/HSSE Director	S. Masi CMS Administrator	B. Welinder / Gestore
	F. Pottier / Production Director		
	I. Rea / G. Boisson / RSES		
	V. Arculeo / HSE Methods & Integrity		

Original signed.


 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 2 of 314	Rev. 02

Index


VOLUME 1	9
CT - INDEX.....	10
BP - BASIC PRINCIPLES.....	11
BP SECTION.....	11
BP0 – INTRODUCTION	13
Definition	13
Purpose	14
Activation.....	15
Efficiency	16
Adaptability	17
Interface with other Emergency Plans	17
Reference Documentation	18
BP1 - DESCRIPTION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT	20
Description of the Tempa Rossa Oil Centre	20
BP2 - LEVELS OF RESPONSE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE EMERGENCY	24
Levels of Emergency Response	24
TotalEnergies' organizational structure in emergency management	27
ACP "Advanced Command Post on Site"	28
ICP "Incident Command Post"	30
CMC "Crisis Management Cell"	33
BP3 - ROLES ASSIGNMENT E ON-DUTY PRINCIPLES	35
ACP Crisis Cell composition	36
ICP Crisis Cell composition	37

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 3 of 314	Rev. 02


CMC Crisis Cell composition.....	38
CCMC Crisis Cell composition.....	38
BP4 - ALERT SCHEME	39
Warning and emergency devices	41
Actions in the event of an emergency being detected	43
The Alert Scheme	44
BP5 - NOTIFICATIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS	46
BP6 - INITIAL BRIEFING AND TIME OUT	48
BP7 - ALARM, ESCAPE, MUSTERING AND EVACUATION MODES	50
BP8 - MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROCEDURES - MEDEVAC.....	55
BP9 - MANAGEMENT OF THE RECOVERY PHASE.....	56
BP10 - COMMON PROCESSES IN INCIDENT MANAGEMENT	57
INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM METHODOLOGY.....	57
"P" planning.....	58
FISA methodology.....	60
Language, Terminology and Modules	64
BP11 - EXTERNAL EMERGENCY	65
JT - JOB TICKETS	69
SECTION JT	69
JT1 – ON-SCENE COMMANDER	71
JT2 – INSTALLATION SHUTDOWN LEADER	76
JT3 – INTERVENTION LEADER	78

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 4 of 314	Rev. 02


JT4 – MUSTER AND EVACUATION LEADER	81
JT5 – ACP EVENT LOGGER	82
JT6 – CCR SHUTDOWN LEADER	83
JT7 – CCR PANEL OPERATOR	84
JT8 - MUSTER COUNTER	86
JT9 – SITE INTERVENTION TEAM LEADER	87
JT10 – FIRST INTERVENTION TEAM	89
JT11 - MEDICAL TEAM LEADER	90
JT12 - PROCESS AND REPORTING OFFICER	92
JT13 – ICP DIRECTOR / INCIDENT COMMANDER	93
JT14 – LOCAL/REGIONAL AUTHORITIES LIAISON	97
JT15 - INJURED / VICTIMS’ FAMILIES/NEXT OF KIN ASSISTANCE OFFICER ...	99
JT16 - ICP/ACP FOPS LIAISON OFFICER.....	101
JT17 - MAINTENANCE SITE SUPPORT OFFICER.....	103
JT18 - EXPORT/RELATIONS WITH ENI OFFICER	104
JT19 - DRILLING EXPERT	105
JT20 - ICP EVENT LOGGER.....	106
JT21 - HSE OFFICER	108
JT22 - MARKETING AND SHIPPING OFFICER	110
JT23 - LOGISTICS AND GENERAL SERVICES OFFICER	111

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 5 of 314	Rev. 02


JT24 – TELECOM & INFORMATIC SERVICES (IT) OFFICER.....	112
JT25 – SITE FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION OFFICER	113
JT26 – CMC DIRECTOR.....	114
JT27 - RELATIONS WITH JOINT VENTURE PARTNERS OFFICER	116
JT28 - FINANCE AND INSURANCE OFFICER.....	117
JT29 - DIRETTORE RESPONSABILE (D.LGS. 624/96)	118
JT30 – ICP/CMC ASSISTANT(S)	119
SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES.....	120
SECTION SR.....	120
SR1 - INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT - TOXIC GAS RELEASE.....	122
SR2 - INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT - FLAMMABLE GAS RELEASE - FLASH FIRE.....	126
SR3 - INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT - JET FIRE	131
SR4 - INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT - SPILL AND POOL FIRE	135
SR5 - INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT - EXPLOSION / UVCE / VCE	141
SR6 - INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT - TANK FIRE / BOIL-OVER	147
SR7 - INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT - TOP MAJOR SCENARIO PER UNIT	152
UNIT 10	152
UNIT 24-25	156
UNIT 26	161
UNIT 30-31	168
UNIT 32	173
UNIT 33	176

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 6 of 314	Rev. 02

UNIT 34	180
UNIT 35	185
UNIT 36	188
UNIT 37	193
UNIT 40	197
UNIT 44	200
UNIT 45	204
UNIT 49	210
UNIT 60	214
UNIT 64-68	218
UNIT 66	221
SR8 - ACCIDENT WITH SERIOUS INJURY / DEATH	223
SR9 - TERRORIST THREAT	225
SR10 - VEGETATION FIRE OUTSIDE THE OIL CENTRE	226
SR11 – NATURAL EVENTS (EARTHQUAKE/LANDSLIDE)	227
SR12 - TRANSPORT INCIDENT	233
SR13 – FIRE IN OIL CENTRE BUILDINGS.....	235
FORMS.....	237
SECTION FO.....	237
FO1 - COMPONENTS OF THE CRISIS CELLS	239
FO1-1 Members of the ACP Crisis Cell	239
FO1-2 Members of the ICP Crisis Cell	240
FO1-3 Members of the CMC Crisis Cell	241
FO2 - FIRST ACTIONS AFTER THE ACTIVATION OF THE ERP	242
FO2-1 - FIRST ARRIVAL CHECK-LIST	242
FO2-2 - IMMEDIATE ACTIONS AFTER CRISIS CELLS ACTIVATION	243


 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 7 of 314	Rev. 02

FO3 - MESSAGE TRANSMISSION CARDS	244
FO4 - REGISTER OF EVENTS AND ACTIONS	245
FO4-1 – FACTS CHART	245
FO4-2 – ACTION PLAN	246
FO5 - CONSEQUENCES AND IMPACTS CONTROL FORM	247
FO6 – STAKEHOLDERS’ CONTROL BOARD	248
FO7 - INCIDENT STATUS	249
FO8 - MANAGEMENT OF A TELEPHONE TERRORIST THREAT	253
FO9 - PRESS RELEASE TEMPLATE	256
FO10 - PEC COMMUNICATION MODULES EXTERNAL EMERGENCY PLAN ...	257
MODULE 1 - Reporting of ATTENTION STATE by the Gestore to the Authorities.	257
MODULE 2 - Reporting of An ACCIDENT by the Gestore to the Authorities.	258
FO11 - EMERGENCY EXERCISE REGISTRATION	259
FO12 - RLSA CONSULTATION	260
FO13A – VICTIMS’ FOLLOW-UP	261
FO13B - INJURED/VICTIM IDENTIFICATION & STATUS.....	262
ERP MANAGEMENT	263
SECTION MA	263
MA1 – TRAINING AND EXERCISES	265
MA2 - UPDATE PROCEDURES	269
MA3 - GLOSSARY	271
VOLUME 2	273
LD1 - OIL CENTRE GENERAL PLAN (IT-TPR-30-EPC1-130900)	274

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 8 of 314	Rev. 02

LD2 - FIRE-FIGHTING LAYOUT (IT-TPR-30-EPC1-168310).....	275
LD3 - F&G DETECTION SYSTEMS LAYOUT.....	276
LD4 - ESCAPE ROUTES LAYOUT (IT-TPR-30-EPC1-168309).....	277
LD5 - COROGRAPHY OF THE SURROUNDING AREA (REF. PEE-ANNEX 2) ...	278
LD6 - MAIN PFDS AND P&I	279
LD7 – ICP EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ROOM LAYOUT	281
LD8 - MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEETS.....	282
LD9 - CARTOGRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF DAMAGE AREAS (FROM SAFETY REPORT)	283
RE1 - TELEPHONE NUMBERS AND USEFUL CONTACTS.....	284
Internal Contacts - TotalEnergies EP Italia Spa	Error! Bookmark not defined.
Internal Contacts ACP Crisis Cell	285
Internal Contacts ICP Crisis Cell.....	286
Internal Contacts CMC Crisis Cell	286
Internal Contacts Central Control Room	288
Stakeholders - Partners	289
Public Authorities	291
Hospitals, ASP.....	298
Transportation	300
Environmental intervention	301
Neighboring Companies	302
RE2 - DESCRIPTION OF THE EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT.....	303
RE3 - INVENTORY OF INTERVENTION MATERIAL FOR OIL SPILLING.....	314

VOLUME 1


 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 10 of 314	Rev. 02

CT	INDEX
-----------	--------------

CT - INDEX

VOLUME 1	
Ref.	Title
CT	INDEX
BP	BASIC PRINCIPLES
JT	JOB TICKETS
SR	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
FO	FORMS
MA	ERP MANAGEMENT


VOLUME 2	
Ref.	Title
LD	LAYOUTS AND DATA
LD1	Oil Centre general plan
LD2	Fire-Fighting layout
LD3	F&G detection systems layout
LD4	Escape routes layout
LD5	Chorography of the surrounding area
LD6	Main PFDs and P&I
LD7	ICP Emergency Management Room Layout
LD8	Material Safety Data Sheets
LD9	Cartographic Representation of Damage Areas (from OC Safety Report)
RE	RESOURCES
RE1	Telephone numbers and useful contacts
RE2	Description of emergency equipment
RE3	Inventory of Intervention Material for Oil Spilling

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 11 of 314	Rev. 02

BP	BASIC PRINCIPLES
-----------	-------------------------

BP Section


BP - BASIC PRINCIPLES

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 12 of 314	Rev. 02

BP	BASIC PRINCIPLES
-----------	-------------------------

BP	BASIC PRINCIPLES
-----------	-------------------------

BP0	Introduction
BP1	Description of the establishment
BP2	Levels of response and organization of the emergency
BP3	Role's assignment and On-Duty management
BP4	Alert scheme
BP5	Notifications and Communications
BP6	Initial briefing and time-out
BP7	Alarm, Escape, Mustering and Evacuation Modes
BP8	Medical Assistance Procedure - MEDEVAC
BP9	Management of the recovery phase
BP10	Common processes in emergency management – IMS Methodology
BP11	External Emergency


 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 13 of 314	Rev. 02

BP0	BASIC PRINCIPLES	INTRODUCTION
------------	-------------------------	---------------------

BP0 – INTRODUCTION

Definition

This **Internal Emergency Response Plan** (hereinafter referred to as **ERP or PEI as per Italian**), is issued to manage emergency situations within the **TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE** plant operated by TotalEnergies EP Italia.




The Internal Emergency Response Plan is drawn up in accordance with:

- Art. 20 and Annex 4 of Legislative Decree 105/15.
- Annexes VII and VIII of the Ministerial Decree 10.03.1998.
- Legislative Decree 81/08 and subsequent amendments.
- TotalEnergies Internal Company Rule: CR-GR-HSE-701 - "Emergency and Crisis Management".
- TotalEnergies Internal General Manual: GM-EP-HSE-091 – "Guidelines for Affiliate Emergency Response Plan".
- TotalEnergies Internal General Manual: GM-EP-HSE-093 – "Guidelines for Site Contingency Plan".

The Internal Emergency Response Plan is part of the Safety Management System for the Prevention of Major Accidents (SGS-PIR).

The Internal Emergency Response Plan is also drawn up in accordance with the Policy Document for the Prevention of Major Accidents of the Tempa Rossa Oil Centre (1-PO-QHSE-002).

The Internal Emergency Response Plan of the Tempa Rossa Oil Centre (Seveso upper-tier establishment) is prepared, issued, tested, and reviewed in accordance with the provisions of art. 20 of Legislative Decree 105/15, specifying all the elements related to the protection and intervention measures to face with possible emergency situations and major accidents.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 14 of 314	Rev. 02

BP0	BASIC PRINCIPLES	INTRODUCTION
------------	-------------------------	---------------------

The ERP, addressed to all workers of the Tempa Rossa Oil Centre, i.e., direct, and indirect workers and occasional visitors, is structured in such a way to define the main safety features of the Oil Centre, the measures set up to detect, report and promptly response in the occurrence of an emergency events and provide the rules to be observed during such events.

The workers of third-party companies and, in general, all occasional visitors are required to acknowledge and memorize the behaviors to be followed in the case of an emergency event, according to the instructions given at the entrance to the plant and by means of the information form defined "**Induction HSE**" described as per the Procedure 3-PR-QHSE-018 "Personnel Access in Tempa Rossa Areas".

TotalEnergies EP Italia undertakes to distribute and to spread this Plan to all those who operate within the areas of competence.

In the case of large-scale works performed by a contractor (e.g., Construction and / or Drilling), a *bridging document* will be drawn up with the contractor who will regulate the organization of emergency events.

Purpose

The ERP is designed to:

a) define the structure, the organizational intervention methods in case of **emergency situations**, the fire-fighting equipment, and the individual and collective protection devices to be used and kept available. An emergency means an event that:

- endanger the health or safety of staff, visitors, contractors, and surrounding communities.
- Present a threat to the environment.
- Jeopardize the production and the plant integrity.
- Damage the corporate image.

b) Allow, through timely and adequate intervention according to specific methods as per the type of hazard, the management of the various emergency situations that may arise to safeguard the people and property present in the Plant, minimizing impact on the environment, and damage on structures and to equipment.

c) Adequately inform workers and competent local authorities.

d) Limit and control the gravity of the incident.

e) allow an orderly and safe escape or evacuate of people from one or more areas in the event of not imminent danger.


f) provide information on how evacuate the Oil Centre in the event of imminent danger by all the personnel present on site.

g) Ensure the necessary coordination with the competent authorities through the connection and integration with the External Emergency Plan (PEE).

h) Manage liaison with the media and information bodies for the protection of the corporate image and reputation.

i) Ensure the necessary communication among the several Company entities in charge of PEI activation.

The ERP was developed based on the potential hazardous events that come from the assessment of major accidents risks reported in:

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 15 of 314	Rev. 02

BP0	BASIC PRINCIPLES	INTRODUCTION
------------	-------------------------	---------------------

- Seveso Safety Report developed by TEPIT and issued to the Regional Technical Committee (Comitato Tecnico Regionale), as per art. 21 of the D.lgs. 105/15.
- Technological Risk Assessment (TRA) developed by TEPIT according to the internal standard GS-EP-SAF-041 (and future update accordingly CR-GR-HSE-301 and GS GR HSE 312).

As required by Legislative Decree 105/15, the following information is contained within the ERP:

- a) name or function of the persons authorized to activate the emergency procedures and of the person responsible for the application and coordination of the intervention measures within the site.
- b) Name or function of the person in charge of liaising with the authority responsible for the activation of the External Emergency Plan.
- c) For predictable situations or events that could play a decisive role in causing a major accident, description of the measures to be taken to deal with such situations or events and to limit their consequences; the description includes available safety equipment and resources.
- d) Measures to limit the dangers for people present at site, including alarm systems and all procedures must be followed by all people at site since the first PA/GA activation.
- e) Provisions to promptly notify, in the event of an accident, the authority in charge of activating the External Emergency Response Plan.
- f) Type of information to be provided immediately and methodology used for communicating more detailed information as soon as available.
- g) Training provisions to prepare involved personnel in specific tasks to be performed and, when necessary, in coordination with the external emergency services.
- h) Provisions to assist in the execution of intervention measures adopted outside the plant.

Activation

The Internal Emergency Response Plan of the Tempa Rossa Oil Centre is activated in the case of a major hazard i.e., an event such as a toxic chemical or gas release, a fire, an explosion, etc. resulting, for instance, from uncontrolled event appeared during operations, and inducing a severe risk for human life, the environment, or assets.

The activation scheme is described in the **BP4 sheet**.


In particular, the following should be considered as initiating events of emergency situations:

- uncontrolled release of energy (liquid pool fires, gas / vapor cloud fires, high velocity released gas / liquid fires, explosions).
- Release of toxic substances.
- Health emergency that may involve one or more people as per following examples:
 - Illness, referable to any morbid form not caused by work activity.
 - Very serious injuries, such as burns, trauma, etc., referable to work activity.
 - Intoxications caused by the release of toxic gases, always referable to work activities.
- Emergency caused by natural events (e.g., flooding from exceptional precipitation, earthquakes, landslides, etc.),
- Intrusion of unauthorized personnel (acts of sabotage, terroristic attacks, demonstrative acts of protest, theft of oil). Refer to "Site Security Plan".

The Internal Emergency Response Plan is activated by the On-Scene Commander, whose function is covered by the RSES (Site Safety, Health and Environment Manager), or by his substitute in case of absence. (See BP4).
The RSES is the Responsible for activating the ERP.

The Internal Emergency Response Plan can provide for the activation of 3 crisis cells, each with different functions depending on the potential or real consequence of the emergency:

- **An Advanced Command Post (ACP) for the management of the emergency onsite**, located in the administrative building in Area N, in ACP Emergency Management Room.

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 16 of 314	Rev. 02

BP0	BASIC PRINCIPLES	INTRODUCTION
------------	-------------------------	---------------------

- **An Incident Command Post (ICP) for the command in the management of the emergency (tactical management)**, located in the TEPIT Offices of Guardia Perticara, ICP Emergency Management Room and, if required, connected with the Taranto office.
- **A Crisis Management Cell (CMC) for the management of corporate interests (strategic management)**, located in the Emergency Management Room of the TEPIT Offices in Milan.
- The CMC crisis cell may request the support of the **Country Crisis Management Cell (CCMC)**, according to the Country Crisis Plan - L2-CIA-PR-002.

The detailed description of the crisis cells is provided in the **BP2** and **BP3** sheets.

In addition to Emergency Management Rooms, dedicated **virtual rooms** for ACP/ICP/ CMC/ CCMC Crisis Cells are available in TEAMS to manage and coordinate the emergency if it **is impossible to reach the Emergency Room** (e.g., snow events or adverse weather conditions). Only the Crisis Cells' Director can authorize the activation of these virtual emergency management rooms.

Upon activation of the Advanced Command Post on the Site, the On-Scene Commander/RSES promptly informs the Gestore who holds the position of ICP Director and Incident Commander.

The Incident Commander decides whether to activate the ICP crisis cell.

The activation of the ICP and CMC crisis cells shall be carried out only if the resources available for the ACP crisis cell are not sufficient to quickly control the event, or if there is a risk of escalation of accidents with effects outside the plant, or if the involvement of the public authority responsible is necessary for the emergency.

The Internal Emergency Response Plan is **NOT activated** in case of minor hazard such as an injury that the local medical team is able to handle, or a minor industrial event.

Minor events are to be considered:


- modest releases of dangerous substance due to leakage from seals (from flanges, valves, pumps, etc.) generally not detected by the gas detectors, or when only gas detectors 1st alarm threshold is triggered.
- Small fire involving office buildings and / or technical rooms, or small events that can be solved by the present operating staff.
- Smoke events in the chimneys or in the flare or visibility events of the flare flame

More detail on the ERP activation procedure is described in the **BP4** sheet.

Efficiency

The efficiency of ERP requires:

- a reliable and suitable organization.
- An optimum number of people in the emergency team, composed of qualified and trained people.
- Appropriate equipment always in good operating conditions.
- A good knowledge of risk to anticipate potential accidents to limit as much as possible escalation and associated impact.
- Drills are frequently organized to:
 - test the crisis management consistency and adequacy;
 - familiarize each member of crisis cell to his function;
 - check the equipment availability and efficiency.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 17 of 314	Rev. 02

BP0	BASIC PRINCIPLES	INTRODUCTION
------------	-------------------------	---------------------

Adaptability

The organization of the ERP should ensure handling all emergency situations, including a partial degradation of the collective means of protection. It is obtained thanks to:

- a multi-skilled trade qualification;
- equipment redundancy;
- self-use communications;
- exercises in emergency situations.

To be operational and fully effective, the ERP needs specific defined people, whose role is detailed in job tickets. Each job ticket shall be reviewed, adapted, and updated in accordance with the current environment and operating condition of site, organization level of defined acceptable risk, change of law requirements. Any changes in the previous factors imply a new review of ERP.

The ERP shall be considered as a living document, which evolves together with the Plant and organization. A specific section at the end of the document summarizes the ERP updating criteria. Substantial changes are noted in the revision list.

Interface with other Emergency Plans


The Internal Emergency Response Plan of the Tempa Rossa Oil Centre represents a part of the site and affiliate emergency management documentation as detailed into Seveso SGS-08 Procedure "Affiliate Emergency Response System" (2-PR-QHSE-019). This ERP can be applied in parallel with one of the following internal emergency plans:

- **Oil Spill Contingency Plan - IT – TPR – GE – SET – 000039:** Anti-pollution plan following an accidental oil spill.
- **Internal Emergency Response Plan Tempa Rossa LPG Centre - 2-PR-QHSE-023.**
- **Blow Out Contingency Plan - IT-TPR-WL-DCT-000139:** Emergency management plan in case of uncontrolled eruption (blow-out) of the extraction wells.
- **H₂S / SO₂ Contingency Plan - IT-TPR-WL-DCT-000140:** H₂S and SO₂ accidental spillage management plan during the work-over activities of the extraction wells.
- **Site Medical Assistance and Emergency Medical Service (MEDEVAC) - 3-PR-QHSE-019:** Management plan for first aid medical care and evacuation of injured and sick people from the Tempa Rossa site to health facilities.

Furthermore, to ensure the required coordination with the competent authorities in case of the emergency event linked to accidents with possible impact outside the Plant, additional emergency procedures shall be used:

- a) **External Emergency Response Plan** of the Tempa Rossa Oil Centre. The PEE is available on the website of the Prefecture of Potenza.
- b) **Memorandum of understanding with the Region and the Prefecture** (Protocollo d'Intesa) in the event of pollution events (AIA - Prescription 14).

In case of activation of the External Emergency Response Plan (see BP11), the coordination of the response to the external emergency is carried out by the Responsible Public Authority (Prefect of Potenza) in liaison with the Gestore-Incident Commander.


 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 18 of 314	Rev. 02

BP0	BASIC PRINCIPLES	INTRODUCTION
------------	-------------------------	---------------------

Reference Documentation


Internal - TEPIT CMS	
Name of the document	Reference
Tempa Rossa Oil Centre Safety Report	IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167544
TEPIT HSEQ Policy	0-CHA-HSEQ-001
Major accident prevention policy - 1 Page	0-CHA-HSEQ-002
Major Risk Register	IT-TPR-00-EPC1-167567
Emergency and Crisis Management	CR-GR-HSE-701
Information, notification and communications between affiliates and E&P in case of emergency/crisis	GR-EP-HSE-092
Guidelines for "Affiliate Emergency Response Plan"	GM-EP-HSE-091
Guidelines for Site Contingency Plan	GM-EP-HSE-093
Tempa Rossa Oil Spill Contingency Plan	IT-TPR-GE-SET-000039
Site Medical Assistance and Emergency Medical Service (MEDEVAC)	3-PR-QHSE-019
Blow Out Contingency Plan	IT-TPR-WL-DCT-000031
H ₂ S/SO ₂ Contingency Plan	IT-TPR-WL-DCT-000140
Affiliate Emergency Response System - SGS-08	2-PR-QHSE-019
Management of Awareness, Information and Training for HSE- SGS 04	2-PR-QHSE-016
HSE Events and Incident Reporting - SGS 11	2-PR-QHSE-013
Personnel access in Tempa Rossa Areas – SGS 21	3-PR-QHSE-018
Site Security Plan	2-PLA-SUR-001
Country Crisis Plan	L2-CIA-PR-002
Organization and Management Model – General	0-PO-SG-001
Organization and Management Model – Specifics and appendixes	0-PO-SG-002

External	
Name of the document	Reference
Implementation of Directive 2012/18 / EU relating to the control of major-accidents hazards involving dangerous substances.	Legislative Decree 105/2015
General criteria for fire safety and emergency management in the workplace and subsequent amendments and updates.	DM 10/03/1998
Regulations containing provisions on company first aid, in implementation of article 15, paragraph 3, of legislative decree no. 626, and subsequent amendments.	DM 15 luglio 2003, n.388
Guidelines for the external emergency planning of industrial plants at risk of major accident.	DPCM 25.02.2005
Implementation of Law 123/2007 on the protection of health and safety in the workplace.	Legislative Decree 81/2008 and subsequent amendments
Implementation of Directive 92/91 / EEC relating to the safety and health of workers in extractive industries by drilling and of Directive 92/104 / EEC relating to the safety and health of workers in open pit or underground extractive industries.	Legislative Decree 624/96 and subsequent amendments
Regolamento recante la disciplina delle forme di consultazione, sui piani di emergenza interna (PEI), del personale che lavora nello stabilimento, ai sensi dell'articolo 20, comma 5, del decreto legislativo 26 giugno 2015, n. 105.	DM 6 giugno 2016, n. 138
Regolamento recante la disciplina per la consultazione della popolazione sui piani di emergenza esterna, ai sensi dell'articolo 21, comma 10, del decreto legislativo 26 giugno 2015, n. 105.	DM 29 settembre 2016, n. 200
Testo unico in materia ambientale.	Legislative Decree 152/2006 and subsequent amendments

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 19 of 314	Rev. 02

BP0	BASIC PRINCIPLES	INTRODUCTION
------------	-------------------------	---------------------

<p>Basilicata Region - Favorable Judgment of AIA environmental compatibility and landscape authorization of the Tempa Rossa Project.</p>	<p>DGR 1888 19/12/11</p>
<p>External Emergency Plan Total EP Italia SpA Tempa Rossa Oil Centre Plant in Corleto Perticara - year 2019.</p>	<p>http://www.prefettura.it/potenza/consentimenti/Permessi/centro_olio_tempa_rossa_total_ep_italia_di_corleto_perticara.-7482024.htm</p>
<p>External Emergency Plan Total EP Italia SpA Tempa Rossa LPG Centre Plant in Corleto Perticara - year 2019.</p>	<p>http://www.prefettura.it/potenza/consentimenti/Permessi/gpl_tempa_rossa_di_guardia_perticara-7526181.htm</p>
<p>Memorandum of Understanding with the Region and Prefecture in the event of pollution events (AIA - Prescription 14).</p>	<p>http://wat.corp.local/sites/s485/en-US/Documents/SEVESO/Protocollo_intesa_prefettura_reg_total_signed_annex.pdf</p>

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 20 of 314	Rev. 02

BP1	BASIC PRINCIPLES	DESCRIPTION OF THE PLANT
------------	-------------------------	---------------------------------

BP1 - DESCRIPTION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT

Description of the Tempa Rossa Oil Centre

Within the Mining Concession “Gorgoglione”, the production sites called Tempa Rossa include:


- the **Tempa Rossa Oil Centre**;
- 6 wells with relative wellpad;
- an LPG storage and loading Centre, called Tempa Rossa Centro LPG;
- 6 Flowlines to send the crude oil extracted from the wells to the Oil Centre. The flowline from PT1 includes a block valve station to close the flowline in case of leak.
- 5 pipelines known as the “Bretella”, from the Oil Centre to the LPG Centre (and vice versa) or to the Corleto Tie-In (and vice versa). In particular, the treated and stabilized crude oil is sent to the Taranto refinery (through the SOM underground pipeline). The pipeline for the transport of stabilized crude oil from the Oil Centre to the Corleto Tie-In includes two sectioning systems (line valves) called BVS (Block Valve Station).
- a connection node for the pipelines for the export and import of natural gas (connection with the SNAM Rete Gas pipeline) and for the export of stabilized oil to the SOM pipeline called Corleto Tie-In.
- A storage area for chemical additives and lubricating oils in the area called Dumping Area 5.

The Tempa Rossa Oil Centre is located in:


**Location Municipal road of Matina,
Contrada Acqua di Maggio,
85012, Corleto Perticara (PZ).**

The altitude and geographical coordinates (WGS84 / ETRF2000) of the plant are indicated below:

**Longitude: 40 ° 24 '33.14" N
Latitude: 16 ° 05 '07.26" E
Altitude asl: 1050 m.**

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 21 of 314	Rev. 02

BP1	BASIC PRINCIPLES	DESCRIPTION OF THE PLANT
-----	------------------	--------------------------




The crude oil extracted from the wells is processed inside the Oil Centre and sent to Taranto refinery. LPG is sent to LPG Centre (Via Bretella) and stored in bullets, to be downloaded to trucks. The methane is sent to Corleto Tie-In (gas section) to be injected in SRG national grid. The recovered liquid sulfur is stored to Oil Centre in dedicated tank and then downloaded to trucks.

The fluid coming from each of the well areas (consisting of a three-phase mixture of crude oil containing H_2S at a maximum of 8% in mol%), is sent to the plants of the Oil Centre via a dedicated underground “flowline” line.

In the Cento Olio, crude oil, associated gas, and production water are treated respectively in the process units listed below:


Unit 10	6 wells and associated Flowlines at the Centro Olio entrance and manifold
Unit 24	Crude oil separation / Heating and cooling
Unit 25	Crude treatment and stabilization
Unit 26	Crude storage and shipping, including fiscal metering. There are 2 crude oil storage tanks each with a capacity of 26000 m ³
Unit 30	Gas Compression
Unit 31	Low pressure gas compression
Unit 32	Gas sweetening
Unit 33	Sulfur recovery
Unit 34	LPG recovery
Unit 35	Gas drying and mercury removal
Unit 36	Dew point facilities
Unit 37	Export gas compression
Unit 38	LPG export line and fiscal metering
Unit 40	Water treatment

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 22 of 314	Rev. 02

BP1	BASIC PRINCIPLES	DESCRIPTION OF THE PLANT
------------	-------------------------	---------------------------------

Auxiliary units and utilities are:

Unit 01	Fire extinguishing system
Unit 05	Emergency Diesel Generator
Unit 44	Drainage system
Unit 45	Slop-Oil system
Unit 49	Flare systems
Unit 54	Wastewater treatment
Unit 60	Fuel System-Gas
Unit 61	Service / instrument air system
Unit 62	Nitrogen production, storage, and distribution system
Unit 63	Diesel storage system
Unit 64	Steam and electric power production system
Unit 65	Chemical injection system
Unit 66	Cooling water circuit
Unit 67	Demineralized and drink water system
Unit 68	Steam and condensate recovery system.





TotalEnergies EP Italia

Company Management System

INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE

2-PR-QHSE-022

Date 15/12/2021


Page 23 of 314

Rev. 02


BP1

BASIC PRINCIPLES

DESCRIPTION OF THE PLANT



This document is the property of TotalEnergies EP ITALIA; it must not be reproduced or transmitted to others without the TotalEnergies EP ITALIA authorization.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 24 of 314	Rev. 02

BP2	BASIC PRINCIPLES	LEVEL OF RESPONSE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE EMERGENCY
------------	-------------------------	--

BP2 - LEVELS OF RESPONSE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE EMERGENCY

Levels of Emergency Response

Emergency situations are classified according to their real or potential severity, i.e., according to the potential evolution of the situation with respect to the detection of the event.

With respect to the potential hazardous scenarios, 2 distinct temporal conditions are identified to classify the emergency and the consequent reaction to be implemented:

- ▶ **State of Alert**
- ▶ **State of Emergency**


The **State of Alert** is configured starting from the presence of a potential accident situation defined by:

- a report directly from the field of an event that can quickly escalate into a serious accident;
- from the occurrence of a significant deviation from normal operating conditions with the potential to evolve towards a serious accident situation.

In the event of a State of Alert, the **RSES** verifies and monitors the situation, as well as with the adoption of **precautionary measures** for the management of a probable emergency situation and for the mitigation of potential consequences.

The **State of Emergency** occurs in the **presence of ongoing events** potentially capable of generating consequences inside or outside the Oil Centre.

To support the RSES for the assessment of the Alert / Emergency state, shall be refer to the Evaluation Matrix of actual and potential severity levels/consequences of HSE Events as per CR-GR-HSE-801 and Seveso Procedure (2-PR -QHSE-013).

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 25 of 314	Rev. 02

BP2	BASIC PRINCIPLES	LEVEL OF RESPONSE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE EMERGENCY
------------	-------------------------	--


The following table represents the evaluation matrix of Actual and Potential Severity Level/Consequences of HSE Event (CR-GR-HSE-801):

Severity Level	TEPIT Response Level	Severity class	Type of Consequences			
			People	Environment	Material or Production	Media ¹
1	Level 1	Minor	First aid.	Temporary exceedance of an emissions standard; accidental spillage below the Group's statistical reporting threshold.	< 20 k€	No reaction.
2		Moderate	Recordable incident without lost time, medical treatment including restricted work.	Very localized pollution with minimal impact on the environment.	20 k€ - 200 k€	Local media. Comments on local or national media websites. Information on social networks (Facebook, Twitter, discussion forums, etc.) in the local language(s).
3	Level 2	Serious	Recordable incident with lost time, including temporary disability (without permanent disability).	Pollution of small area with limited impact on the environment.	200 k€ - 2 m€	"Notices" in the national media + press agency dispatch(es). Negative comments on social networks and/or intervention by national influencers ² in the local language(s) or the Group's official languages ³ .
4	Level 3	Very serious	Internal: permanent disability or a fatality.	Pollution with significant environmental impact.	2 m€ - 10 m€	"Report" in the national media. Numerous negative comments on social networks and/or interventions by national influencers, in the local language(s) or the Group's official languages
5		Catastrophic	External: injuries among local population.	Large-scale pollution in ecosystems of recognized ecological interest.	10 m€- 100 m€	Report" in international media. Negative comments on social networks and/or intervention by international influencers.
6		Disastrous	Transport or security related third-party fatality.	Pollution with massive and lasting consequences for vast ecosystems of high ecological interest.	> 100m€	Reuse of the event by personalities (political, NGOs, etc.) followed by negative mobilization.

1 Media: written press, radio, TV

2 Influencers: more than 500 followers on Facebook or Twitter


3 Official Group languages: English and French

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 26 of 314	Rev. 02

BP2	BASIC PRINCIPLES	LEVEL OF RESPONSE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE EMERGENCY
------------	-------------------------	--

Three (3) levels of Emergency Response are then defined as summarized in the following diagram:

Description	Level	Actions	Communications
<p>Consequences minors only inside the establishment for things and / or people.</p> <p>Events with automatic activation of internal PA/GA alarm with possible perception outside the establishment.</p> <p>The means available on site are adequate to be able to solve the problem quickly.</p>	LEVEL 1	<p>→ Alert in CCR. → RSES informed. → First Intervention Team prepares. → Reconnaissance in the plant on request RSES.</p> <p>PEI → Activation of the ACP crisis cell if necessary. → RSES informs the ICP Director.</p>	<p>→ The ICP Director decides to send, through the ICP crisis cell, communications to the authorities according to the State of ATTENTION of the PEE:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ via email PEC and telephone - FO10 PEC - PEE Model n.1 ➤ If the PEE ATTENTION STATE is not activated, communications are managed according to the 2-PR-017-QHSE and 2.-PR-QHSE-013.
<p>Consequences moderate only inside the establishment for things and / or people.</p> <p>Events with possible perception outside the establishment.</p> <p>Site support from the TEPIT branch is required.</p>		<p>PEI → Activation of the ACP crisis cell. → Activation of the ICP crisis cell.</p> <p>PEE → Activation of the ATTENTION STATE.</p>	<p>→ The ICP Director, through the ICP crisis cell, sends the communications to the authorities for ACTIVATION of the State of ATTENTION of the PEE:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ via email PEC and telephone - FO10 PEC - PEE Model n.1
<p>Consequences relevant only inside the establishment for things and / or people.</p> <p>Events with certain perception outside the establishment.</p> <p>Events with possible development towards scenarios with external effects.</p> <p>Site support from the TEPIT Branch or other entities within the TotalEnergies Group is required.</p>		<p>PEI → Activation of the ACP crisis cell. → Activation of ICP / CMC crisis cells.</p> <p>PEE → Activation of the PRE-ALARM STATUS. → PA/GA activation for external alarm upon Authority request (continuous sound).</p>	<p>→ The ICP Director, through the ICP crisis cell, sends communications to the authorities for ACTIVATION PRE-ALARM State of the PEE:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ via email PEC and telephone - FO10 PEC - PEE Model n.1.
<p>Relevant consequences outside the establishment for things, environment and / or people.</p> <p>The impact on public opinion has repercussions on the public image of the branch, and therefore on the image of the TotalEnergies Group.</p> <p>Site support is required from the Public Authorities, the TEPIT branch, or the TotalEnergies Group.</p>	LEVEL 3	<p>PEI → Activation of the ACP crisis Cell. → Activation of ICP / CMC crisis cells.</p> <p>PEE → Activation of the EMERGENCY-ALARM STATUS. → The Gestore activates the PA/GA directly or at the request of the Authorities for external alarm</p>	<p>→ The ICP Director, through the ICP crisis cell, sends the communications to the Authorities for ACTIVATION EMERGENCY-ALARM STATUS of the PEE:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ via email PEC and telephone - FO10 PEC - PEE Model n.2.


 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 27 of 314	Rev. 02

BP2	BASIC PRINCIPLES	LEVEL OF RESPONSE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE EMERGENCY
-----	------------------	---

TotalEnergies' organizational structure in emergency management

The organization of TotalEnergies' emergency in response to incidental events that may occur within the plant is carried out in accordance with the criteria of the **IMS - Incident Management System**.


The IMS includes a set of proven organizational and management principles. In particular, the IMS makes it possible to develop the organizational elements, a management structure, terminology, and operating procedures common to other TotalEnergies' branches and establishments.



Emergency management takes place through the following crisis cells:

- an "Advanced Command Post on Site" (ACP);
- an "Incident Command Post" (ICP);
- a "Crisis Management Cell" (CMC).

If emergency management requires skills and resources not available in TEPIT, the CMC crisis cell contacts the **Country Crisis Management Cell (CCMC)** of TIS (TotalEnergies Italia Servizi) and the **Crisis Support Cell (CSC)** of the TotalEnergies Group.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 28 of 314	Rev. 02

BP2	BASIC PRINCIPLES	LEVEL OF RESPONSE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE EMERGENCY
------------	-------------------------	--


ACP "Advanced Command Post on Site"

The organization of the emergency for the **Advanced Command Post on the Site** is based on the intervention and emergency response team located at the Oil Centre.


The Advanced Command Post on Site has the following functions, under the leadership of the **RSES**, responsible of ERP activation, which assumes the functions of **On Scene Commander (OSC)**:

- ▶ check the coordination of the operations in progress within the plant (**Field Coordination**).
- ▶ Secure the installations to avoid the escalation of the emergency (**Plant Safety**).
- ▶ Provide first aid and evacuate the injured if possible (**First Intervention - Medical Aid**).
- ▶ Control access to the site and make sure that all staff and visitors have gathered at the Muster Points by checking of the POB (**Access Control and POB**).
- ▶ Use first aid equipment and activate fire protection means (non-automatic means, fixed or mobile means, remotely or locally activated) (**First Intervention - Fire Fighting**).
- ▶ Communicate with the ICP crisis cell in case of activation of the External Emergency procedures. Coordinates with the external rescue team sent to the plant, if activated (**External Emergency and External Support**), and collects information if the organization of the PCA (Posto di Comando avanzato as per PEE) if requested.
- ▶ Regularly assess the emergency and report to the Incident Commander (**Communication with ICP crisis cell**), also through the ICP/ACP FOPS Liaison Officer.
- ▶ Organize the evacuation plan from the site if necessary (**Evacuation**).

The organizational structure of ACP crisis cell is shown below:

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 29 of 314	Rev. 02

BP2	BASIC PRINCIPLES	LEVEL OF RESPONSE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE EMERGENCY
------------	-------------------------	--



The **On-Scene Commander** is the person in charge of managing the emergency inside the plant, this role is covered by the **RSES**. In case of his absence, unavailability, his designated substitute is the **Operating Authority**. During night shift, his designated substitute is the **Shift Supervisor** that assumes the role of the RSES and the Intervention Leader until they reach the Site (within 30 minutes).

The ACP crisis cell meets in the Emergency Management Room of Area N. If the meeting of the ACP crisis cell at the Emergency Management Room in Area N is not possible (e.g., Fire in Area N, canteen or workshop, SR13), the On-Scene Commander identifies another place (for example the meeting room at Technical Building SS1) and communicates it to the members of the ACP crisis cell via PA/GA and to the ICP Commander or ICP/ACP FOPS Liaison Officer.

The first member of the ACP crisis cell that reaches the ACP Emergency Management Room uses the "**FO2 - 1 FIRST ARRIVAL CHECK LIST**" module. At the entry of ACP Emergency Management Room each member shall badge on specific badge reader placed there, in order to have the correct status of POB at site, including ACP crisis cell members present in the Emergency Management Room.

Each member of the ACP crisis cell who is present in the ACP Emergency Management Room shall register his presence on the form "**FO1-1 MEMBERS OF THE ACP CRISIS CELL**".


BP2	BASIC PRINCIPLES	LEVEL OF RESPONSE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE EMERGENCY
------------	-------------------------	--


ICP "Incident Command Post"

The organization of the emergency of the **Incident Command Post** crisis cell allows to give support to the ACP crisis cell.

In particular, the ICP crisis cell has the scope of guaranteeing assistance to the site and anticipate means in the event of an accident (**Tactical Response**).

The management of the emergency by the ICP Crisis Cell takes place through the **Incident Management Team (IMT)** and according to the **IMS principles** ("P" Planning and FISA Method) presented in the BP10 sheet.



 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 31 of 314	Rev. 02

BP2	BASIC PRINCIPLES	LEVEL OF RESPONSE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE EMERGENCY
------------	-------------------------	--

The **Incident Management Team** composition is based on four essential functions under the **Command** function and coordinated by the **Incident Commander: Operations, Planning, Logistics and Finance**.

Each of these functions is represented by an organizational section and is divided into other roles and functions based on the organization of the branch. Each function is associated with an internationally recognized and adopted color code.

The functions of each section can be summarized as follows:

Command: The Incident Commander is responsible for all activities in the management of the emergency and has the function of identifying priorities, establishing the objectives to be achieved and the strategies to be followed for managing the situation. The IC may decide to assign some responsibilities to other individuals who must, however, refer to him directly and continuously. The IC is responsible for all aspects of the response including goal development and operations management. The Command function is carried out by the **Incident Commander** who is the **Director of the ICP Crisis Cell**. For the Oil Centre, the person in charge of this function is the **Gestore** pursuant to Legislative Decree 105/2015, in case of absence a delegate is designated as per on-duty planning.

For the management of the emergency inside the plant, the Incident Commander has full authority to manage the response.

In case of activation of the External Emergency Response Plan (see BP11), the coordination of the response to the external emergency is carried out by the Responsible Authority (Prefect of Potenza) in liaison with the Gestore-Incident Commander. An internal referent shall be sent to the external PCA: this role is covered by the Local/Regional Authorities Liaison.

For major or large-scale accidents (Major Accidents), the Incident Commander is supported by the Local / Regional Authority Liaison and by the ICP/ACP FOPS Liaison Officer.

For accidents involving serious injuries or victims, the Incident Commander is supported by the Victim / Injured Next of Kin Assistance Officer for the management of assistance to families and next of kin.

The Command function is identified with the color **WHITE**.


Operations: The personnel of the "Operations" section is responsible for managing tactical operations during the incident to achieve key objectives such as personal safety, environmental protection, fire containment and protection of the property. It also ensures a direct link between emergency management objectives and the response actions taken on site by the ACP crisis cell.

In particular, the Operations section shall:

- Assist in the development of the operations response strategies and tactics of the Incident Action Plan.
- Oversee the execution of the operational part of the Action Plan.
- Maintain close contact with the situation in the field and provide technical assistance for the safeguarding of the plants.
- Request resources to support tactical operations through the Logistics section.
- Provide the Incident Commander with reports on the situation and status of the resources in the field and request the upgrading of the site teams, or their rotation, if the emergency persists.

The Operations section is identified with color **RED**.

Planning: is responsible for preparing the Incident Action Plan and collecting information on the state of resources and the general state of the incident. The "Planning" section is responsible for collecting, evaluating, and distributing tactical information in relation to the emergency situation. This information is needed to understand the current situation, predict a probable escalation of incidents, and prepare alternative strategies to mitigate the. During an incident, the Planning section maintains a continuous assessment of the state of the situation and the factors that may influence the response, e.g., meteorological conditions, zone of dispersion of gaseous or liquid releases, risk of fire,

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 32 of 314	Rev. 02

BP2	BASIC PRINCIPLES	LEVEL OF RESPONSE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE EMERGENCY
------------	-------------------------	--

The Planning section is identified with the color **BLUE**.

Logistics: has the scope of providing the resources, services and means required by the incident response activities. The Logistics section coordinates and analyses requests for additional resources and services in the form of personnel, facilities, IT support, specialist materials, machinery, products, and other additional rescue vehicles.

The Logistics section is identified with the color **YELLOW**.

Finance: is responsible for financial controls, tenders and claims management. This section provides monitoring of all expenses and cost registration for personnel, equipment, and response resources. Accidents often involve claims for property damage, business interruptions, or other issues such as health or medical claims, all of which are handled by this section. Within the ICP crisis cell this section is identified as the Finance and Administration Officer on the site. If necessary, a functional link is established with the Finance and Insurance function of the CMC cell.

The Finance section is identified with the color **GREEN**.

The ICP crisis cell interacts with the ACP crisis cell via the On-Scene Commander.

OSC/RSES < = > ICP Director or ICP/ACP FOPS Liaison Officer


The ICP crisis cell interacts with the CMC crisis cell via the CMC Director.

ICP Director < = > CMC Director

The ICP crisis cell meets in the ICP Emergency Management Room of TEPIT Offices in Guardia Perticara, or through a dedicated virtual room "ICP" available in TEAMS to manage and coordinate emergency it is impossible to reach the ICP Emergency Room, (e.g., snow events or adverse weather conditions). (See **BP0**).

The first member of the ICP crisis cell to reach the ICP Emergency Management Room uses the form "**FO2 - 1 FIRST ARRIVAL CHECK LIST**".

Each member of the ICP crisis cell who is present in the ICP Emergency Management Room shall register his presence on the form "**FO1 -2 MEMBERS OF THE ICP CRISIS CELL**".


 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 33 of 314	Rev. 02

BP2	BASIC PRINCIPLES	LEVEL OF RESPONSE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE EMERGENCY
------------	-------------------------	--

CMC "Crisis Management Cell"

The **Crisis Management Cell** is composed of TEPIT staff.

The CMC crisis cell of TEPIT is assisted for some roles by TotalEnergies Italia Servizi (TIS), a company of TotalEnergies that provides transversal services to the various TotalEnergies business units present in Italy, including TEPIT. TIS through the CCMC (**C**ountry **C**risis **M**anagement **C**ell), provides support for TEPIT emergency management that requires skills and resources not available in TEPIT, according to the following scheme.




The roles and functions of the CCMC crisis cell are described in the document “L2-CIA-PR-002 - Country Crisis Plan” drawn up and managed by TotalEnergies Italia Servizi (TIS).

The CMC crisis cell has the aim of guaranteeing the support and "Strategic assistance" functions, which consists in evaluating the possibility that the technical incident can turn into a crisis, immediate or delayed over time, and attempting to avoid it or limit the impacts with preventive actions.

Specifically, the significant functions supported by the Crisis Cell CMC are the following:

- Non-local communication consists in the management of external information supports (Media/Journalists, National Authorities, TotalEnergies Group, Partners) and internal (TEPIT collaborators).
- Legal and insurance assistance guarantees assistance on legal issues related to emergency management and provides for the availability of insurance experts to help assess the consequences on the impact of an accident.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 34 of 314	Rev. 02

BP2	BASIC PRINCIPLES	LEVEL OF RESPONSE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE EMERGENCY
------------	-------------------------	--

- Financial and contractual assistance: in support of the Finance / Administration function of the ICP crisis cell, it consists in ensuring that any cash requirements are met and identifying additional financial resources or evaluates and advises the ICP crisis cell on the contractual aspects of the emergency.

The CMC crisis cell, through **the CMC Director**, allows coordination with the **TEPIT Managing Director-CEO**, as well as Country Chair Italy, with the **Crisis Support Cell of the TotalEnergies Group (CSC)**, gathered at the Paris office and other national authorities not managed by the ICP crisis cell.

For the above functions, the CMC Director can also request the support of the CCMC crisis cell according to the Country Crisis Plan - L2-CIA-PR-002.

The CMC crisis cell interacts with the ICP crisis cell receiving information from the ICP Director.

The CMC crisis cell contacts the CCMC crisis cell via:


- the Country CMC Deputy Director during normal weekly working hours,
- the Standby Duty Officer outside normal weekly working hours.

The CMC Crisis cell meets at the CMC Crisis Management Room of TotalEnergies Offices in Milan, or through a dedicated virtual room "CMC" available in TEAMS to manage and coordinate emergency it is impossible to reach the ICP Emergency Room, (e.g., snow events or adverse weather conditions). (See **BP0**).

The CCMC crisis cell meets at the same crisis room of CMC in the Milan office.

The first member of the CMC crisis cell to reach the Emergency Management Room of Milan uses the form "**FO2 - 1 FIRST ARRIVAL CHECK LIST**".

Each member of the CMC crisis cell who is present in the Emergency Management Room of Milan shall register his presence on the form "**FO1 -3 MEMBERS OF THE CMC CRISIS CELL**".

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 35 of 314	Rev. 02

BP3	BASIC PRINCIPLES	ROLES ASSIGNMENT & ON-DUTY MANAGEMENT
------------	-------------------------	--

BP3 - ROLES ASSIGNMENT AND ON-DUTY MANAGEMENT

Each crisis cell is assigned to a role Owner. Substitutes are defined for each role. In case of absence, each owner designates their own substitute.

The members of the Owner and Substitute roles of each crisis cell are appointed by the TEPIT Managing Director through a specific **Organization Note** also available on the TEPIT Intranet site.

A shared folder on the TEPIT server (W: \ Entity \ 120-CRISIS MANAGEMENT) and in TEAMS channel "Emergency Management Tempa Rossa" contains the documents for emergency management and the file "Emergency_Cells_On_Duty_Personnel", in order to identify on-duty people with the names and telephone number of the owners and substitutes of the role, for each shift.

The Crisis Cells roster it is constantly updated by each function owner to indicate people (Owner or Substitute) on duty.


If at the time of activation of the Internal Emergency Response Plan, both the owner and the substitute are absent, the Director of the crisis cell appoints another person from the branch staff.

The roles of the Crisis cell members are defined in the function sheets, section Job Tickets.

Each person participating in the Emergency Response Plan is responsible for knowing their role.

In relation to the function requested in the emergency, there are the following obligations of the statute:

- **ROT:** rotational, work 7 days a week and presence inside the plant is ensured during 12 hours of the day. During the night, the members of duty remain in site vicinity with intervention time in 30 minutes, for the entire duration of the rotation.
- **REP:** availability, work 5 days a week, availability 24 hours a day, available on call to reach the ICP/CMC Emergency Management Room within 120 minutes, for the entire duration of availability.
- **DISP:** availability, work 5 days a week, availability 24 hours a day, available on call (telephone and computer), in Italy, for the entire duration of the availability.

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 36 of 314	Rev. 02

BP3	BASIC PRINCIPLES	ROLES ASSIGNMENT & ON-DUTY MANAGEMENT
------------	-------------------------	--

ACP Crisis Cell composition

The composition of the ACP crisis cell is described below:

ACP TEAM		
STATUTE	ROLE	POSITION OWNER
ROT	ON-SCENE COMMANDER	RSES
ROT	INSTALLATION SHUTDOWN LEADER	Operating Authority
ROT	ACP EVENT LOGGER	Maintenance Superintendent
ROT	MUSTER AND EVACUATION LEADER	Leader of Security (contractor) on duty
ROT	INTERVENTION LEADER	HSE Superintendent
ROT	PROCESS AND REPORTING OFFICER	Field Engineer
-	MEDICAL TEAM LEADER	Medical Doctor on duty

It meets in the ACP Emergency Management Room Area N.

The ACP Team is normally present at the Tempa Rossa Oil Centre during 12 hours of the day. During the night, the members of the ACP team on-duty remain in site vicinity with intervention time in **30 minutes**.


The First Intervention Team made up of personnel always present in the Plant:

FIRST INTERVENTION TEAM – FIRE FIGHTING & FIRST AID TEAM (24/7)		
ROLE	POSITION	Number
SITE INTERVENTION TEAM LEADER - FIREFIGHTING	TEPIT operator	1
FIRST INTERVENTION TEAM - FIREFIGHTING	TEPIT operator	4
	GMC operator	2
FIRST INTERVENTION TEAM – FIRST AID	Nurse	1
	Ambulance driver	1

The First Intervention Team-Firefighting reaches the Firefighting Room (located on SS1 ground floor) and proceed on site, at the place of the event, after RSES demand.

The members of the Intervention Team-Firefighters, are qualified to fill that role by specific training, are appointed by the TEPIT Managing Director and present within the Register "Intervention Team Members".

In addition, for the safety of the installations during the emergency, the following team supports the RSES:

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 37 of 314	Rev. 02

BP3	BASIC PRINCIPLES	ROLES ASSIGNMENT & ON-DUTY MANAGEMENT
------------	-------------------------	--

CENTRAL CONTROL ROOM TEAM (24/7)		
ROLE	POSITION	Number
CCR SHUTDOWN LEADER	Shift Supervisor	1
CCR PANEL OPERATOR	CCR operator	2


It meets in the Oil Centre Control Room.

ICP Crisis Cell composition

The composition of the ICP crisis cell is described below.

ICP - CORE TEAM			
STATUTE	SECTION	ROLE	POSITION OWNER
REP	COMMAND	ICP DIRECTOR - INCIDENT COMMANDER	Asset Director Gestore D. Lgs. 105/2015
REP	COMMAND	LOCAL/REGIONAL AUTHORITY LIAISON	HSSE Director
REP	COMMAND	ICP/ACP FOPS LIAISON OFFICER	Production Director
REP	PLANNING	HSE OFFICER	Head of the Environment Department
REP	PLANNING	ICP EVENT LOGGER	Fluid Environment & Operation Safety Leader
REP	LOGISTICS	LOGISTICS AND GENERAL SERVICES OFFICER	Head of Logistic & Facilities
REP	FINANCE	SITE FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION OFFICER	Asset Business Performance & Geoinformation
REP	OPERATIONS	MAINTENANCE SITE SUPPORT OFFICER	Head of Maintenance Department
ICP - STAND-BY TEAM			
STATUTE	SECTION	ROLE	POSITION OWNER
REP	OPERATIONS	EXPORT / RELATIONS WITH ENI OFFICER	Export Coordination
ROT	OPERATIONS	DRILLING/WELLS EXPERT	Drilling Superintendent
REP	COMMAND	INJURED/VICTIMS'FAMILIES/NEXT OF KIN ASSISTANCE OFFICER	Head of Human Resources Department
DISP	PLANNING	MARKETING AND SHIPPING OFFICER	JV Representative
DISP	LOGISTICS	TELECOM & INFORMATIC SERVICES (IT) OFFICER	IT & Telecommunication Services

It meets in the ICP Emergency Management Room at the TEPIT Offices of Guardia Perticara.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 38 of 314	Rev. 02

BP3	BASIC PRINCIPLES	ROLES ASSIGNMENT and DUTY PRINCIPLES
------------	-------------------------	---

CMC Crisis Cell composition


The composition of the CMC crisis cell is described below.

STATUTE	ROLE	POSITION OWNER
REP	CMC DIRECTOR	Institutional Affairs, External Relations and CSR Director
DISP	RELATIONS WITH PARTNERS - JV	Head of the Joint Venture Department
DISP	FINANCE AND INSURANCE	Finance Director

It meets at the CMC Emergency Management Room at the TotalEnergies Offices in Milan.

CCMC Crisis Cell composition

The roles and functions of the CCMC crisis cell are described in the document “L2-CIA-PR-002 - Country Crisis Plan” drawn up and managed by TotalEnergies Italia Servizi (TIS).

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 39 of 314	Rev. 02

BP4	BASIC PRINCIPLES	ALERT SCHEME
------------	-------------------------	---------------------

BP4 - ALERT SCHEME

The Internal Emergency Response Plan is activated only in case of a significant accident, or in case the **RSES** assesses the risk of escalation to a major accident. For example:

- leakage of toxic products or gases, a fire or explosion posing a serious risk to people, the environment, and the asset.
- a serious medical case involving multiple people, or death.
- a media case involving the image of the Company.

The Internal Emergency Response Plan provides the activation of the following crisis cells:

- ▶ "Advanced Command Post on Site", at the ACP Emergency Management Room (Oil Centre Tempa Rossa, Administrative Office-Area N).
- ▶ "Incident Command Post", at the ICP Emergency Management Room of TEPIT Offices in Guardia Perticara and, if necessary, at Taranto Offices.
- ▶ "Crisis Management Cell", at the CMC Emergency Management Room of TotalEnergies Offices in Milan.

In addition to Emergency Management Rooms, dedicated **virtual rooms** for ACP/ICP/CMC crisis cells are available in TEAMS to manage and coordinate the emergency. (See **BP0**).

The **ACP** crisis cell:

- is activated automatically by the PA/GA, with confirmation by the **RSES**, or by his designated substitute. In case of unavailability, his designated substitute is the **Operating Authority**. During the night shift, his substitute is the **Shift Supervisor** that assumes responsibility until the RSES, and Intervention Leader reach the Site.
- is activated upon decision of the RSES also for events which the PA/GA automatic alert system is not activated.

In case of activation of the ACP crisis cell, the RSES:

- ➔ assumes the role of **On-Scene Commander**.
- ➔ Promptly informs the **Gestore**.

The **ICP** crisis cell:

- is activated upon decision of the **Gestore** based on information provided by the OSC.

In case of activation of the ICP crisis cell, the Gestore:


- ➔ informs the **CMC Director**, if necessary.
- ➔ Promptly inform the **TEPIT Managing Director**.

The **CMC** crisis cell:

- it is activated on the decision of the **CMC Director** also based on the request of the ICP Director.

The activation of the ICP and CMC crisis cells shall be carried out only if the resources available for the ACP crisis cell are not sufficient to quickly control the event, or if there is a risk of escalation to major accidents, or if the involvement of the public authority is necessary.


In case of significant accident within the Oil Centre, the **TEPIT Managing Director** also Country Chair Italia is informed by the ICP Director or by the CMC Director.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	<i>INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE</i>			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 40 of 314	Rev. 02

BP4	BASIC PRINCIPLES	ALERT SCHEME
------------	-------------------------	---------------------

Once alerted, the TEPIT Managing Director also Country Chair Italia, she/he informs the CSC Director.

The CMC Director maintains links with the CSC Director and the TEPIT Managing Director.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 41 of 314	Rev. 02

BP4	BASIC PRINCIPLES	ALERT SCHEME
------------	-------------------------	---------------------

Warning and emergency devices

The Tempa Rossa Oil Centre is equipped with alarm communication devices designed to be manually or automatically activated, in the event of unfavorable conditions with the purpose to “raise the alert” with audible/visual alarm.

In detail, the communication systems that can be used to communicate the alert or other information during emergency situations are the following:

- ▶ **Group of luminous (flashing) and acoustic (sirens) alarms**, linked to the PA/GA, with automatic or manual activation (from the CCR, from the field via MACs or from the Fire & Gas System), with coverage over the entire area of the establishment.
- ▶ **Fixed Phone network (yellow telephones)** within the plant areas with the possibility of immediately contacting the CCR by dialing a rapid emergency number (**number 100**).
- ▶ **Telephone network inside the buildings and in the CCR** for connection with the outside.
- ▶ **Two-way internal communication system with portable radios**, supplied to TEPIT operators and members of the first Intervention Team, of a type suitable for use in areas classified as explosive atmospheres.

The PA/GA system allows to generate an acoustic (siren) and optical (flashing) signal or to transmit a specific voice message in case of emergency from the CCR.

The acoustic signals generated by the PA/GA sirens for internal emergency are of three types:

1. General alarm (flammable gas - fire):

- ▶ Intermittent tone - 1000 Hz. 1 second on / 1 second off.
- ▶ Red light.
- ▶ Action: the staff leaves the operational activity and reaches the Muster Point according to the indications of the CCR.

2. Toxic alarm (toxic gas):


- ▶ Continuous Bi-tonal sound with variable frequency (1200/800 Hz) - 800Hz for 0.25 seconds and return to 1200Hz for 0.25 seconds.
- ▶ Blue light.
- ▶ Action: the staff leaves the operational activity and reaches the Muster Point wearing the escape mask.

3. A third siren associated with the **external emergency** is added to the internal emergency alarms described above:

- ▶ Continuous tone at a fixed frequency - 1000 Hz.

The external emergency alarm is activated by the CCR by order of the On-Scene Commander on the directive of the ICP Director (Gestore if present or his substitute).

It is the responsibility of every person present in the plant (Employees, Contractors, Visitors, etc.) to know the different alarm signals and what are the behaviors to be followed and the immediate actions to be taken in case of emergency. This information is transmitted to every person who accesses to the Plant through the HSE Induction provided at the first access to the Oil Centre.

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 42 of 314	Rev. 02

BP4	BASIC PRINCIPLES	ALERT SCHEME
------------	-------------------------	---------------------

All staff shall know the position and the routes to the muster point, which is indicated by appropriate exit signs. The Muster Points are also indicated in the layouts posted in various places of the plant.

Area N

Alarm from the Site

The PA/GA alarm of the plant is relayed inside the buildings of area N (Offices, Workshop, Canteen and Guard Post) also through the activation of specific flashing lights located in the corridors (red in case of fire or release of inflammable gas, blue in case of toxic gas release).

The people who are inside the buildings of Area N:

- in case of activation of the acoustic and visual alarm signal of toxic alarm (Continuous Bi-tonal sound and blue light) shall gather at the Canteen registering for the POB at the badge reader at the entrance (e-mustering).
- In case of activation of the acoustic and visual alarm signal of general alarm-flammable gas/fire (intermittent tone and red light) shall gather at the Muster Point in the car park of area N to register for the POB at the badge reader (e-mustering).

Depending on the situation, the RSES/OSC will request, also through the Muster and Evacuation Leader, the evacuation outside the Plant (see **BP7**).

Alarm inside the Area N

A specific additional red flashing light and alarm in case the fire occurred inside the buildings of Area N (Offices, Workshop, Canteen) is present for this scenario (as per following picture):




Fire Alarm inside the area N.

Toxic Alarm from Oil Centre.

Fire Alarm from Oil Centre.

The people who are inside the buildings of Area N shall gather the Muster Point in the car park of Area N to register for the POB (e-mustering).

Depending on the situation, the RSES/OSC will request, also through the Muster and Evacuation Leader, the evacuation outside the Plant (see **BP7**).

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 43 of 314	Rev. 02

BP4	BASIC PRINCIPLES	ALERT SCHEME
------------	-------------------------	---------------------

Actions in the event of an emergency being detected

INCIDENTAL EVENT

Any person within the Oil Centre who notices an incident such as fire / explosion / gas or oil leak shall:

- ▶ **move away from the accident site** and go to a safe place.
- ▶ **Raise the alarm in one of the following ways:**
 - call the CCR through one of the fixed field telephones (**Yellow Telephone - rapid emergency number 100**).
 - Call the CCR via a telephone outside the plant (**0971 965873**).
 - Inform the CCR via **radio**.
 - Activate a **Manual Call Point**, located in different points of the plant.
 - Alert the **Sorvegliante**.
- ▶ **Inform the Central Control Room** indicating:
 - the location and nature of the accident.
 - Your name and place where you are located.
 - All information about the injured or trapped person, if any.
- ▶ If it is safe to do so, if the person is adequately trained and if authorized by the CCR, try to manage the event using the emergency equipment present on site.
- ▶ If the incident cannot be safely controlled, leave the area (if it is in an enclosed area, close all doors behind you).
- ▶ Respond to the indications provided by the alarm system or Intercom - Public Address.

ACCIDENT (see also Annex **SR8**)

Any person who identifies an **injured person** shall:

- ▶ do not approach or move the victim unless necessary and safe to do so.
- ▶ Raise the alarm through the nearest means:
 - call the CCR (Yellow telephone - rapid emergency number 100).
 - Call the CCR by radio.
- ▶ Inform the CCR of the presence of an injured person as soon as possible, providing the following details:
 - the position of the injured person, identifying him if known.
 - The type of injury.
 - Your name and position.
- ▶ Carry out first aid only if trained or if strictly necessary.
- ▶ Assist the injured person until the arrival of the Medical Team and the First Intervention Team if the permanence in the area does not jeopardize their safety.


TERRORIST ATTACK (see also Annex **SR9**)

Anyone observing a potential **terrorist attack** shall:


- ▶ sound the alarm to attract the attention of nearby personnel or call the CCR (Yellow Telephone - rapid emergency number **100**).
- ▶ If not able to attract attention immediately, give the alarm through the nearest means:
 - call the CCR (Yellow telephone - rapid emergency number 100).
 - Call the CCR by radio.


BP4	BASIC PRINCIPLES	ALERT SCHEME
------------	-------------------------	---------------------

The Alert Scheme



BP4	BASIC PRINCIPLES	ALERT SCHEME
------------	-------------------------	---------------------




 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 46 of 314	Rev. 02

BP5	BASIC PRINCIPLES	NOTIFICATIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS
------------	-------------------------	---

BP5 - NOTIFICATIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS


The Internal Emergency Response Plan provides that notifications and communications outside TEPIT are carried out by the 3 crisis cells according to the following scheme:



The telephone numbers are indicated in the Annex "RE1 - Telephone numbers and useful contacts".

Formal communications with the Authorities as part of the External Emergency Plan are carried out through the forms **FO10** – "PEC Communication Modules External Emergency Plan" (ref. **BP11**).

For the notification and communication of the emergency the form **FO7** "Incident Status" is used.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 47 of 314	Rev. 02

BP5	BASIC PRINCIPLES	NOTIFICATIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS
------------	-------------------------	---

The contact between the site and the local/regional public authorities remains the ICP Crisis Cell: if necessary, any request for additional means is sent to the IC through the On-Scene Commander.

An exception is the request for **medical assistance** (118) which can be formulated by the Medical Team of the ACP Crisis Cell. However, in this eventuality, the ICP Director shall be promptly informed.


For **notifications** and **internal communications to crisis cells**:

- The On-Scene Commander ensures communication between the ACP and the ICP crisis cells, also through the ICP/ACP FOPS Liaison Officer.
- The ICP crisis cell interacts with the CMC crisis cell via the CMC Director.
- The CMC crisis cell contacts the CCMC crisis cell via:
 - the Country CMC Deputy Director during normal weekly working hours,
 - the Standby Duty Officer outside normal weekly working hours.

The communications between the crisis cells are carried out through the following means available, depending on their availability:

- ▶ Landline phone.
- ▶ Mobile phone.
- ▶ E-mail. There are email addresses dedicated to the emergency:
 - ➔ tepit.acp@totalenergies.com (ACP crisis cell).
 - ➔ tepit.icp@totalenergies.com (ICP crisis cell).
 - ➔ tepit.cmc@totalenergies.com (CMC crisis cell).
- ▶ Video Conference.
- ▶ Radio.
- ▶ Dedicated laptop.

Important internal messages are formalized through the **FO3** form “Message Transmission Cards”.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 48 of 314	Rev. 02

BP6	BASIC PRINCIPLES	INITIAL BRIEFING AND TIME OUT
------------	-------------------------	--------------------------------------

BP6 - INITIAL BRIEFING AND TIME OUT

This basic principle summarizes the elements useful to effectively conduct initial briefings and periodic time-outs.

► Purpose of the initial and regular briefings:

The main purpose of the briefings is to ensure that crisis cell members have access to the same level of information.

The initial briefing allows to determine a first report on the progress of the information and to list the activities of the team, immediately after the mobilization of the Crisis Cell members.

Subsequent briefings allow to summarize the events that occurred, and the information received (from the previous briefing) and to define the objectives of the work.

► Basic principles of regular briefings:


- **Limited duration:** 2 to 3 minutes maximum.
- **Participation of each member:** stop of the activities and participation of each member present in the crisis room.
- **Rigor in management and control:** keep conciseness, be essential, avoid wandering, control the time.
- **Regularity:** organize briefings on a regular basis, for example every half hour or at the beginning of each hour. This must be communicated by the Cell Director to the people present "time out in X minutes".
- **Planning:** at the end of each briefing, remember to plan the time for the next briefing.

► Main rules to follow during briefings - General:

- Time controller.
- Clearly distinguish main information from secondary information.
- Clearly distinguish consolidated elements from additional information.
- Don't get involved in troubleshooting.
- Ensure proper control of ongoing actions.
- Formalize the new actions to be put into practice.

► Main rules to be respected during briefings - ACP crisis cell:


- Inform the Intervention Team Leader that there will be a time-out in two (2) minutes via an alert notification: "In 2 minutes we will have a time-out"
- Ask each if they have more recent news or know other important facts.
- Open the time-out by announcing it verbally and ask everyone not to pick up the phone (or pick up the phone to inform people who will call after the timeout).
- Illustrate the status of the accident.
- Highlight unknown problems.
- Provide clear tasks to members of the Intervention Team.
- Make sure the actions are noted by the Event Logger on a white board: "pending actions".
- Check / request extra resources.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 49 of 314	Rev. 02

BP6	BASIC PRINCIPLES	INITIAL BRIEFING AND TIME OUT
------------	-------------------------	--------------------------------------

- Check / ask if there are other problems / requests.
- Provide extra time for the next "time out" (in the early hours or +/- every 15 minutes).
- Close the time-out by verbally announcing it.

The typical development of the time-out phases of an emergency is as follows:



 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 50 of 314	Rev. 02

BP7	BASIC PRINCIPLES	ALARM, ESCAPE, MUSTERING & EVACUATION MODES
------------	-------------------------	--


BP7 - ALARM, ESCAPE, MUSTERING AND EVACUATION MODES

In the event of activation of the PA/GA alarm, and in accordance with the PA/GA voice announcement, all personnel within the Tempa Rossa Oil Centre (except for the members of the ACP Team) shall suspend any activity in progress, secure the equipment and the workplace and reach the **Muster Point**.

DEFINED MUSTER POINTS

At Oil Centre, three Muster Points have been identified:

1. car park in area N (OC2), in the area outside the buildings.
2. Car park in area M (OC1), near the ENEL electrical substation.
3. Canteen inside Administrative Building Area N.



The Muster Points are identified by the following sign:



People gathered at the Muster Point shall not obstruct the rescue operations.

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 51 of 314	Rev. 02

BP7	BASIC PRINCIPLES	ALARM, ESCAPE, MUSTERING & EVACUATION MODES
------------	-------------------------	--

MUSTERING FROM THE PLANT AREAS

During the alert, each person who does not have a specific role in the emergency response joins the muster point, unless otherwise indicated through the PA/GA voice announcement.

The Muster Counter, is therefore responsible for counting the POB, identifying missing persons, activating the search for missing persons (charged to the first intervention team upon RSES request) and evacuation

MANAGEMENT OF THE POB (Personnel on Board)

The POB is the list of personnel presents on site. It is constantly updated by means of software and dedicated workstations (one present in the CCR and the other in the ACP Emergency Management Room).

Furthermore, once the Muster Point has been reached, each person must validate their presence by reading their identification badge on the special columns equipped at the Muster points (e-mustering).

It is not allowed to delegate the reading of one's badge.

The POB is used during the mustering and evacuation phases, to check people present and identify missing people.

GATHERING OF THE ACP CRISIS CELL

The members of the ACP crisis cell, except for the members of the First Intervention Team and the necessary staff in the CCR (Shift Supervisor and CCR Panel Operators), gather in the ACP Emergency Management Room in Area N. At the entrance to the ACP Emergency Management Room there is a badge reader for the POB.

The members of the First Intervention Team gather in the Firefighting Room (located on SS1 ground floor). Inside the Firefighting Room there is a badge reader for the POB.

The Intervention Team Leader ensures that all members of the Team are mustered before the intervention on site.

The personnel necessary to manage the emergency present in the CCR (Shift Supervisor and CCR Panel Operators) register through the badge reader located inside the CCR. Unnecessary personnel must leave the CCR and Technical Building/SS1 and reach the muster point (car park in area M) and register at the badge readers.

MUSTERING FOR STAFF PRESENT IN AREA N

Alarm from the Site

The people who are inside the buildings of Area N:

- in case of activation of the acoustic and visual alarm signal of toxic alarm (Continuous Bi-tonal sound and blue light) shall gather at the Canteen registering for the POB at the badge reader at the entrance (e-mustering).

Where the confinement inside buildings is required, it must be ensured that doors and windows (where present) are closed to prevent the entry of toxic and flammable gases that may be released from plant

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 52 of 314	Rev. 02

BP7	BASIC PRINCIPLES	ALARM, ESCAPE, MUSTERING & EVACUATION MODES
------------	-------------------------	--

areas. The presence of toxic and flammable gas detectors in the building air intakes and outside along the perimeter of the buildings allows monitoring of the external atmosphere.

- In case of activation of the acoustic and visual alarm signal of general alarm-flammable gas/fire (intermittent tone and red light) shall gather at the Muster Point in the car park of area N to register for the POB (e-mustering).

Depending on the situation, the RSES/OSC will request, also through the Muster and Evacuation Leader, the evacuation outside the Plant (see **BP4**).

Alarm inside the Area N

The people who are inside the buildings of Area N shall gather the Muster Point in the car park of Area N to register for the POB (e-mustering).

Depending on the situation, the RSES/OSC will request, also through the Muster and Evacuation Leader, the evacuation outside the Plant (see **BP4**).

SEARCH FOR MISSING PEOPLE

If some people are missing at the Muster Point, the On-Scene Commander could organize a back-up team to search for and rescue missing persons (Rescue Team). Search and rescue teams must be composed of at least 2 people: the number of teams mobilized depends on the POB.

EVACUATION

The OSC will decide when to perform a partial or complete evacuation of the plant based on the evolution of the emergency.

If the evacuation is announced, it will take place, in the manner communicated, through the two access points of the plant.

In case of complete evacuation, or abandonment of the site, a CCR operator will make PA announcements regarding the evacuation method, as per directive of the OSC.

EXTERNAL EMERGENCY ALARM

In the event of an emergency associated with a major accident, the **Gestore**, on the advice of the Direttore Tecnico dei Soccorsi (Fire Brigade) after consulting the Prefect, may request the OSC to activate the siren sound for the External Emergency. (see **BP2**).

This sound allows the population outside the plant to implement the protection measures established in the External Emergency Plan.

This alarm for external emergency is activated by the CCR by order of the On-Scene Commander on the directive of the ICP Director (Gestore or his Substitute).

The External Emergency siren is activated via a button on the PA/GA console in CCR.

The siren, being associated with a serious emergency, should be started after the activation of the PA/GA siren for General Alarm/Fire or Toxic Alarm. For the personnel inside the plant, the sound of the external emergency siren does not introduce any further provisions compared to the other PA/GA alarms and reiterates the request to go to the Muster Point.

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 53 of 314	Rev. 02

BP7	BASIC PRINCIPLES	ALARM, ESCAPE, MUSTERING & EVACUATION MODES
------------	-------------------------	--

The external emergency siren must not in any way activate the complete evacuation of the Site by exiting the fence.

The evacuation of personnel, or abandonment of the site, if necessary, will be communicated through the voice announcement of the PA/GA, on the directive of the OSC.

In summary:

(A) LISTENING TO THE PA/GA ALARM - GENERAL / FIRE / FLAMMABLE GAS:

- Audible alarm **signal: intermittent tone -1000Hz. 1 second on / 1 second off.**
 - Alarm in case of confirmed detection of Fire, Flammable gas, or another general emergency.
 - Visual alarm signal: light **Red** Flashing.
- ▶ The General alarm can be started automatically by the Fire & Gas system (Fire or Flammable Gas detection) or manually started from one of the PA access control panels.
 - ▶ **All personnel must go to the muster point.**
 - ▶ Emergencies are managed by the ACP crisis cell. Once the emergency is identified, staff will be informed of the situation and any action required.
 - ▶ To facilitate the verification of the POB, people present on site shall meet in an orderly manner to allow the Muster Counters to complete the count of people present at the Muster Points. People shall validate their presence using a badge reader on the special columns equipped at the Muster points (e-mustering).
 - ▶ The staff present in Area N, gathers at the Muster Point in the car park of area N to register for the POB (e-mustering). Depending on the situation, the RSES/OSC will request, also through the Mustering and Evacuation Leader if the ACP crisis cell has been activated, the re-entry inside the buildings, the stay in the muster area or the evacuation outside of the plant.
 - ▶ The people who are inside the buildings of Area N shall gather at the Muster Point in the car park of area N to register for the POB (e-mustering).
- Depending on the situation, the RSES/OSC will request, also through the Muster and Evacuation Leader the evacuation outside the Plant (see **BP4**).

(B) LISTENING TO THE PA/GA ALARM - TOXIC GAS:

- Audible alarm **signal: Continuous dual tone sound, 0.25 seconds at 800Hz and 0.25 seconds at 1200Hz.**
 - Alarm in case of confirmed Toxic Gas detection
 - Visual alarm signal: light **Blue** Flashing
- ▶ The toxic gas alarm can be started automatically from the Fire & Gas system or manually started from one of the PA access control panels.
 - ▶ **All personnel must proceed to the Muster Point wearing the escape mask.**
 - ▶ Emergencies are managed by the ACP crisis cell. Once the emergency is identified, staff will be informed of the situation and any action required.
 - ▶ To facilitate the verification of the POB, people present on site shall meet in an orderly manner to allow the Muster Counter to complete the count of people present at the Muster Points. People shall validate their presence using a badge reader on the special columns equipped at the Muster points (e-mustering).
 - ▶ The people who are inside the buildings of Area N shall gather at the Canteen registering for the POB at the badge reader at the entrance (e-mustering).

Depending on the situation, the RSES/OSC will request, also through the Muster and Evacuation Leader, the evacuation outside the Plant (see **BP4**).

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 54 of 314	Rev. 02


BP7	BASIC PRINCIPLES	ALARM, ESCAPE, MUSTERING & EVACUATION MODES
------------	-------------------------	--

(C) LISTENING TO THE PA/GA ALARM - EXTERNAL EMERGENCY - PEE SIREN:

→ Audible alarm signal: **Continuous sound at a fixed frequency at 1000 Hz.**

- ▶ The External Emergency signal (PEE Siren) is activated by the Central Control Room (manual button activation) at the request of the ICP Director (the Gestore or his substitute), through the OSC. (see **BP2**).
- ▶ All personnel shall proceed to the muster point and wear the escape mask if indicated during the PA announcement, pending further instructions. People must validate his presence by reading his identification badge on the special columns equipped at the Muster points (e-mustering).
- ▶ The personnel present in Area N, gather the Muster Point in the canteen of Area N in case of toxic gas alarm (Continuous dual tone sound and blue light). In case of general alarm fire/flammable gas they gather at the Muster Point in the car park of Area N. Registering their presence for the POB at the badge reader (e-mustering).

Depending on the situation, the RSES/OSC will request, also through the Muster and Evacuation Leader the re-entry inside the buildings, the maintenance of the garrison in the assembly area or the evacuation to the outside the plant.

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 55 of 314	Rev. 02

BP8	BASIC PRINCIPLES	MEDEVAC PROCEDURE
------------	-------------------------	--------------------------

BP8 - MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROCEDURES - MEDEVAC

The MEDEVAC procedure defines the arrangement for the medical evacuation of personnel present on site, in case of injury or illness from the site to public medical emergency facilities in Basilicata.


The TEPIT Medical Evacuation Procedure 3-PR-QHSE-019 is available on the TEPIT CMS.


The helipad, located in Area R of the Tempa Rossa Oil Centre, was designed to be used during MEDEVAC. Il rendezvous (with 118) is organized in Guardia Perticara Parking Area.

The procedure applies to all TEPIT employees and the Company's contractors, including visitors who may be present on the Tempa Rossa Site.

Public health emergency structures in Basilicata

The distances and times to reach the closest health facilities in Basilicata are as follows:



 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 56 of 314	Rev. 02


BP9	BASIC PRINCIPLES	MANAGEMENT OF THE RECOVERY PHASE
------------	-------------------------	---

BP9 - MANAGEMENT OF THE RECOVERY PHASE

This section describes the procedures relating to how to restore functions following a major accident, at the end of the emergency.

The management of the recovery of the plant functions includes the following phases:

- ▶ Securing the area (ACP crisis cell). It includes, if necessary, the intervention of workers (scaffolding, mechanical, electrical etc.) to ensure the final safety of the plant.
- ▶ Assistance to victims / injured and employees (ACP/ICP/CMC crisis cells).
- ▶ Decontamination or treatment of contaminated collected water (ACP / ICP crisis cells).
- ▶ Formal notifications (ICP / CMC crisis cells), including Seveso notifications as per Annex 6 of D.Lgs 105/2015.
- ▶ Evaluation of the consequences of the accident and investigation of the causes of the accident:
 - ➔ the post-accident assessment must be done within 5 working days from the date of demobilization of the crisis cells.
 - ➔ An emergency cell support team will be formed to conduct an accident study.
 - ➔ The purpose of the investigation is to evaluate the consequences of the accident (injuries, deaths, property losses, environmental damage, etc.) and analyze the causes of the accident that occurred.
 - ➔ Following the analysis, the response actions will be reviewed and evaluated. It will be necessary to analyze the human and material resources mobilized and evaluate the performances obtained during the emergency management phase.
 - ➔ The other consequences on the Company deriving from the incident will also have to be assessed, including the reactions of public opinion, the media, clients, contractors, and competitors (ICP / CMC crisis cells)
- ▶ Insurance and legal aspects
 - ➔ Create an inventory of damaged equipment / facilities (ACP crisis cell).
- ▶ Information of the external population (ICP crisis cell).
- ▶ Internal communication (ACP / ICP / CMC crisis cells).
- ▶ Refurbishment activity, (ACP crisis cell):
 - ➔ refurbishment of safety and emergency systems.
 - ➔ Cleaning of areas.
 - ➔ Refurbishment of electricity, if missing, without creating additional risks.
 - ➔ Verification of black start-up procedures.
 - ➔ Keep track of waste evacuation.
- ▶ Prepare a report, including recommendations for policy changes, plans and procedures (ACP/ICP crisis cells).

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 57 of 314	Rev. 02

BP10	BASIC PRINCIPLES	COMMON PROCESSES - IMS METHODOLOGY
-------------	-------------------------	---

BP10 - COMMON PROCESSES IN INCIDENT MANAGEMENT

Incident Management System Methodology

This Internal Emergency Response Plan is based on the principles of the IMS (Incident Management System) widely used by industry and professional emergency services organizations.

The IMS method is a standardized approach to **command**, **control**, and **coordinate** of emergency response.

The IMS Principles provide the Command function with guidelines to coordinate the organization's efforts so that response objectives and priorities can be achieved through the efficient and effective use of available resources.

IMS includes planning and operational organization, personnel and management, direction, and control of the organization.

An IMS is based on the following management principles:

- Ensuring an objectives-driven response.
- Formulation of an Incident Action Plan.
- Use of common and consistent terminology.
- Maintaining a manageable span of control.
- Coordination of equipment, personnel resources, and communication

In managing the emergency, the following hierarchy is followed when defining the objectives:

- ▶ **People:** protect the health and safety of responders and the public.
- ▶ **Environment:** protect and mitigate impacts to the environment.
- ▶ **Assets:** protect public and industry assets from further impact.
- ▶ **Reputation:** conduct the response in an ethical and transparent manner.

An Incident Action Plan typically contains this information as a minimum:

- ➔ Incident objectives.
- ➔ Organization chart.
- ➔ Response strategies and work assignments.
- ➔ Medical Plan.
- ➔ Health and Safety Plan.
- ➔ Waste management plan.
- ➔ Communications Plan with incident radio details.
- ➔ Maps, photographs, or other graphics (e.g., oil trajectories)
- ➔ Resources.

The IMS method involves the use of recognized methods for analyzing the emergency ("P" planning, FISA method) and the use of standard tools, terminology and supports commonly used in other TotalEnergies Group plants or, possibly, of Public Authorities.


This allows unified coordination in a common management structure with common terminology.

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 58 of 314	Rev. 02

BP10	BASIC PRINCIPLES	COMMON PROCESSES - IMS METHODOLOGY
-------------	-------------------------	---

"P" planning

"P" planning is a common emergency management scheme that illustrates the incident management process over an operational period. The "P" planning is based on the following phases according to the figure below:



REACTIVE PHASE

1. Notification of the incident.
2. Initial response and incident analysis.
3. Complete the **FO7** form "Incident Status" and apply the FISA methodology (**FO4**, **FO5**, **FO6**).
4. Prepare the command meeting.

Most incidents are handled only in the Reactive phase. For example, small incidents are managed and directed using a simple iterative process. This involves conducting response activities and evaluating progress towards achieving objectives until the response is complete and Incident Command is deactivated.

ICS Form 201 (FO7) provides the Incident Command team with information about the situation and resources assigned to the incident. This form serves as a permanent record of the initial response to the incident and can be used for the transfer of command.


PROACTIVE PHASE

1. Establish objectives in incident management.
2. Develop the plan to mitigate the hazardous effects.
3. Prepare and share the plan.
4. Execute, evaluate, and review the plan.

The "P" planning process consists of iterative cycles of work, evaluation and synthesis which can be considered as the repetition of the fundamental phases.

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 59 of 314	Rev. 02

BP10	BASIC PRINCIPLES	COMMON PROCESSES - IMS METHODOLOGY
-------------	-------------------------	---



The lower part of the figure shows the typical stages of an initial incident response and the simplified planning cycle underway for that incident.


BP10	BASIC PRINCIPLES	COMMON PROCESSES - IMS METHODOLOGY
-------------	-------------------------	---

FISA methodology

To analyze events during crisis management and to proportionate interventions, the methodology validated and shared in the Group is the FISA Method (Facts, Impacts, Stakeholders, Action Plan).

The FISA methodology is mainly addressed to the ICP crisis cell, and CMC crisis cell.

The FISA methodology allows you to structure the actions of the crisis unit and harmonize its processes according to an order of collection and formalization of information according to the following scheme:



 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 61 of 314	Rev. 02


BP10	BASIC PRINCIPLES	COMMON PROCESSES - IMS METHODOLOGY
-------------	-------------------------	---



The elements to be identified with the FISA method will be formalized on posters posted inside the ICP Emergency Management Room, at the TEPIT offices in Guardia Perticara. The ICP Director is the guardian of the compilation of the boards.

1. Facts


- ▶ The events are identified with the support of the “**Statement of Facts**” board.
- ▶ The 5W Method (**What**, **Who**, **When**, **Where**, **Why**) is used to identify and classify events.
- ▶ The poster is permanently posted inside the ICP Emergency Management Room.
- ▶ See also **FO4-1** – “Facts Chart”:



BP10	BASIC PRINCIPLES	COMMON PROCESSES - IMS METHODOLOGY
------	------------------	------------------------------------


2. Impacts

- ▶ In the event of a crisis, the order of priority that the Crisis Cell must take into consideration to assess the impacts is the **PEARL Method** (People, Environment, Asset, Reputation, Liability).



- ▶ The events are identified with the support of the “**Impacts Mapping** (PEARL)” poster, permanently posted inside the ICP Emergency Management Room.
- ▶ See also **FO5** – “Consequences and impacts control form”:

People	
Actual	Potential
Environment	
Assets / Activities / Clients	
Reputation	
Legal	

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 63 of 314	Rev. 02

BP10	BASIC PRINCIPLES	COMMON PROCESSES - IMS METHODOLOGY
-------------	-------------------------	---

3. Stakeholders

► Stakeholders shall be identified according to the emergency to calibrate the actions. The main Stakeholders are listed below.

<i>Stakeholders *</i>		<i>② Identificare gli Stakeholders</i>	<i>③ Classificare gli Stakeholder per profilo: (alleati, neutrali, ostili)</i>
AUTORITA E AMMINISTRAZIONE PUBBLICA	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Amministrazione pubblica locale, regionale e nazionale• Forze dell'ordine	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Servizi di urgenza e Vigili del Fuoco• Autorità giudiziarie• Assistenza medica	
PARTNERS COMMERCIALI	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Clienti• Fornitori e Appaltatori• Partners	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Banche• Assicurazioni• Organizzazioni	
STAKEHOLDERS INTERNI	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Management• Impiegati• Sindacati	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Azionisti• Siti• Divisioni/Entità	
RETE LOCALE	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Vicini• Associazioni• Eletti		
OPINIONE PUBBLICA	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Media• Social Media• Esperti riconosciuti• Leader dell'opinione pubblica	<div>PERSONE COINVOLTE</div> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Vittime• Familiari	

- The identification and management of the Stakeholders are formalized through the board called “**Stakeholder’s mapping**” permanently posted inside the ICP Emergency Management Room.
- See also **FO6** – “Stakeholder’s control form”:

Stakeholders mapping			
Stakeholder	Name and function of the contact	Internal counterpart	Notes
INTERNAL			
EXTERNAL			
Other:			

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 65 of 314	Rev. 02

BP10	BASIC PRINCIPLES	EXTERNAL EMERGENCY
-------------	-------------------------	---------------------------

BP11 - EXTERNAL EMERGENCY

If an industrial accident originating inside the Oil Centre has or may have effects on the areas outside the perimeter of the plant, the emergency procedures described in the External Emergency Plan (PEE) are applied.

The External Emergency Plan (PEE) is managed by the **Prefecture of Potenza**. The Prefecture of Potenza coordinates the implementation of the PEE in relation to the different levels of alert.

- ▶ The PEE is available on the website of the Prefecture of Potenza at the following web addresses:
http://www.prefettura.it/potenza/contenuti/Pee_centro_olio_tempa_rossa_total_ep_italia_di_corleto_perticara.-7482024.htm
- ▶ A copy of the PEE with its attachments is present inside the cabinet of the ICP Emergency Management Room.

Note: The Memorandum of Understanding (Protocollo d'Intesa) between the Prefecture of Potenza - Basilicata Region - Total E&P Italia spa for the management of emergency situations, including accidents constitutes "integration" and "completion" of the procedures for managing emergencies from major accidents contained in the Safety Reports and in the External Emergency Plans. In the case of the Oil Centre, being a SEVESO plant, the Memorandum of Understanding does not introduce additional emergency procedures with respect to the PEE.


The objective of the PEE is to provide public authorities with the ability to respond in a timely manner to an industrial emergency without make the exposed population suffer the harmful effects of the expected accident or mitigating its consequences by reducing damage. The PEE organizes and coordinates the actions and interventions of all those involved in the management of major accidents, liaising with the ERP.

In general, **the Gestore (Incident Commander) must promptly forward to the Responsible Authority, that is to the Prefect of Potenza (Prefettura di Potenza), the communication concerning the occurrence of events in the production process that could reasonably cause a "near miss" or a significant accident.** In the event of an accidental event, the Responsible Authority (Prefect of Potenza) is placed on alert **to have the time necessary to activate the PEE**. This makes it possible to identify the most adequate protection systems to be employed by the population to safeguard their health.

According to the PEE, the various anomalous events that may affect the plant can be grouped into three categories, namely:

- ▶ STATE OF ATTENTION
- ▶ PRE-ALARM STATUS
- ▶ EXTERNAL ALARM-EMERGENCY STATUS

It is emphasized that the State of Attention and the State of Pre-alarm do not correspond to a situation of real external danger and emergency, indeed most of the external subjects are only alerted.

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 66 of 314	Rev. 02

BP10	BASIC PRINCIPLES	EXTERNAL EMERGENCY
-------------	-------------------------	---------------------------

STATE OF ATTENTION

State resulting from an event which, **without any effects outside the plant, can or could be felt by the population**, thus creating in it an incipient form of alarmism and concern for which it becomes necessary to activate an information procedure by the municipal administration.

In the State of Attention, only the operational rooms of the authorities participating in the PEE and the Municipalities intervene to provide correct information to the population.

In the State of Attention, the Gestore shall inform the following public bodies:

- COMANDO VVF POTENZA
- PREFETTURA POTENZA
- PRESIDENTE GIUNTA REGIONALE
- MAYOR COMUNE CORLETO PERTICARA
- MAYOR COMUNE GORGOGNONE
- MAYOR COMUNE GUARDIA PERTICARA
- CARABINIERI POTENZA
- CARABINIERI VIGGIANO

STATE OF PRE-ALARM

A state of "Pre-Alarm" is established when the event, although under control, due to its nature or environmental, spatial, temporal, and meteorological conditions, **can cause fear for a potential worse escalation or can be felt by most of the surrounding population**, entailing the need to activate safety and information procedures.

These circumstances are related to all those events which, due to the **showiness or loudness of their effects, are clearly perceived by the surrounding population, although the physical parameters that characterize them do not reach threshold levels** that the literature assumes as dangerous for the population and / or the environment.

In the pre-alarm state, the only subjects that intervene are the Fire Brigade, the Emergency Health Service 118, the Municipalities concerned and the ARPAB.

In the Pre-Alarm state, the Gestore shall inform the following public bodies:

- COMANDO VVF POTENZA
- PREFETTURA POTENZA
- PRESIDENTE GIUNTA REGIONALE
- MAYOR COMUNE CORLETO PERTICARA
- MAYOR COMUNE GORGOGNONE
- MAYOR COMUNE GUARDIA PERTICARA

During the PRE-ALARM state, **the Gestore**, through the On-Scene Commander, **can activate the sound of the siren for the External Emergency (see BP7) only on the recommendation of the Direttore Tecnico dei Soccorsi (Fire Brigade) after hearing the Prefect.**

EXTERNAL ALARM-EMERGENCY STATUS

A state of "alarm" is established when the **incidental event** requires, for its control, the help of the Fire Brigade and, from its onset or following its uncontrolled development, can involve, with its effects, the external areas to the plant.

These circumstances relate to all those events that **can present effects externally to the plant to exceeding the threshold values used as reference for the estimation of the consequences**

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 67 of 314	Rev. 02

BP10	BASIC PRINCIPLES	EXTERNAL EMERGENCY
-------------	-------------------------	---------------------------

(Ministerial Decree of 09 May 2001). In this phase, there is the intervention of all the subjects identified in the PEE.

An external emergency alarm state can be reached from an alert level corresponding to the pre-alarm state, or if the contingent situation requires it, the external emergency alarm state can be directly declared by the Gestore.

In the state of External Alarm-Emergency there is the **general mobilization of all External Public Authorities**. In this case, the Posto di Comando Avanzato (PCA) is activated near the plant and the CCS (Centro Coordinamento Soccorsi) is established at the Prefecture, with the participation of the representatives of the various subjects involved in the coordination of intervention and rescue operations, as well as those supporting the emergency.

As per PEE the Gestore send a referent to the external PCA (Posto di Comando Avanzato) if activated. This role is assigned to the Local/Regional Authorities Liaison Officer.

In case of an accidental event, **the Prefect coordinates the implementation of the PEE** in relation to the different levels of alert and, on a local scale, coordinates the interventions of the Police with those of the Fire Brigade, DIRES 118 and other operational structures provincial.

In the state of External Alarm-Emergency, the Gestore shall inform the following public bodies:

- COMANDO VVF POTENZA
- PREFETTURA POTENZA
- PRESIDENTE GIUNTA REGIONALE
- MAYOR COMUNE CORLETO PERTICARA
- MAYOR COMUNE GORGOGNONE
- MAYOR COMUNE GUARDIA PERTICARA

During the state of External Alarm-Emergency, the Gestore **actives**, through the On-Scene Commander **directly or at the disposal of the Responsabile delle Operazioni di Soccorso** (Fire Brigade) the sirens to give the alarm to the areas outside the plant (**external emergency siren**) and communicates any malfunction to the Fire Brigade and the Prefect.

During the state of Pre-Alarm and Alarm-External Emergency, and where necessary for the state of Attention, the Mayors, according to their own procedures and with the coordination of the Prefecture, provide information to the population.

For the population potentially exposed to damage effects, in general, the protection intervention to be planned consists of an indoor shelter.

Only in particular cases (accident not in progress but potential and foreseeable development or toxic release of a duration such as to make the indoor shelter ineffective), where deemed appropriate and technically feasible, must it be provided for, at the disposal of the Public Safety authority and in consideration of extreme caution and only in favorable circumstances, the spontaneous or assisted evacuation of the population.


ALARM TERMINATED

The procedure for activating the all-clear is undertaken by the Prefect, after consulting the operational structures and local administrators, when the safety of the territory and the environment is ensured.

COMMUNICATIONS

The official communication shall be carried out via PEC through the Forms **FO10** - PEC communication modules External Emergency Plan". In particular:

- Reporting of Attention State: Module 1.

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 68 of 314	Rev. 02


BP10	BASIC PRINCIPLES	EXTERNAL EMERGENCY
-------------	-------------------------	---------------------------

- Reporting of an Accident: Module 2.

The certified email (PEC) to be used for outgoing messages to PEE public authorities is as follows:
temparossa.totaleitalia@postecert.it

accessible via the following website:
<https://webmail.postecert.it>


The access credentials (username and password) are available at the ICP Emergency Management Room.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 69 of 314	Rev. 02

JT	JOB TICKETS
-----------	--------------------

JT Section


JT - JOB TICKETS

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 70 of 314	Rev. 02

JT	JOB TICKETS
-----------	--------------------

JT	JOB TICKETS
-----------	--------------------

JT1	On-Scene Commander	ACP
JT2	Installation Shutdown Leader	ACP
JT3	Intervention Leader	ACP
JT4	Muster and Evacuation Leader	ACP
JT5	ACP Event Logger	ACP
JT6	CCR Shutdown Leader	ACP
JT7	CCR Panels Operators	ACP
JT8	Muster Counter	ACP
JT9	Site Intervention Team Leader	ACP
JT10	First Intervention Team	ACP
JT11	Medical Team Leader	ACP
JT12	Process and Reporting Officer	ACP
JT13	ICP Director - Incident Commander	COMMAND
JT14	Local/Regional Authorities Liaison	COMMAND
JT15	Injured/victims' families/next of kin assistance Officer	COMMAND
JT16	ICP/ACP FOPS Liaison Officer	COMMAND
JT17	Maintenance Site Support Officer	OPERATIONS
JT18	Export / Relations with Eni Officer	OPERATIONS
JT19	Drilling Expert	OPERATION
JT20	ICP Event Logger	PLANNING
JT21	HSE Officer	PLANNING
JT22	Marketing and Shipping Officer	PLANNING
JT23	Logistics and General Services Officer	LOGISTICS
JT24	Telecom & Informatic Services (IT) Officer	LOGISTICS
JT25	Site Finance and Administration Officer	FINANCE
JT26	CMC Director	CMC
JT27	Relations with Joint Venture Partner Officer	CMC
JT28	Finance and Insurance Officer	
JT29	Responsible Director as per D. Lgs. 624/96	
JT30	ICP/CMC Assistant/s	

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 71 of 314	Rev. 02

JT1	JOB TICKETS	ON-SCENE COMMANDER
ACP Crisis Cell		

JT1 – ON-SCENE COMMANDER

SYNTHESIS

- ▶ **The role of On-Scene Commander (OSC) is assumed by RSES or his substitute according to the criteria defined in BP4.**
- ▶ **The OSC is the Responsible for the Activation of the Internal Emergency Response Plan and Coordinator of the emergency on the site.**
- ▶ **The OSC is responsible for the Advanced Command Post crisis cell.**
- ▶ **The OSC mobilizes and coordinates the ACP crisis cell on site, including the First Intervention Team and the Medical Team.**
- ▶ **The OSC ensures coordination between the ICP crisis cell and the site: she/he provides the Incident Commander the report on the situation and status of the resources on site.**
- ▶ **The RSES must be reachable 24/7 and able to reach the site in 30 minutes. If not, his substitute shall be able to do so.**

LOCATION

The On-Scene Commander gathers at the ACP Emergency Management Room of the administrative building in Area N of the Tempa Rossa Oil Centre. Where the gathering of the ACP crisis cell at the Emergency Management Room in Area N is not practicable, the OSC identifies another place (for example the SS1 Technical Room of the Oil Centre) and communicates it to the members of the ACP crisis cell.

MISSION


Mobilization phase of the ACP crisis cell

- ▶ If She/He is the "first arrived", She/He sets up the ACP crisis cell according to the form **FO2-1** – "First arrived check-list".
- ▶ She/He receives the initial accident report, confirms the information, and updates the status of the emergency (nature and severity of the accident).
- ▶ She/He makes the decisions to activate the Oil Centre Internal Emergency Response Plan.
- ▶ She/He decides to mobilize the members of the First Intervention Team and the Medical Team (or First Aid).
- ▶ She/He ensures that the First Intervention Team is informed and mobilizes team according to the situation.
- ▶ She/He takes charge of the management of the event within the Plant.
- ▶ In the event of the absence of a member of the ACP crisis cell, She/He designates a replacement for the respective position.
- ▶ She/He ensures that the actions recommended as per Form **FO2-2** "Immediate actions after crisis cells activation" are followed.

Operational phase of the ACP crisis cell

State of the situation and coordination

- ▶ She/He alerts and informs the Incident Commander/Gestore.


 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 72 of 314	Rev. 02

JT1	JOB TICKETS	ON-SCENE COMMANDER
ACP Crisis Cell		

- ▶ She/He verifies the status of the plant through the information received from the CCR or from the First Intervention Team, through the Installation Shutdown Leader and the Intervention Leader, but also with the help of the Process and Reporting Officer.
- ▶ She/He validates the technical data received from the field. Ensures the presence of validated data and understandable documentation relating to the event also with the support of the ACP Event Logger.
- ▶ She/He informs and ensures regular communication with the ICP crisis cell (if mobilized) following the evolution of the emergency on site. She/He coordinates continuously with the Incident Commander and with the members of the Operations Section.
- ▶ She/He asks the Incident Commander for complementary means (technical and logistical, experts...) if necessary.
- ▶ She/He organizes and leads briefings on the evolution of the emergency with all members of the ACP crisis cell.
- ▶ Together with the Intervention Leader and the Incident Commander, She/He organizes the change of the Intervention Team if necessary.
- ▶ She/He alerts and informs the Responsible Director pursuant to Legislative Decree 624/96.

Operations Execution

- ▶ During the Reactive phase of the event, She/He anticipates the escalation of the events and makes the decisions deemed necessary to contain the progression of the emergency.
- ▶ She/He carries out the intervention tactics defined by the ICP crisis cell also with the support of the Scenario Cards (SR #).
- ▶ In collaboration with the Installation SD Leader, She/He prepares and approves a partial or total shutdown of the plant if necessary.
- ▶ She/He uses the means necessary to be able to control the incident in collaboration with the other members of the ACP crisis cell.
- ▶ She/He collaborates with the Intervention Leader to identify a team in charge of searching for eventually missing persons.
- ▶ With the support of the Intervention Leader and the Medical Team Leader, She/He identifies the missing people, injured or victims and communicates the relevant data (name, type of injury, severity) to IC with the support of the Form FO13a – “Victim’s follow-up”.
- ▶ She/He validates with the Intervention Leader and the Medical Team Leader the need to implement the MEDEVAC procedure.
- ▶ She/He mobilizes the means for surveillance / security.
- ▶ She/He ensures the information of the evolution of events to the personnel at the Muster Points, verifying through the Muster and Evacuation Leader that the behavior is always appropriate to the situation and arranging any controlled mobilizations of the same.
- ▶ On the directive of the ICP Director, She/He instructs the CCR to activate the Siren for the External Emergency. In case of activation of PEE and the PCA (Posto di Comando Avanzato), He/She ensures coordination with External Authorities (e.g., Fire Brigade) via the TEPIT Referent (Local/Regional Authorities Liaison) or via the Gestore.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPRA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 73 of 314	Rev. 02

JT1	JOB TICKETS	ON-SCENE COMMANDER
ACP Crisis Cell		

Demobilization phase of the ACP crisis cell

- ▶ She/He demobilizes the ACP crisis cell, the First Intervention Team, and the Medical Team.
- ▶ She/He dismisses the persons at the Muster Points, authorizing a possible return to the plant area or abandonment of the plant.
- ▶ She/He leads the debriefing session.
- ▶ She/He validates and distributes the final emergency report (log of events, analysis of the main difficulties encountered, conclusions and recommendations) and defines the parties responsible for all the actions identified.


TOOLS and DOCUMENTS REQUIRED

The On-Scene Commander will have the following documents at his disposal:

- ▶ Oil Centre Internal Emergency Response Plan.
- ▶ Oil Spill Contingency Plan.
- ▶ Medical Evacuation Plan.
- ▶ P&ID, PFDs, Layout Drawings.


The On-Scene Commander will personally take and retain the following:

- ▶ Job Ticket JT1.
- ▶ FO2-1 “First Arrived Check List”.
- ▶ FO2-2 “Immediate actions after crisis cells activation”.
- ▶ FO13a – “Victim’s follow-up”.
- ▶ SR # - specific scenarios and emergency procedures.
- ▶ The SR # scenario card corresponding to the incident in progress.
- ▶ TW radio, telephone.
- ▶ RE1 - Telephone numbers and useful contacts.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 74 of 314	Rev. 02


JT1	JOB TICKETS	ON-SCENE COMMANDER
ACP Crisis Cell		

JT1 - ON-SCENE COMMANDER CHECKLIST		
Item	Action	√
1	RSES assumes command as On-Scene Commander.	<input type="checkbox"/>
2	Emergency Response duties initiated.	<input type="checkbox"/>
3	Updated POB available.	<input type="checkbox"/>
4	POB confirmed.	<input type="checkbox"/>
5	Missing personnel identified	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Injured personnel	<input type="checkbox"/>
6	All communications tested and verified correct:	
	a. Internal communications.	<input type="checkbox"/>
	b. External communications.	<input type="checkbox"/>
7	Emergency Response Plan. –Emergency Response Team Leader appointed	
	a. Search and Rescue required.	<input type="checkbox"/>
	b. Search and rescue completed.	<input type="checkbox"/>
8	Plant conditions and assets:	
	a. Administrative Building.	<input type="checkbox"/>
	b. Site F&G status – Deluge/Foam/Inergen system status.	<input type="checkbox"/>
	c. Plant integrity.	<input type="checkbox"/>
	d. Essential electric supplies.	<input type="checkbox"/>
	e. Ventilation and HVAC systems:	
	- Available.	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- Shut-in/Isolated.	<input type="checkbox"/>
	- Fire dampers status.	<input type="checkbox"/>
	f. Stability and Well condition.	<input type="checkbox"/>
	g. IG system availability.	<input type="checkbox"/>
9	Emergency response resource availability:	
	a. Emergency Response Teams.	<input type="checkbox"/>
	b. Fire-fighting capability:	
	i. Equipment.	<input type="checkbox"/>
	ii. Pumps.	<input type="checkbox"/>
	iii. Foam/Water/N2/Inergen.	<input type="checkbox"/>
10	Communication	
	a. Incident form raised.	<input type="checkbox"/>
11	Emergency Response Control Measures:	
	a. Plant shutdown/depressurized.	<input type="checkbox"/>
	b. Protection Systems activated.	<input type="checkbox"/>
	c. System isolations.	<input type="checkbox"/>
	d. Permit to work cancelled/suspended.	<input type="checkbox"/>
	e. External assistance required.	<input type="checkbox"/>
	f. Oil spill control.	<input type="checkbox"/>
	g. Chemical spill control.	<input type="checkbox"/>

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 75 of 314	Rev. 02

JT1	JOB TICKETS	ON-SCENE COMMANDER
ACP Crisis Cell		

12	Safety: Personal Protective Equipment required. a. Breathing apparatus required. b. Chemical protection required. c. Lifesaving equipment required. d. MSDS checked – REACH assessment available.	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
13	Access and egress: a. Safe route(s) identified/available. b. Is access aloft/at height required. c. Is Confined Space Entry required?	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
14	Emergency situation under control/recovered: a. Hazard Identification. b. Risk Assessment. c. Control Measures Implementation.	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
15	Stand down: a. Is it safe to assume normal operations? b. Begin Accident Investigations. c. Reports draw up.	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 76 of 314	Rev. 02

JT2	JOB TICKETS	INSTALLATION SHUTDOWN LEADER
ACP Crisis Cell		

JT2 – INSTALLATION SHUTDOWN LEADER

SYNTHESIS

- ▶ The role of **Installation SD Leader** is covered by the **Operating Authority** within the ACP Crisis Cell.
- ▶ The Installation SD Leader is the On-Scene Commander's assistant in managing of the incident.
- ▶ She/He ensures that the process, shutdown, and depressurization are managed correctly. She/He offers support on any technical problems to the OSC.
- ▶ She/He is in permanent contact with the CCR and supports the CCR Shutdown Leader (Shift Supervisor), and the CCR Panels Operators.

LOCATION

The Installation SD Leader gathers at the ACP Emergency Management Room of the administrative building in Area N of the Tempa Rossa Oil Centre.

MISSION

Mobilization phase of the ACP crisis cell

- ▶ She/He reaches the ACP Emergency Management Room when She/He hears the alarm, or when alerted by the On-Scene Commander and joins the ACP crisis cell.

Operational phase of the ACP crisis cell


- ▶ She/He continuously informs the OSC about the status of the system, that maintains the direct transfer of information to the ACP Event Logger.
- ▶ She/He ensures that the affected units are in safe conditions and that, according to the OSC directive, all emergency shutdowns and electrical and mechanical isolation have been initiated.
- ▶ She/He promptly informs the OSC about the isolation of the affected process equipment.
- ▶ She/He ensures for the duration of the emergency that the ESD and F&G systems are functioning correctly.
- ▶ She/He considers environmental threats in the management of the emergency (accidental spills, gas emissions ...).
- ▶ She/He maintains frequent contact with the CCR Shutdown Leader (Shift Supervisor) and the CCR to ensure that the process remains safe, and that the F&G system is monitored for any escalation.

Demobilization phase of the ACP crisis cell

- ▶ She/He takes part in the debriefing on the site and in the REX.


TOOLS and DOCUMENTS REQUIRED

- ▶ Job Ticket JT2.
- ▶ SR # - specific scenarios and emergency procedures and reflex sheet.
- ▶ Oil Spill Contingency Plan.
- ▶ P&ID, PFDs, Layout Drawings, PI, radio.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 77 of 314	Rev. 02

JT2	JOB TICKETS	INSTALLATION SHUTDOWN LEADER
ACP Crisis Cell		

JT2 – INSTALLATION SHUTDOWN LEADER- CHECKLIST		
Item	Action	√
1a.	Confirm CCR Team is at the location.	<input type="checkbox"/>
1b.	Confirm the LPGC RSES-D is at the location.	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> N.A.
2.	Check communications: Radios. <input type="checkbox"/> Telephone: <input type="checkbox"/>	
3.	INSTALLATION STATUS a) Status of the Plant: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Installations stopped partially. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No • Installations stopped completely. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No • Depressurization started. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No • Depressurization completed. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No • ESD activated. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No • Fire-zone segregation done. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No • Fire water operating. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No • Foam fire extinguishing system operating. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No • Deluge systems activated. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No • Water mist fire extinguishing systems activated. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No • Inert gas fire extinguishing systems activated. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No • Main power supply. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No • Emergency power supply. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No • Export-import stopped. <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No 	

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 78 of 314	Rev. 02

JT3	JOB TICKETS	INTERVENTION LEADER
ACP Crisis Cell		

JT3 – INTERVENTION LEADER

SYNTHESIS

- ▶ The role of the **Intervention Leader** is held by the **HSE Superintendent** within the ACP crisis cell.
- ▶ The role of the Intervention Leader is to coordinate the activities of the First Intervention Team and the Medical Team (or First Aid) on site at the scene of the accident through the Intervention Team Leader and Medical Doctor.
- ▶ She/He is responsible for management and coordination of the activities of Fire Fighting, First Aid and Rescue Team under the instruction of the On-Scene Commander.
- ▶ She/He ensures that the OSC is kept up to date with the evolution of the incident.

LOCATION

The Intervention Leader gathers at the ACP Emergency Management Room of the administrative building in Area N of the Tempa Rossa Oil Centre.

MISSION

Mobilization phase of the ACP crisis cell


She/He reaches the ACP Emergency Management Room when She/He hears the alarm or when alerted by the On-Scene Commander and joins the ACP crisis cell.

Operational phase of the ACP crisis cell

- ▶ She/He contacts the Intervention Team Leader.
- ▶ She/He reports the emergency on site to the OSC and provide information on the response to the incident.
- ▶ She/He mobilizes and coordinates the activities of the First Intervention Teams at the accident site through the Site Intervention Team Leader.
- ▶ She/He guarantees the authorization received from the OSC before engaging the personnel on the field.
- ▶ She/He ensures that the resources available to the First Intervention Team are adequate for the accident and are activated in the necessary time.
- ▶ She/He evaluate the escalation of events in the units concerned also with Scenario Cards (SR #).
- ▶ She/He monitors the use of fire systems and provides information to the OSC, by the Installation Shutdown Leader or CCR Shutdown Leader.
- ▶ She/He requires further support, in terms of materials or people, to the intervention on site, also at the request of the First Intervention Team Leader.
- ▶ If necessary, She/He mobilizes the Medical Team (or First Aid) and coordinates the activities at the accident site through the Medical Team Leader (Medical Doctor).
- ▶ She/He guarantees accurate monitoring of the state of the victims using the charts posted in the ACP Emergency Management Room, Form **FO13a** – “Victim’s Follow-up”.
- ▶ She/He maintains the direct transfer of information to the ACP Event Logger.

Demobilization phase of the ACP crisis cell

- ▶ She/He takes part in the debriefing on the site and in the REX.


 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 79 of 314	Rev. 02

JT3	JOB TICKETS	INTERVENTION LEADER
ACP Crisis Cell		

Toolbox and necessary documents


- ▶ Job Ticket JT3.
- ▶ FO13a "Victim's Follow-up":
- ▶ SR # - Specific scenarios and emergency procedures.
- ▶ Annex LD2 - Firefighting plans.
- ▶ Annex LD3 - F&G detection system planimetry.
- ▶ Annex RE2 - Description of the emergency equipment.
- ▶ Radio, plot plans, magnets.

JT3 - INTERVENTION LEADER CHECKLIST																																																								
Item	Action	√																																																						
1a.	Confirm OC First Intervention Team is at Firefighting Room (located on SS1 ground floor).	<input type="checkbox"/>																																																						
1b.	Confirm LPGC First Intervention Team is at Firefighting Room.	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> N.A.																																																						
2	Confirm OC First Intervention Team is at the Muster Point.	<input type="checkbox"/>																																																						
3	Check all communications: Radios. <input type="checkbox"/> Telephone: <input type="checkbox"/>																																																							
4	Emergency equipment checks complete.	<input type="checkbox"/>																																																						
5	Breathing apparatus required?	<input type="checkbox"/>																																																						
6	Obtain Incident Briefing a) Site details. <input type="checkbox"/> b) Type of Emergency <table border="0" style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <td>• Explosion</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Yes</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> No</td> </tr> <tr> <td>• Fire</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Yes</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> No</td> </tr> <tr> <td>• Gas Release</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Yes</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> No</td> </tr> <tr> <td>• Tank Fire</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Yes</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> No</td> </tr> <tr> <td>• Casualty</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Yes</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> No</td> </tr> <tr> <td>• Flood</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Yes</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> No</td> </tr> <tr> <td>• Chemical Spill</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Yes</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> No</td> </tr> <tr> <td>• Oil Spill</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Yes</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> No</td> </tr> <tr> <td>• Civil work external impact</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Yes</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> No</td> </tr> <tr> <td>• Transport Accident</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Yes</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> No</td> </tr> <tr> <td>• Radioactive source damage</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Yes</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> No</td> </tr> </table> c) Initial response - Control Actions <table border="0" style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <td>• ESD</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> 0</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> 1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>• Fire Pumps – status</td> <td colspan="2"><input type="checkbox"/> Pump A running <input type="checkbox"/> Pump B running <input type="checkbox"/> Pump C running</td> </tr> <tr> <td>• Deluge status</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> OK</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Problem</td> </tr> <tr> <td>• Foam system status</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> OK</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Problem</td> </tr> <tr> <td>• Water Mist system status</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> OK</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Problem</td> </tr> <tr> <td>• Gas Inert System Status</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> OK</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Problem</td> </tr> <tr> <td>• Ventilation System Status (Fire Dampers)</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> OK</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Problem</td> </tr> </table>	• Explosion	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	• Fire	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	• Gas Release	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	• Tank Fire	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	• Casualty	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	• Flood	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	• Chemical Spill	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	• Oil Spill	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	• Civil work external impact	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	• Transport Accident	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	• Radioactive source damage	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	• ESD	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1	• Fire Pumps – status	<input type="checkbox"/> Pump A running <input type="checkbox"/> Pump B running <input type="checkbox"/> Pump C running		• Deluge status	<input type="checkbox"/> OK	<input type="checkbox"/> Problem	• Foam system status	<input type="checkbox"/> OK	<input type="checkbox"/> Problem	• Water Mist system status	<input type="checkbox"/> OK	<input type="checkbox"/> Problem	• Gas Inert System Status	<input type="checkbox"/> OK	<input type="checkbox"/> Problem	• Ventilation System Status (Fire Dampers)	<input type="checkbox"/> OK	<input type="checkbox"/> Problem	
• Explosion	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No																																																						
• Fire	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No																																																						
• Gas Release	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No																																																						
• Tank Fire	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No																																																						
• Casualty	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No																																																						
• Flood	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No																																																						
• Chemical Spill	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No																																																						
• Oil Spill	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No																																																						
• Civil work external impact	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No																																																						
• Transport Accident	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No																																																						
• Radioactive source damage	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No																																																						
• ESD	<input type="checkbox"/> 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 1																																																						
• Fire Pumps – status	<input type="checkbox"/> Pump A running <input type="checkbox"/> Pump B running <input type="checkbox"/> Pump C running																																																							
• Deluge status	<input type="checkbox"/> OK	<input type="checkbox"/> Problem																																																						
• Foam system status	<input type="checkbox"/> OK	<input type="checkbox"/> Problem																																																						
• Water Mist system status	<input type="checkbox"/> OK	<input type="checkbox"/> Problem																																																						
• Gas Inert System Status	<input type="checkbox"/> OK	<input type="checkbox"/> Problem																																																						
• Ventilation System Status (Fire Dampers)	<input type="checkbox"/> OK	<input type="checkbox"/> Problem																																																						

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 80 of 314	Rev. 02

JT3	JOB TICKETS	INTERVENTION LEADER
ACP Crisis Cell		

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> HVAC Status <input type="checkbox"/> On <input type="checkbox"/> Off Lifesaving equipment <input type="checkbox"/> On site <input type="checkbox"/> Not there 	
7	Search and Rescue Plan required <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 81 of 314	Rev. 02

JT4	JOB TICKETS	MUSTER AND EVACUATION LEADER
ACP Crisis Cell		

JT4 – MUSTER AND EVACUATION LEADER

SYNTHESIS

The role of **Mustering Evacuation Leader** is to assist the On-Scene Commander in the management of the POB (Personnel on Board) to verify the missing personnel in the plant compared to those who went to the Muster Points.

LOCATION

The Mustering Evacuation Leader gathers at the ACP Emergency Management Room of the administration building in Area N. of the Tempa Rossa Oil Centre.

MISSION

Mobilization phase of the ACP crisis cell

She/He reaches the ACP Emergency Management Room when She/He hears the alarm or when alerted by the On-Scene Commander and joins the ACP crisis cell.

Operational phase of the ACP crisis cell

- ▶ She/He maintains communications and coordination with the Muster Counters at the Muster Points.
- ▶ She/He guarantees a regular gathering for employees and visitors at identified Muster Points or alternative Muster Points communicated via PA/GA.
- ▶ She/He collects e-mustering data and confirms POB data.
- ▶ She/He coordinates with the Muster Counters to update missing personnel.
- ▶ With the approval of the OSC, She/He mobilizes the appropriate support team from Muster Points.
- ▶ She/He records any movement of personnel from Muster Points.
- ▶ She/He updates the POB as the emergency evolves.


Demobilization phase of the ACP crisis cell I

- ▶ She/He takes part in the debriefing on the site

TOOLBOX and NECESSARY DOCUMENTS

The Mustering Evacuation Leader will take and keep the following:

- ▶ Job Ticket JT4.
- ▶ Radio TETRA.
- ▶ Phone numbers muster points:
 - Area M: 603954437
 - Area N: 603954434

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 82 of 314	Rev. 02

JT5	JOB TICKETS	ACP EVENT LOGGER
ACP Crisis Cell		

JT5 – ACP EVENT LOGGER

SYNTHESIS

The role of the **ACP Event Logger** is to record the chronology of the events and the decision taking by the ACP crisis cell during the emergency.

LOCATION

The ACP Event Logger gathers at the ACP Emergency Management Room of the administrative building in Area N of the Tempa Rossa Oil Centre.

MISSION

Mobilization phase of the ACP crisis cell

She/He reaches the ACP Emergency Management Room when alerted by the On-Scene Commander and joins the ACP crisis cell.

Operational phase of the ACP crisis Cell

- ▶ She/He ensures that all information is recorded when it is communicated to the ACP Crisis Cell: origin of the accident, information from the site, chronology of events and decisions.
- ▶ She/He records the decisions and statements of the On-Scene Commander.
- ▶ During the "Time out", She/He reports the evolution of the situation to the OSC.
- ▶ She/He registers the names of the components of the ACP crisis cell present through the form **FO1-1** "Members of the ACP Crisis Cell, if requested by the RSES.


Demobilization phase of the ACP crisis Cell

After the emergency, She/He participates in the debriefing.

TOOLBOX and NECESSARY DOCUMENTS

The ACP Event Logger must have and / or be aware of the following:

- ▶ Job Ticket JT5.
- ▶ FO1-1 – "Members of the ACP Crisis Cell".

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 83 of 314	Rev. 02

JT6	JOB TICKETS	CCR SHUTDOWN LEADER
ACP Crisis Cell		

JT6 – CCR SHUTDOWN LEADER

SYNTHESIS

- ▶ The role of the **CCR Shutdown Leader** is covered by the **Shift Supervisor**.
- ▶ The CCR Shutdown Leader is responsible for the implementation of actions to make the plants and the production process safe.
- ▶ The CCR Shutdown Leader is supervised by Installation SD Leader.

LOCATION

The CCR Shutdown Leader gathers at the Central Control Room.

MISSION

Mobilization phase of the ACP crisis cell

- ▶ She/He informs the RSES about any incident without delay.
- ▶ She/He remains in place in the CCR when alerted by RSES or by the acoustic warning system.
- ▶ She/He confirms that all Permit to Work have been recovered and suspended.

Operational phase of the ACP crisis cell

- ▶ Once the ACP crisis cell is activated, the Shift Supervisor assumes the functions of CCR Shutdown Leader and responds to the OSC via the Installation SD Leader.
- ▶ The CCR Shutdown Leader manages the control room operators who activate the actions from the remote control and command.
- ▶ Through the support of *Reflex Sheets*, (see SR # Sheets - Cards) She/He ensures the activation of the emergency stop system and, if required, of the fire protection system in response to the type of accident.
- ▶ She/He monitors the process parameters, and the status of the Fire & Gas alarms and provides a continuous update to the Installation SD Leader.
- ▶ Promptly She/He informs the ACP crisis cell if a complete loss of power supply occurs (the control system can be powered by a backup system).
- ▶ She/He ensures that the CCR Panel Operators have enough support and adequate instructions.


Demobilization phase of the ACP crisis cell

- ▶ She/He takes part in the debriefing on the site
- ▶ She/He participates in restarting of the plant.

TOOLBOX and NECESSARY DOCUMENTS

The CCR Shutdown Leader will take and keep in his possession the following:

- ▶ Job Ticket JT6.
- ▶ The SR # scenario card corresponding to the current incident.
- ▶ Reflex Sheets.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 84 of 314	Rev. 02

JT7	JOB TICKETS	CCR PANEL OPERATOR
ACP Crisis Cell		

JT7 – CCR PANEL OPERATOR

SYNTHESIS

- ▶ The role of the **Central Control Room Panel Operator** is to implement the actions to make the plants and the production process safe.
- ▶ The CCR Panel Operator is supervised by CCR Shutdown Leader.

LOCATION

The CCR Panel Operator is already located in the Central Control Room.

MISSION

Mobilization phase of the ACP Crisis Cell


- ▶ She/He remains at your seat in the Central Control Room.
- ▶ She/He receives notification of the incident, location, time, caller and type of incident.
- ▶ She/He informs the Shift Supervisor, the RSES of any incident without delay.
- ▶ On the directive of the RSES She/He activates the PA/GA alarm sirens (internal alarm), if not activated automatically.

Operational phase of the ACP Crisis Cell

- ▶ She/He broadcasts On-Scene Commander instructions / messages to all Plant personnel through regular announcements via the public address (PA) during an emergency.
- ▶ If required, with the support of Reflex Sheets, (see also SR # Sheets - Cards), She/He carries out the safety actions from the remote control and command station in the control room (ESD1, SD2, SD3). She/He uses the ESD Matrix Panel.
- ▶ She/He checks that the automatic system isolation devices (SDV, ESDV) have worked following the activation of the safety measures.
- ▶ If required, She/He activates the fire protection / control systems. She/He uses the F&G Control Panel (F&G Matrix Panel). Refer to the SR # sheets according to the accident scenario and to Annex LD2 "Fire-fighting Layout", LD3 – "F&G Detection System" and RE2 – "Description of the Emergency equipment".
- ▶ She/He checks the process parameters for the unit affected by the incident and for those adjacent or involved.
- ▶ She/He checks the status of the Fire & Gas alarms on the Matrix Panel and DCS control system.
- ▶ She/He provides a continuous update to the CCR Shutdown Leader.
- ▶ At the direction of the OSC, after hearing the Incident Commander-Gestore, She/He activates the external alarm sirens.

Demobilization phase of the ACP Crisis Cell

- ▶ She/He participates in restarting installations.


 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 85 of 314	Rev. 02

JT7	JOB TICKETS	CCR PANEL OPERATOR
ACP Crisis Cell		

TOOLBOX and NECESSARY DOCUMENTS

The CCR Panel Operator will take and keep in his possession the following:

- ▶ Job Ticket JT7.
- ▶ The SR # scenario card corresponding to the incident in progress.
- ▶ Reflex Sheets.
- ▶ Annex LD2 – “Fire-fighting Layout”.
- ▶ Annex LD3 – “F&G Detection System”
- ▶ Annex RE2 – “Description of the Emergency equipment”.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 86 of 314	Rev. 02

JT8	JOB TICKETS	MUSTER COUNTER
ACP Crisis Cell		

JT8 - MUSTER COUNTER

SYNTHESIS

- ▶ The **Muster Counter** ensures the correct organization at the Muster Points.
- ▶ This function can be performed by several people depending on the number of muster points.
- ▶ The Muster Counter shall verify the number and name of the missing persons and obtain updated information from the Intervention Leader regarding the situation within the plant areas and technical buildings.
- ▶ The function oversees the **security personnel** who are indicated in the Roaster of the emergency team for each shift and for each Muster Point.

LOCATION

The Muster Counter gathers at the assigned Muster Point.

MISSION

Mobilization phase of the ACP crisis cell

She/He reaches the assigned Muster Point when alerted.

Operational phase of the ACP crisis cell


- ▶ She/He controls of the gathered personnel. Verification of the POB.
- ▶ She/He checks the number of people present at the Muster Point and report to the Muster and Evacuation Leader.
- ▶ She/He takes the name of any other person at the Muster Point without a badge and reports it to the Muster and Evacuation Leader.
- ▶ She/He identifies the names of those who are missing and report them to the ACP crisis cell via the Muster and Evacuation Leader.
- ▶ She/He verifies that the personnel gathered complies with the behavioral provisions.
- ▶ She/He provides information relating to the evolution of the emergency and manages any movements of the personnel gathered ordered by the On-Scene Commander.

Demobilization phase of the ACP crisis cell

After the emergency, She/He participates in the debriefing on the site.

TOOLBOX AND NECESSARY DOCUMENTS

- ▶ Job Ticket JT8
- ▶ Radio TETRA.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 87 of 314	Rev. 02

JT9	JOB TICKETS	FIRST INTERVENTION TEAM LEADER
ACP Crisis Cell		

JT9 – SITE INTERVENTION TEAM LEADER

SYNTHESIS

- ▶ The role of the **Site Intervention Team Leader** is carried out by one of the TEPIT operators according to planning.
- ▶ The role of the Site Intervention Team Leader is:
 - provide field support and emergency response on the front line.
 - continuously report the status of the incident / emergency to the Intervention Leader, who will transmit it to the On-Scene Commander.
 - manage fire and rescue response of eventually injured personnel.
 - lead the operation of the First intervention / fire team.
- ▶ The Site Intervention Team Leader follows the instructions of the Intervention Leader.
- ▶ The decision to mobilize the First Intervention Team to the scene of the incident will be agreed upon by the Intervention Leader and the On-Scene Commander.
- ▶ Final authorization for mobilization to the scene of the accident is entrusted to the On-Scene Commander.

LOCATION

The Site Intervention Team Leader reaches the Firefighting Room (located on SS1 ground floor). She/He then goes to the accident site with the team or waits at the muster point.


MISSION

Mobilization phase of the ACP crisis cell

- ▶ Upon hearing the PA/GA alarm, She/He contacts the Intervention Leader and reaches the Firefighting Room, reporting his position via badge reader.
- ▶ She/He checks that all the members of the First Intervention team are gathered and register their presence via badge reader.
- ▶ On the recommendation of the Intervention Leader, She/He wears and verifies if the First Intervention Team wear the firefighter personal protective equipment (fireproof suit, breathing apparatus, helmet, gloves, boots) present in the Firefighting Room.

Operational phase of the ACP Crisis Cell

- ▶ On the recommendation of the Intervention Leader, She/He makes sure that all the members of the First Intervention Team have correctly worn the protective equipment, goes with the Intervention Team inside the plant or meets at the muster point or reach the area of the incident decided by the Intervention Leader according to the OSC.
- ▶ She/He leads the activities and coordinate the firefighting team on site.
- ▶ She/He establishes contact with the CCR and with the Intervention Leader and reports on the activities of the Intervention Team.
- ▶ She/He manages the use of resources on site to contain and control the accident.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 88 of 314	Rev. 02

JT9	JOB TICKETS	SITE INTERVENTION TEAM LEADER
ACP Crisis Cell		


- ▶ Under the coordination of the Intervention Leader, to control or contain the incident:
 - She/He coordinates with the CCR for the remote or local activation of fire protection systems, where applicable (deluge, water-mist, foam systems).
 - She/He manages the use of locally activated fire-fighting equipment (hydrants, water monitors, foam monitors).
- ▶ She/He searches for missing persons and rescue injured personnel according to the instructions of the Intervention Leader.
- ▶ She/He coordinates with the Medical Team if required the medical assistance
- ▶ She/He leads the Intervention Team and gives clear and unambiguous orders.
- ▶ She/He asks the Intervention Leader about the need for further external assistance if needed.
- ▶ She/He decides to abandon fire or rescue operations if the risk to the members of the Rescue Team is not acceptable.

Demobilization phase of the ACP Cell

- ▶ After the emergency, She/He provides details of the intervention on site
- ▶ She/He participates in the debriefing

TOOLBOX AND NECESSARY DOCUMENTS

- ▶ Firefighter PPE.
- ▶ Gas detectors.
- ▶ Radio.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 89 of 314	Rev. 02

JT10	JOB TICKETS	FIST INTERVENTION TEAM
ACP Crisis Cell		

JT10 – FIRST INTERVENTION TEAM

SYNTHESIS

- ▶ The role of the **First Intervention Team** is to provide the response on site to the emergency.
- ▶ The First Intervention Team is composed of: **5 TEPIT Operators as firefighters+ 2 GMC Operators** (maintenance service company) in continuous hours (24/7).

LOCATION:

The First Intervention Team reaches the Firefighting Room (located on SS1 ground floor), and then goes to the place of event or waits at the Muster Point.

MISSION

Mobilization phase of the ACP Crisis Cell

- ▶ Upon hearing the PA/GA alarm, each member of First Intervention Team on duty proceeds to the Firefighting Room, reporting his position via badge reader.
- ▶ On the recommendation of the Site Intervention Team Leader, each member of the Team wears the firefighting PPE (fireproof suit, jacket, helmet, gloves, boots and breathing apparatus) present in the Firefighting Room.
- ▶ After wearing the firefighting PPE, on the advice of the Site Intervention Team Leader, each member of the Team reaches the place of the event or stays waiting at the Muster Point.
- ▶ Under the direction of the Site Intervention Team Leader, each member of the Team remains as a group and is ready to respond to an emergency.

Operational phase of the ACP Crisis Cell


- ▶ She/He uses fire-fighting equipment according to the directives of the Site Intervention Team Leader.
- ▶ She/He always checks the safety of installations before intervening.
- ▶ She/He immediately provides first aid to victims and rescue any trapped person.
- ▶ On the instructions of the CCR, She/He may intervene to complete the safety of the plants.
- ▶ She/He takes precautions to avoid the escalation of fire accidents.
- ▶ She/He supports the Medical Team on site if required for medical assistance.

Demobilization phase of the ACP Crisis Cell

- ▶ After the emergency, She/He participates in the debriefing.

TOOLBOX AND NECESSARY DOCUMENTS

- ▶ Firefighter PPE.
- ▶ Gas detectors.
- ▶ Radio.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 90 of 314	Rev. 02

JT11	JOB TICKETS	MEDICAL TEAM LEADER
ACP Crisis Cell		

JT11 - MEDICAL TEAM LEADER

SYNTHESIS

- ▶ The role of **Medical Team Leader** or First Aid Team Leader is held by **Medical Doctor on-duty**.
- ▶ The role of the Medical Team Leader is to lead the Medical Rescue (or First Aid) Team in case of medical assistance.
- ▶ The Medical Team Leader manages the use of the stretcher and organizes care for the injured.
- ▶ Collaborates with the OSC and with the Dires-118 Service Coordinator if needed.
- ▶ She/He organizes the treatment and transfer of victims, establishes a medical reception area.
- ▶ She/He collaborates directly with the First Intervention Team Leader if present at the place of the accident.
- ▶ The decision to mobilize someone from the Medical Team to the place of the event will be agreed upon by the Intervention Leader and the OSC.
- ▶ Final authorization for mobilization to the place of the accident is entrusted to the OSC.

MISSION

Mobilization phase of the ACP crisis cell


She/He reaches the ACP Emergency Management Room when alerted by the OSC or the Intervention Leader and joins the ACP crisis cell.

Operational phase of the ACP crisis cell

- ▶ She/He instructs First Aid Team / Medical Team members to prepare for victim/injured rescue.
- ▶ She/He supervises and directs the assessment and treatment of injured persons. Stabilizes and heals the recovered victims.
- ▶ She/He maintains communications with the Intervention Leader.
- ▶ In agreement with the OSC, She/He contacts the coordinating doctor of the national service directly (118).
- ▶ She/He evaluates the situation, priorities and organize treatment using team medical members, identifying any additional requirements.
- ▶ She/He updates and monitors the status of the victims/injured using the Form **FO13b** – “Injured/Victim Identification & Status”.
- ▶ She/He prepares victims/injured for evacuation and liaise with the Intervention Leader and the OSC on evacuation requirements.
- ▶ She/He oversees the evacuation of victims/injured by ensuring that all necessary documents are provided.
- ▶ She/He prepares status report of injured/victim for the OSC.

Demobilization phase of the ACP crisis cell


- ▶ After the emergency, She/He participates in the debriefing.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 91 of 314	Rev. 02

JT11	JOB TICKETS	MEDICAL TEAM LEADER
ACP Crisis Cell		

TOOLBOX and NECESSARY DOCUMENTS

- ▶ Job Ticket JT11.
- ▶ FO13b – “Injured/Victim Identification & Status”.
- ▶ First aid equipment required.
- ▶ Radio.
- ▶ DPI.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 92 of 314	Rev. 02

JT12	JOB TICKETS	PROCESS AND REPORTING OFFICER
ACP Crisis Cell		

JT12 - PROCESS AND REPORTING OFFICER

SYNTHESIS

The role of the **Process and Reporting Officer** is to assist the OSC with the monitoring and recording of process and environmental parameters according to the emergency.

LOCATION

The Process and Reporting Officer gathers at the ACP Emergency Management Room of the administrative building in Area N of the Tempa Rossa Oil Centre.

MISSION

Mobilization phase of the ACP crisis cell

She/He reaches the ACP Emergency Management Room when She/He hears the PA/GA alarm, or when alerted by the OSC and joins the ACP crisis cell.

Operational phase of the ACP crisis cell

- ▶ Check the process parameters during the emergency by reading current and historical data from the process monitoring system and report to the OSC.
- ▶ Use process monitoring tools and other parameters via remote access to control systems (DCS, environmental monitoring system, Coresight, PI, etc.).
- ▶ Provides information on current and historical data of the process upon request of the OSC.
- ▶ Provides information on weather data and environmental monitoring units.


Demobilization phase of the ACP Crisis Cell

- ▶ Take part in the final debriefing.
- ▶ At the conclusion of the emergency, She/He provides a report of all process parameters and not during the emergency.

TOOLBOX AND NECESSARY DOCUMENTS

The Process and Reporting Officer will take and keep in his possession the following:

- ▶ Job Ticket JT12.
- ▶ Process monitoring tools (Coresight, PI).
- ▶ Weather parameters monitoring tools.
- ▶ Environmental parameters monitoring tools.
- ▶ P&ID and other documents.
- ▶ The SR # scenario card corresponding to the incident in progress.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 93 of 314	Rev. 02

JT13	JOB TICKETS	ICP DIRECTOR / INCIDENT COMMANDER
ICP Crisis Cell - COMMAND		

JT13 – ICP DIRECTOR / INCIDENT COMMANDER

SYNTHESIS

The function of the **Incident Commander (IC)** is carried out by the Asset Director, **Gestore** of the Establishment pursuant to Legislative Decree 105/2015.

The Incident Commander has authority over all activities related to the management of the emergency.

The main functions of the IC are:

- ▶ Provide and coordinate **field assistance** to the OSC in response to the incident, with the support of the ICP/ACP FOPS Liaison Officer.
- ▶ Try to **anticipate** the possible escalation of events.
- ▶ Ensure that the **safety conditions** for people and for carrying out operations are respected.
- ▶ Ensure **communications with the Local/Regional Public Authorities** and ensuring their coordination with the establishment. If the **External Emergency Plan is activated**, She/He ensures compliance with the emergency procedures (see **BP11**) and, first, ensures that:
 - ➔ communications via certified e-mail with the authorities are made using the **FO10** forms – “PEC communication modules External Emergency Plan”.
 - ➔ directly or at the disposal of the Rescue Operations Manager (Fire Brigade), promptly instructs the OSC to activate the Siren for External Emergency.
- ▶ Ensure that **ICP Crisis Cell Members assume their specific function**.
- ▶ With the support of the ICP/ACP FOPS Liaison Officer, She/He ensures that the **Action Plan** for incident management is formulated and applied through the **FO4-2** “Action Plan”.
- ▶ She/He draws up or have drawn up by the ICP/ACP FOPS Liaison Officer the Form **FO7** – “Incident status”.
- ▶ **The management of the emergency by the ICP crisis cell takes place with the support of the IMS methodology**. In particular, the “P” planning and the F.I.S.A. method (see **BP10**).
- ▶ Guarantee the frequency and duration of the regular **time out**.
- ▶ Manage the event in connection with the CMC Director for **communications to external and to Partners** and for requiring support from the crisis cells CCMC or CSP.


LOCATION

The IC meets at the ICP Emergency Management Room of TEPIT Offices in Guardia Perticara.

MISSION

Activation of the ICP crisis cell

- ▶ Once alerted by the OSC, She/He decides whether to activate the ICP crisis cell. If She/He activates the ICP crisis cell is, reaches the ICP Emergency Management Room as soon as possible.
- ▶ She/He contacts the members on-duty of the ICP crisis cell.
- ▶ If She/He is the “first arrived”, She/He sets up the ICP crisis cell according to the form **FO2-1** – “First arrived check-list”.
- ▶ If it deems appropriate, She/He may designate a person from the ICP crisis cell with direct communication functions with the ACP Team. This person will be identified as the “ICP/ACP FOPS Liaison Officer”.


 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 94 of 314	Rev. 02

JT13	JOB TICKETS	ICP DIRECTOR / INCIDENT COMMANDER
ICP Crisis Cell - COMMAND		

- ▶ She/He ensures that the actions recommended in the Form **FO2-2** “Immediate actions after crisis cells activation” are followed.

Technical management of the emergency

- ▶ During the **Reactive Phase** of the incident management, She/He advises the OSC on the technical aspects to limit the consequences of the incident and prevent its escalation.
- ▶ She/He confirms and updates the analysis of the situation in the plant (through the ICP/ACP FOPS Liaison Officer) according to the following information:
 - ➔ Type of event, actual consequences, and possible evolution of the accident.
 - ➔ Real or potential presence of consequences outside the plant or in the environmental matrices.
 - ➔ Staff counting in the plant and compliance with the POB.
 - ➔ Number, severity and position of injured / victims and type of first aid using the Form **FO13a**- “Victims’ Follow-up”.
 - ➔ Situation of plants and processes (if necessary, She/He requests to shut down).
 - ➔ Other data and information to be transmitted to the competent public authorities.
 - ➔ Other data and information to be transmitted to contractors.
- ▶ With the support of the ICP/ACP FOPS Liaison Officer, She/He ensures that the **Action Plan** for the management of the emergency is formulated and implemented via the Form **FO4-2** “Action Plan”.
- ▶ She/He also asks the On-Scene Commander:
 - ➔ the list of members of the ACP crisis cell.
 - ➔ To send him photos of the incident site.
 - ➔ to communicate the time of the first contact (alert) and subsequent contacts.
- ▶ She/He draws up or have drawn up by the ICP/ACP FOPS Liaison Officer the Form **FO7** – “Incident status”.
- ▶ She/He communicates or have communicated the emergency to the competent **Local/Regional Public Authorities** according to the procedures of the PEE. Form **FO10** – “PEC communication modules External Emergency Plan.
- ▶ During the **Proactive Phase** of incident management, She/He establishes the objectives of the response and ensures the drafting of an **Action Plan** with the support of the ICP/ACP FOPS Liaison Officer using the Form **FO4-2** “Action Plan”.
- ▶ She/He maintains communication and, if the PEE is activated, coordinates the intervention with the Public Authorities competent for crisis management according to the PEE.
- ▶ Through the Action Plan, She/He ensures that all sections of the ICP Crisis Cell work to reach them according to the following functions:
 - ➔ **OPERATIONS section**: analysis of the situation, definition, preparation, and execution of tactical intervention operations on site.
 - ➔ **PLANNING section**: preparation and updating of the action plan for the management of the incident by maintaining information on the state of resources and the general state of the incident.
 - ➔ **LOGISTICS section**: provision of the resources, services and support required by the incident.
 - ➔ **FINANCE Section**: carrying out financial controls, tenders and claims management.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 95 of 314	Rev. 02

JT13	JOB TICKETS	ICP DIRECTOR / INCIDENT COMMANDER
ICP Crisis Cell - COMMAND		

- ▶ She/He validates the intervention tactics decided by the team on the site and the mobilization of additional means (technical and logistical, experts).
- ▶ She/He tries to anticipate the possible evolutions of events through the prediction and prevention of the risks of aggravation and consecutive and chain accidents.
- ▶ If the level of risk is judged to be too high, She/He has the First Intervention Team withdraw.
- ▶ The IC, in case of mobilization of the crisis cell for a prolonged period, will have to organize the turnover of personnel.
- ▶ The IC, possibly also through the support of the CMC crisis cell, will ensure coordination with the representatives of the contractors (on site and in the crisis cell, appointing, if necessary, a person responsible for monitoring the contractors or requesting the presence of a representative of the contractor in the crisis cell).
- ▶ As per External Emergency Plan, She/He guarantee the assessment and coordination as per levels expected: “Stato di Attenzione” - “Pre-Allerta” - “Allarme/Emergenza”.
- ▶ In case of External emergency with activation of PEE, She/He guarantee the coordination with Prefect of Potenza and the PCA via mobilization of the TEPIT Referent (Local/Regional Authorities Liaison).
- ▶ She/He draws up or have drawn up by the ICP/ACP FOPS Liaison Officer the Form **FO7** – “Incident status”.

Interface with CMC crisis cell

- ▶ She/He confirms the news as soon as possible to the CMC Director also with the support of the form **FO7** – “Incident Status”.
- ▶ She/He takes stock with the CMC Director, before the latter begins the information phase of the media and partners.
- ▶ As soon as they are available, She/He asks the assistant (ICP/ACP FOPS Liaison Officer) to send to the CMC crisis cell:
 - ➔ the POB of the site and its updating during the crisis.
 - ➔ the list of the ACP members of the site and the team in support of the RSES.
 - ➔ photos of the accident site.


End of the crisis

- ▶ She/He closes the ICP crisis cell and transmit the information to all the people involved, to the CMC Director and to the Local/Regional Authorities involved.
- ▶ After the crisis, She/He organizes the debriefing.

TOOLS

The Incident Commander obtains and keeps the following documents:

- ▶ Job Ticket JT13.
- ▶ FO2-1 “Check List Primo Arrivato”.
- ▶ FO4-2 “Action Plan”.
- ▶ FO7 – “Status of the incident”.
- ▶ FO13a- “Victims’ Follow-up”.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 96 of 314	Rev. 02

JT13	JOB TICKETS	ICP DIRECTOR / INCIDENT COMMANDER
ICP Crisis Cell - COMMAND		

- ▶ RE1 - Telephone numbers and useful contacts.
- ▶ SR # - Specific scenarios and emergency procedures.
- ▶ Any technical document relating his competencies.


GUIDELINES

Main guidelines for Incident Commander:

- ▶ She/He checks the times, do not improvise on troubleshooting.
- ▶ She/He differentiates important information from secondary one.
- ▶ She/He differentiates well-established elements from those that require additional information.
- ▶ She/He formalizes the list of priority actions in progress through the form **FO4** – “Action Plan”, with managers and timing, to facilitate control during the next time-out.
- ▶ Once command is established, the IC provides clear rules for transferring command to another individual or individuals, using the form FO7- “Status of Incident”.

Time Out Management

- ▶ The IC is the guarantor of compliance with the frequency and timing of regular time out.
- ▶ Basic principles of regular time out:
 - ➔ Uniform information for all members.
 - ➔ Manage regular audio / video conference time out with other crisis cells, where possible.
 - ➔ Limited duration: 10 minutes maximum.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 97 of 314	Rev. 02

JT14	JOB TICKETS	LOCAL/REGIONAL AUTHORITIES LIAISON
ICP crisis cell - COMMAND		

JT14 – LOCAL/REGIONAL AUTHORITIES LIAISON

SYNTHESIS


- ▶ The role of the **Local/Regional Authorities Liaison** is to **assist the Incident Commander/Gestore** in the following tasks:
 - ➔ inform the public bodies and representatives of the local authorities (municipal, provincial, and regional) competent in emergency management of the occurrence of an emergency and communicate, if necessary, the request for assistance for operational or management support.
 - ➔ Ensure coordination between the Authorities in charge and the Establishment. Where the emergency can have a safe or probable impact outside the plant, She/He is the interface between the IC (Gestore) and the “Responsabile delle Operazioni di Soccorso” (Fire Brigade) according to the procedures of the External Emergency Plan.
- ▶ The Local/Regional Authorities Liaison supports the IC in official communications with the Local/Regional Authorities (Municipalities, Region, Province, Fire Brigade, Prefecture, Police Forces) according to the procedures of the PEE (**BP11**).
- ▶ The Local/Regional Authorities Liaison belongs to the COMMAND Section of the ICP crisis cell and is identified by the color **WHITE**.

LOCATION

The Local/Regional Authorities Liaison meets at the ICP Emergency Management Room of TEPIT Offices in Guardia Perticara.

MISSION

- ▶ She/He reaches the ICP Emergency Management Room once alerted.
- ▶ She/He reports to the IC.
- ▶ She/He assists the IC in communicating with the Local/Regional Authorities, through the procedures of the External Emergency Plan (**BP11**) and the communication forms of the PEE - **FO10**.
- ▶ She/He reports to the IC the provisions expressed by the Local/Regional Authorities.
- ▶ She/He assists the IC in compiling and updating the Stakeholders' management board posted in the ICP Emergency Management Room (**FO6** – “Stakeholders’ Control Form”).
- ▶ She/He ensures the coordination between the Local/Regional Authorities and the IC as per PEE levels expected: “Stato di Attenzione” - “Pre-Allerta” - “Allarme/Emergenza”:
 - ➔ in case of activation of the external state of emergency, with the establishment of the PCA, He/She guarantees communications between the Fire Brigade, the Local / Regional Authorities, the RSES and the ICP Director.
 - ➔ The management of traffic blocking points by the Police at the request of the Prefecture of Potenza.
 - ➔ The request for assistance from the Fire Brigade in coordinating the emergency and as operational support within the Plant.
 - ➔ The assistance of other Public Authorities that can access to the plant.
 - ➔ Sending of technical data and information relating to the emergency at the request of the competent authorities in the management of the emergency.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 98 of 314	Rev. 02

JT14	JOB TICKETS	Local/Regional Authorities Liaison
ICP Crisis Cell - COMMAND		

➔ Give information to the population by the Municipality of Corleto Perticara or other interested Municipalities.


➔ The management of confinement activities or, only if requested by the Competent Authority, the evacuation of the populations adjacent to the Plant.

➔ The choice of the best route to be taken by the emergency teams of public Authorities to reach the Plant.

- ▶ After the crisis, She/He takes part in the debriefing.

TOOLS

- ▶ Job Ticket JT14.
- ▶ FO10 “PEC Communication modules External Emergency Plan”.
- ▶ PEE - Annex 7: Population and Productive Activities Contacts in Risk Areas (Reserved).
- ▶ FO6 – “Stakeholder’s control board”.
- ▶ RE1 - Telephone numbers and useful contacts - Public Authorities.

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 99 of 314	Rev. 02

JT15	JOB TICKETS	INJURED / VICTIMS' FAMILIES/NEXT OF KIN ASSISTANCE OFFICER
ICP Crisis Cell - COMMAND		

JT15 - INJURED / VICTIMS' FAMILIES/NEXT OF KIN ASSISTANCE OFFICER

SYNTHESIS

The role of the **Injured/victims' families/next of kin assistance Officer** is to:

- ▶ coordinate information and assistance to the injured/victim of TEPIT personnel and their families (or next of kin).
- ▶ ensure, in collaboration with the persons in charge of the contract, that information about the accident is available and that the contractors and subcontractors correctly manage the victims (and next-of-kin) of their respective organizations.


The Attendant to this role belongs to the COMMAND Section of the ICP crisis cell and is identified by the color **WHITE**.

LOCATION

The Attendant for this role meets at the ICP Emergency Management Room of TEPIT Offices in Guardia Perticara.

MISSION

- ▶ She/He reports to the IC.
- ▶ She/He reaches the ICP Emergency Management Room once alerted.
- ▶ Once alerted, She/He is informed, through the ICP crisis cell, on the conditions of the people involved in the accident as well as on the presence of any victims.
- ▶ She/he requires necessary information through the ICP/ACP FOPS Liaison Officer or IC to fill in the form **FO13a** – “Victims’ Follow-up”.
- ▶ She/He obtains from the Human Resources Service, the personal information of the victims/injured of TEPIT staff or of the contractors and subcontractors.
- ▶ She/He updates the form **FO5** – “Consequences and impacts control sheet” and **FO6** – “Stakeholder’s control sheet” with the information in its possession on the condition of the victims/injured.
- ▶ She/He collaborates with the Medical Team Leader (Medical Doctor of the emergency team) and ensures that She/He has been mobilized.
- ▶ In case of transfer of the injured to the hospital, She/He evaluates with the IC the possibility of sending TEPIT personnel to guarantee the welcome and assistance to the families of the victims/injured. In the most serious cases, on the recommendation of the IC, She/He can personally go to the hospital.
- ▶ She/He ensures that information and assistance is provided to the families of the injured and the families of unharmed employees are reassured, also through a press release.
- ▶ She/He evaluates with the Medical Team Leader the advisability of setting up the psychological assistance in the establishment or at the disposal of families (through external psychologists).
- ▶ She/He evaluates the situation with the Medical Team Leader and proposes to the IC the activation of TotalEnergies support services: EUTELMED (psychological assistance in a crisis management situation) and KENYON (Disaster management services following mass fatality events).
- ▶ In the event of the death of a worker, after confirmation from the doctor and in the absence of doubts about the person's identity, She/He meets the family personally to inform them.


 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 100 of 314	Rev. 02

JT15	JOB TICKETS	INJURED/VICTIMS' FAMILIES/NEXT OF KIN ASSISTANCE OFFICER
ICP Crisis Cell - COMMAND		

- ▶ She/He attends the debriefing.

TOOLS

- ▶ Job Ticket JT15.
- ▶ FO5 "Consequences and impacts Control".
- ▶ FO6 "Stakeholder's control sheet".
- ▶ FO13a "Victims' Follow-up".
- ▶ support services: EUTELMED and KENYON.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 101 of 314	Rev. 02

JT16	JOB TICKETS	ICP/ACP FOPS LIAISON OFFICER
ICP Crisis Cell - COMMAND		

JT16 - ICP/ACP FOPS LIAISON OFFICER

SUMMARY


- ▶ The role of the **ICP/ACP FOPS Liaison Officer** is to assist the Incident Commander by ensuring the effective liaison between the ACP crisis cell and the ICP crisis cell.
- ▶ The ICP/ACP FOPS Liaison Officer belongs to the COMMAND Section of the ICP crisis cell and it is identified by the **WHITE** color.

LOCATION

The ICP/ACP FOPS Liaison Officer reaches the ICP Emergency Management Room of TEPIT Offices in Guardia Perticara.

MISSION

- ▶ Maintain a close liaison between ACP crisis cell (in particular with the OSC), and the ICP crisis cell.
 - ➔ She/He confirms and updates the analysis of the situation inside the establishment according to the following information, and with the support of the posters **FO4-1** “Fact Chart” and **FO4-2** “Action Plan”.
 - ➔ Type of event, actual consequences, and possible escalation of the accident.
 - ➔ Real or potential presence of consequences outside the plant or in the environmental matrices (supported by the HSE Officer - JT21).
 - ➔ Number of people present inside the plant and compliance with the POB.
 - ➔ Number, severity and position of injured / victims and type of first aid, also through the poster **FO13a** – “Victims’ Follow-up”.
 - ➔ Situation of plant and equipment process.
 - ➔ Other data and information to be transmitted to contractors.
 - ➔ If necessary, fill in the form **FO3-** “Message transmission Card”.
- ▶ Based on the state of integrity of the plant known before the emergency (Inspection reports, Open Integrity Notifications, Downgraded Situations, Integrity Threats, etc.), She/He provides to the IC with all the elements at its disposal to define the technical measures of intervention.
- ▶ She/He acquires information on the accident situation and prepares the inspection activities of the plants, supported by the HSE Officer (JT21).
- ▶ She/He supports the OSC in the analysis of field inspections during the emergency (if possible) and at the conclusion of the accident.
- ▶ She/He informs the IC on the state of the plant integrity following the on-site inspections, supported by the HSE Officer (JT21).
- ▶ Manage the site tactical operations with the directive from IC.
- ▶ Assist in developing the operations response strategies and tactics of the Action Plan.
- ▶ Supervise the execution of the operations section of the Incident Action Plan.
- ▶ Maintain close contact with OPERATIONS section team.
- ▶ Assess the progress of the response.
- ▶ Provide the Incident Commander with situation and resource status reports within the Operations Section.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 102 of 314	Rev. 02


JT16	JOB TICKETS	ICP/ACP FOPS LIAISON OFFICER
ICP Crisis Cell - COMMAND		

- ▶ Fill in the Form FO7- “Incident Status”, if requested by the IC.
- ▶ Take part in the final debriefing.

TOOLBOX AND NECESSARY DOCUMENTS

The ICP/ACP FOPS Liaison Officer will take and keep in his possession the following:

- ▶ Job Ticket JT16.
- ▶ FO3- “Message transmission Card”.
- ▶ FO7 – “Incident Status”.
- ▶ FO13a – “Victims’ follow-up”.
- ▶ Integrity Threats, DGS report, Inspection reports, Open Integrity Notifications.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 103 of 314	Rev. 02

JT17	JOB TICKETS	MAINTENANCE SITE SUPPORT OFFICER
ICP Crisis Cell - OPERATIONS		

JT17 - MAINTENANCE SITE SUPPORT OFFICER

SYNTHESIS

- ▶ The role of the **Maintenance Site Support Officer** is to assist the Incident Commander to manage material resources within the establishment during an emergency.
- ▶ The Maintenance Site Support Officer belongs to the OPERATIONS Section of the ICP crisis cell and is identified by the color **RED**.

LOCATION

The Maintenance Site Support Officer reaches the ICP Emergency Management Room of TEPIT Offices in Guardia Perticara.


He/She could joint to the ACP Team (ACP Emergency Management Room of the administrative building in Area N of the Tempa Rossa Oil Centre), if requested by the RSES in accordance with the ICP Director.

MISSION

- ▶ She/He coordinates urgent activities on site.
- ▶ She/He identifies and manages the supply of tools, means and material (clamps, spare parts, etc.) to repair and restart critical equipment.
- ▶ She/He guarantees an accurate monitoring of the logistic/construction means engaged on site or available in the plant.
- ▶ In relation to the situation on site and at the request of the OSC, She/He requests to the Incident Commander to supply other means or support from external entities to transfer equipment and material to the Plant, or from the Plant. This function is carried out in collaboration with the Logistics and General Services Officer (JT23).
- ▶ She/He ensures analysis of failure and prepares report.
- ▶ She/He takes part in the final debriefing
- ▶ At the conclusion of the emergency, She/He provides an account of all the resources used in the plant during the emergency.

TOOLS

- ▶ Job Ticket JT17.
- ▶ The SR # scenario card corresponding to the incident in progress.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 104 of 314	Rev. 02

JT18	JOB TICKETS	EXPORT/RELATION WITH ENI OFFICER
ICP Crisis Cell - OPERATIONS		

JT18 - EXPORT/RELATIONS WITH ENI OFFICER

SYNTHESIS

- ▶ The role of the **Export / Relationship with ENI Officer** is to assist the Incident Commander during the management of emergency involving the operations and plants for the shipment of stabilized crude oil from the Tempa Rossa Oil Centre to the Taranto refinery.
- ▶ The Export/Relations with ENI Officer belongs to the OPERATIONS Section of the ICP crisis cell and is identified by the color **RED**.

LOCATION

The Export Officer/Relations with ENI, only if requested by the IC reaches the ICP Emergency Management Room of TEPIT Offices in Guardia Perticara.


MISSION

- ▶ If requested, She/He provides the Incident Commander with information on the status of the export process towards ENI's infrastructures.
- ▶ Where the emergency involves the operations and facilities for the shipment of stabilized crude oil, on the recommendation of the IC, She/He informs the Eni Emergency Manager.
- ▶ She/He applies the emergency procedures provided for by the Emergency Pipeline Device Monte Alpi – Taranto, (DEO).
- ▶ She/He ensures communications between the ENI Emergency Manager and the IC.
- ▶ At the conclusion of the emergency, She/He provides information about the actions taken with ENI

TOOLBOX and NECESSARY DOCUMENTS

The Export / Relationship with ENI Officer will take and keep in his possession the following:

- ▶ Job Ticket JT18.
- ▶ Emergency Pipeline Device Monte Alpi – Taranto, (DEO).
- ▶ Oil Spill Contingency Plan.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 105 of 314	Rev. 02

JT19	JOB TICKETS	DRILLING EXPERT
ICP Crisis Cell - OPERATIONS		

JT19 - DRILLING EXPERT

SYNTHESIS

- ▶ The role of the **Drilling Expert** is to support the Incident Commander in defining and applying the technical measures that may include intervention on the extraction wells.
- ▶ The Drilling Expert belongs to the OPERATIONS Section of the ICP Crisis Cell and is identified by the colour **RED**.

LOCATION

The Drilling Expert, only if requested by the IC, She/He meets at the ICP Emergency Management Room of TEPIT Offices in Guardia Perticara.


MISSION

- ▶ She/He reaches the ICP Emergency Management Room once alerted.
- ▶ She/He reports to the Incident Commander.
- ▶ In case of drilling activities in progress during an emergency on the Oil Centre, She/He assesses the involvement of the drilling personnel (contractor and internal) and, if deemed appropriate, activates the emergency procedures specific to the well areas (gathering, evacuation).
- ▶ She/He ensures, if requested by the IC, the safety of the wells during the drilling phase.
- ▶ She/He mobilizes the necessary means and resources by activating the specific emergency procedures for Drilling operations (Blow Out Contingency Plan - BACP, H₂S / SO₂ Contingency Plan).
- ▶ She/He guarantees the synthesis of technical needs and interventions on wells where necessary.
- ▶ She/He attends regular briefings.
- ▶ Once the crisis is over, She/He demobilizes all the means used (material and personal).
- ▶ She/He takes part in the final debriefing.

TOOLS

The Perforation expert obtains and keeps the following documents:

- ▶ Job Ticket JT19.
- ▶ Blow Out Contingency Plan - IT-TPR-WL-DCT-000031.
- ▶ H₂S/SO₂ Contingency plan - IT-TPR-WL-DCT-000140.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 106 of 314	Rev. 02

JT20	JOB TICKETS	ICP EVENT LOGGER
ICP Crisis Cell - PLANNING		

JT20 - ICP EVENT LOGGER

SYNTHESIS

- ▶ The ICP Event Logger is to assist the Incident Commander in drafting the Incident Management Action Plan (**BP10**), during the entire duration of the emergency.
- ▶ The ICP Event Logger belongs to the PLANNING Section of the ICP crisis cell and is identified by the color **BLUE**.

LOCATION

The ICP Event Logger reaches the ICP Emergency Management Room of TEPIT Offices in Guardia Perticara.


MISSION

- ▶ She/He reaches the ICP Emergency Management Room once alerted.
- ▶ She/He reports to the Incident Commander.
- ▶ She/He writes down on the supports provided (see FISA Method) or on a blackboard/paperboard if the former is not available:
 - ➔ The details of the accident (place, nature, and severity of the accident).
 - ➔ The description of the events.
 - ➔ The POB of the Site.
 - ➔ The time of the following "Time out".
- ▶ Assisting the IC, She/He:
 - ➔ Updates, as requested by the IC, the Posters **FO4-1** "Facts Chart" and **FO4-2** – "Action Plan".
 - ➔ Summarizes all the events that take place during the crisis, noting the corresponding time: facts, incoming and outgoing messages, data, actions, means employed (personal, technical, financial), telephone calls, PEC, and e-mail.
 - ➔ Writes down all key points (actions, important telephone appointments, main actions in progress).
 - ➔ Updates the **FO5** – "Consequences and impact control form" on the recommendation of the IC.
 - ➔ Supports the updating of the posters, **FO6** – "Stakeholders' Control Board".
 - ➔ Supports the ICP/ACP FOPS Liaison Officer to fill in the Form **FO7** – "Incident status".
- ▶ She/He registers the names of the ICP Crisis Cell's components present through the form **FO1-2** "Members of the ICP crisis cell".
- ▶ She/He participates in time-out, during which retrieves key information and the timeline.
- ▶ Once the crisis is over, She/He participates in the final debriefing.
- ▶ She/He collects all relevant documentation in a summary file.
- ▶ She/He assists the IC in the preparation of the final "post crisis" report.

TOOLS


The ICP Event Logger obtains, updates, and keeps the following documents:

- ▶ Job Ticket JT20.
- ▶ FO1-2 – "Members of the ICP crisis cell".
- ▶ FO4 .1– "Action Plan".
- ▶ FO4 .2– "Facts Chart".

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 107 of 314	Rev. 02

JT20	JOB TICKETS	ICP EVENT LOGGER
ICP Crisis Cell - PLANNING		

- ▶ FO5 – “Consequences and impacts control”.
- ▶ FO6 – “Stakeholder’s control board”.
- ▶ FO7 – “Status of the incident”.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 108 of 314	Rev. 02

JT21	JOB TICKETS	HSE OFFICER
ICP Crisis Cell - PLANNING		

JT21 - HSE OFFICER

SYNTHESIS


- ▶ During the management of the events, the **HSE Officer** is responsible for monitoring all aspects of Health, Safety and Environment for crisis management.
- ▶ He/She monitors the safety conditions on site and the development of measures to guarantee the safety of all intervention personnel.
- ▶ He/She analyses the current situation, foresees a probable development of accidents, and prepares alternative strategies to mitigate the effects of accidents.
- ▶ He/She belongs to the PLANNING Section of the ICP Crisis Cell and is identified by the color **BLUE**.

LOCATION

The HSE Officer reaches the ICP Emergency Management Room of TEPIT Offices in Guardia Perticara.

MISSION

- ▶ She/He reaches the ICP Emergency Management Room once alerted.
- ▶ She/He reports to the Incident Commander.
- ▶ She/He anticipates dangerous situations and monitor ongoing response activities to stop or prevent unsafe actions or conditions for the First Intervention Team.
- ▶ Within the PLANNING Section, the HSE Officer is responsible for the development of the Safety Plan and the revision of the Health Plan in collaboration with the Medical Team Leader (Doctor on-duty of the emergency team).
- ▶ She/He reviews the Action Plan (see **BP10**) for safety, health and environmental implications and can recommend changes to the IC if necessary. She/He advises the IC in defining the strategies for the organization of rescue, firefighting, anti-pollution and on aspects of hygiene and health.
- ▶ She/He continuously monitors the state of the situation and detect factors that can influence the response, e.g., meteorological conditions, dispersion trajectory of spilled products, air quality, ecological and socio-economic characteristics at risk and other factors
- ▶ With the support of HSE Risk studies (Oil Centre Safety Report, Major Risk Register and Technological Risk Assessment), or with the support of the Scenario Cards (SR #), She/He evaluates the possible developments of the situation in terms of impact on people, the environment, and asset (escalation). He/She ensures support to ICP/ACP FOPS Liaison Officer (JT16).
- ▶ She/He evaluates the potential environmental impacts of the accident, establishes environmental priorities, identifies the ecological and socio-economic characteristics at risk and provides advice on the management of sampling activities.
- ▶ She/He assists the IC in compiling and updating the poster **FO5** – “Consequences and impacts control form”.
- ▶ She/He advises the IC on the advisability of preparing in advance the means of intervention (firefighting, rescue, anti-pollution), even at the risk of having them demobilized later, if the situation should evolve in a favorable way.
- ▶ She/He advises the IC on the organization strategy of anti-pollution interventions as defined in the Oil Spill Contingency Plan and in coordination with the Oil Spill Coordinator.


 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 109 of 314	Rev. 02

JT21	JOB TICKETS	HSE OFFICER
ICP Crisis Cell - PLANNING		

- ▶ In coordination with the TEPIT Oil Spill Coordinator, She/He manages any requests for support necessary to deal with the consequences of events that cannot be faced with the means available to the Affiliate (e.g., group specialists' intervention, international emergency contractors, etc.).
- ▶ She/He attends time-outs.
- ▶ She/He takes part in the final debriefing.

TOOLS

- ▶ Job Ticket JT21.
- ▶ SR # - Specific scenarios and emergency procedures.
- ▶ Safety Report of the Tempa Rossa Oil Centre - IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167544.
- ▶ Major Risk Register - IT-TPR-00-EPC1-167567.
- ▶ Site Medical Assistance and Emergency Medical Service (MEDEVAC).
- ▶ Tempa Rossa Oil Spill Contingency Plan - IT-TPR-GE-SET-000039.
- ▶ Environmental Monitoring Network Interface.
- ▶ Real-time weather data
- ▶ GIS Tempa Rossa.
- ▶ FO5 – “Consequences and impacts control form”.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 110 of 314	Rev. 02

JT22	JOB TICKETS	MARKETING AND SHIPPING OFFICER
ICP Crisis Cell - PLANNING		

JT22 - MARKETING AND SHIPPING OFFICER

SYNTHESIS

- ▶ The role of the **Marketing and Shipping Officer** is to:
 - ➔ Represent TEPIT during crises involving marketing and shipping operations, in particular the transport via underground pipeline and ships.
 - ➔ Communicate with the partners involved with the marketing and shipping activities of TEPIT products.
- ▶ The Marketing and Shipping Officer belongs to the PLANNING Section of the ICP crisis cell and is identified by the color **BLUE**.

LOCATION


The Marketing and Shipping officer, only if requested by the IC, She/He reaches at the ICP Emergency Management Room of TEPIT Offices in Guardia Perticara.

MISSION

- ▶ She/He reports to the Incident Commander.
- ▶ If requested, She/He provides the IC with information on the effects associated with commercial activities and participates in the definition of emergency response actions for the activities pertaining to him.
- ▶ She/He ensures the management of communication with the partners involved with the marketing and shipping of TEPIT products.
- ▶ At the conclusion of the emergency, She/He provides an account of the actions taken with business partners.

TOOLS

The Marketing and Shipping Officer obtains and keeps any useful supporting documents.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 111 of 314	Rev. 02

JT23	JOB TICKETS	LOGISTICS AND GENERAL SERVICES OFFICER
ICP Crisis Cell - LOGISTICS		

JT23 - LOGISTICS AND GENERAL SERVICES OFFICER

SYNTHESIS

- ▶ The role of the **Logistics and General Services Officer** is to mobilize and coordinate the different logistic supports and the supply of materials, additional machinery, products, and other means of emergency necessary for the response to the accident at the plant.
- ▶ The Logistics and General Services Officer belongs to the Section LOGISTICS of the ICP crisis cell and is identified by color **YELLOW**.

LOCATION


The ICP Logistics and Services Officer meets at the ICP Emergency Management Room of TEPIT Offices in Guardia Perticara.

MISSION

- ▶ She/He reaches the ICP Emergency Management Room once alerted.
- ▶ She/He reports to the IC.
- ▶ She/He assists the IC in everything related to:
 - ➔ Intervention of means required.
 - ➔ Provision of means of transport (shuttles, cars, etc.).
 - ➔ Booking of cars, buses, hotels.
 - ➔ Procurement of means, materials, and products.
- ▶ She/He assists the ACP/ICP FOPS Liaison Officer/IC to fill in and update the Form **FO7** – “Incident Status”.
- ▶ Where means of transport are used, She/He ensures:
 - ➔ that transport safety conditions are guaranteed (e.g., speed, needs of drivers, etc.).
 - ➔ that regular contact is maintained with people traveling.
 - ➔ that these people are informed about the evolution of the crisis.
- ▶ She/He attends time-out.
- ▶ She/He takes part in the final debriefing

TOOLS

- ▶ Job Ticket JT23.
- ▶ The ICP Logistics and Services Officer obtains and keeps any useful supporting documents.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 112 of 314	Rev. 02

JT24	JOB TICKETS	TELECOM & INFORMATIC SERVICES (IT) OFFICER
ICP Crisis Cell - LOGISTICS		

JT24 – TELECOM & INFORMATIC SERVICES (IT) OFFICER

SYNTHESIS

- ▶ The **Telecom & Informatic Services (IT) Officer** assists the ICP/ACP emergency management cells to ensure the availability of IT and telecommunication means and ensure the correct exchange of information inside and outside, as well as the availability of data through the company network.
- ▶ The Telecom & Informatic Services (IT) Officer belongs to the Section LOGISTICS of the ICP crisis cell and is identified by color **YELLOW**.

LOCATION


The Telecom & Informatic Services (IT) Officer, only if requested by the IC, She/He reaches the ICP Emergency Management Room of TEPIT Offices in Guardia Perticara or, if necessary and with the indication of the ICP Director, She/He the ACP Emergency Management Room of the administrative building in Area N of the Tempa Rossa Oil Centre.

MISSION

- ▶ She/He reports to the IC or OSC.
- ▶ If requested, She/He provides assistance to IT aspects.
- ▶ She/He verifies the proper functioning of the telecommunication systems in the various crisis rooms (landline telephone, smartphone, computer, videoconference tools, emails, PEC).
- ▶ She/He supports to the crisis cells in solving any IT problems.
- ▶ She/He supports to the crisis cells in the use of IT tools.

TOOLS

- ▶ Job Ticket JT24.
- ▶ The Telecom & Informatic Services (IT) Officer obtains and keeps any useful supporting documents.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 113 of 314	Rev. 02

JT25	JOB TICKETS	SITE FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION OFFICER
ICP Crisis Cell – FINANCE		

JT25 – SITE FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION OFFICER

SYNTHESIS

- ▶ The **Site Finance and Administration Officer** is responsible on the site for financial controls, tenders and claims management.
- ▶ The Site Finance and Administration Officer belongs to the FINANCE Section of the ICP crisis cell and is identified by color **GREEN**.

LOCATION


The Site Finance and Administration Officer reaches the ICP Emergency Management Room of TEPIT Offices in Guardia Perticara.

MISSION

- ▶ She/He reaches the ICP Emergency Management Room once alerted.
- ▶ She/He reports to the IC.
- ▶ If necessary, She/He interfaces with the Finance and Insurance Officer of the CMC crisis cell.
- ▶ She/He provides tracking of all expenses and recording of costs for response personnel, equipment, and resources.
- ▶ She/He manages claims for property damage, business interruptions or other issues such as health or medical claims.
- ▶ She/He attends time-outs.
- ▶ She/He takes part in the final debriefing.

TOOLS

- ▶ Job Ticket JT25.
- ▶ The Site Finance and Administration Officer obtains and keeps any useful supporting documents.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 114 of 314	Rev. 02

JT26	JOB TICKETS	DIRETTORE CMC
CMC Crisis Cell		

JT26 – CMC DIRECTOR

SYNTHESIS


- ▶ The **CMC Director** ensures that the emergency response strategy is defined to protect the image of the Company.
- ▶ The CMC Director, through the CMC crisis cell or through the support of the CCMC crisis cell, ensures communications with:
 - ➔ TEPIT Managing Director.
 - ➔ The crisis cell CSC - Paris, according to the Country Crisis Plan - L2-CIA-PR-002.
 - ➔ National authorities not involved locally.
 - ➔ The commercial partners of the Joint Venture.
 - ➔ Local and national media.
- ▶ The CMC Director, through the CMC crisis cell or also through the support of the CCMC crisis cell, ensures the following functions during an emergency:
 - ➔ Press releases.
 - ➔ Legal assistance.
 - ➔ Finance and insurance assistance.
 - ➔ Assistance on contracts.

LOCATION

The CMC Director reaches the CMC Crisis Management Room of TotalEnergies Offices in Milan.

MISSION

- ▶ Once informed of the emergency, She/He decides whether to activate the CMC crisis cell.
- ▶ She/He registers the names of the components of the CMC crisis cell present through the Form **FO1-3** "Members of the ACP crisis cell".
- ▶ If She/He is the "first arrived", She/He sets up the CMC crisis cell according to the Form **FO2-1** – "First arrived check-list".
- ▶ She/He ensures that the actions recommended in the Form **FO2-2** "Immediate actions after crisis cells activation" are followed.
- ▶ She/He takes stock of the situation with the Incident Commander and requests, if available, Form **FO7** – "Incident status".
- ▶ She/He reports all information to the TEPIT Managing Director and, if necessary, invites him/her to take part in the CMC crisis cell.
- ▶ She/He maintains direct and frequent contact with the ICP crisis cell.
- ▶ She/He decides whether to contact the CCMC via:
 - ➔ the Country CMC Deputy Director during normal weekly working hours,
 - ➔ the Stand-By Duty Officer outside normal weekly working hours (according to the updated document CCMC First Point of Contact - Country CMC Emergency Number - On Call Duty list).
- ▶ In cooperation with the IC, She/He decides whether to contact the CSC crisis cell and ensures its interface.


 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 115 of 314	Rev. 02

JT26	JOB TICKETS	DIRETTORE CMC
CMC Crisis Cell		

- ▶ She/He defines the communication strategy, potentially with the support of the CCMC crisis cell.
- ▶ In coordination with the IC, She/He manages communication with the authorities at national level (Local/Regional Authorities are managed directly by the ICP crisis cell).
- ▶ In coordination with the IC, She/He ensures the first communications with the Local and/or National media by issuing press releases published on the press media or on the TEPIT website or on other communication carriers. She/He also uses form **FO9** – “Press release template”. If necessary, through the CCMC crisis cell, She/He requests the support of Communication staff.
- ▶ One of his main tasks is to assess the risks in terms of the image of the Affiliate and of the Group, of questioning the permits to operate, of loss of trust on the part of partners, shareholders, administration, population, or investors.
- ▶ In coordination with the IC, She/He defines proactive actions to try to avoid, or limit, the media, political, environmental, social, and corporate impacts.
- ▶ She/He ensures the management of the emergency regarding the legal and insurance dimension, possibly with the support of the CCMC crisis cell.
- ▶ In coordination with the FINANCE section of the ICP crisis cell, She/He ensures the financing of all the necessary means requested by the IC for the management of the crisis, the control of the event and the prevention of subsequent events.
- ▶ If necessary, through the CCMC crisis cell, She/He requests the support of legal staff or lawyers to assist the staff on site, or to verify the contents of the externally press releases from a legal point of view.
- ▶ In the event of the involvement of contractors or service companies, through the support of the CCMC crisis cell, She/He contacts the Representative of the contracting companies and coordinates their communication.
- ▶ She/He decides on the demobilization of the CMC crisis cell by informing the various entities involved.
- ▶ After the crisis, She/He participates in the debriefing with the ICP crisis cell.
- ▶ She/He supports the IC in the drafting of the “End of Crisis Report”.

TOOLS

- ▶ Job Ticket JT26.
- ▶ FO1-3 “Members of the ACP Crisis Cell”.
- ▶ FO2-1 “First Arrived Check List”.
- ▶ FO2-2 “Immediate Action after crisis cells activation”.
- ▶ FO9 – “Press Release Template”.
- ▶ RE1 – “Phone numbers and useful contacts”.
- ▶ Country Crisis Plan - L2-CIA-PR-002.
- ▶ CCMC First Point of Contact - Country CMC Emergency Number - On Call Duty list.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 116 of 314	Rev. 02

JT27	JOB TICKETS	RELATIONS WITH JOINT VENTURE PARTNERS OFFICER
CMC Crisis Cell		

JT27 - RELATIONS WITH JOINT VENTURE PARTNERS OFFICER

SYNTHESIS

- ▶ The role of the **Relations with Joint Venture Partners Officer** is to support the CMC Director in communications with the Joint Venture partners.
- ▶ In coordination with the CMC Director, She/She/He:
 - ➔ Informs the partners of the occurrence of the emergency.
 - ➔ Transmits the requested information after having validated it with the CMC Director.
 - ➔ Coordinates communications with Partners.

LOCATION


The Relations with Joint Venture Partners Officer reaches the CMC Crisis Management Room of TotalEnergies Offices in Milan.

MISSION

- ▶ She/He contacts the persons of the Partners designated for emergency situations.
- ▶ She/He keeps track of requests for information and information transmitted.
- ▶ After the crisis, She/He participates in the final debriefing with the ICP crisis cell.

TOOLS

The JV Partner Relations Officer obtains and maintains any useful supporting documents.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 117 of 314	Rev. 02

JT29	JOB TICKETS	FINANCE AND INSURANCE OFFICER
CMC Cell - FINANCE		

JT28 - FINANCE AND INSURANCE OFFICER

SYNTHESIS

- ▶ The role of the **Finance and Insurance Officer** is to assist the CMC Director in ensuring financial support to deal with the crisis of the plant.
- ▶ Furthermore, the Finance and Insurance Officer is responsible for supporting the CMC Director in matters related to financial, asset and insurance management.
- ▶ The Finance and Insurance Officer of the CMC crisis cell assists the Finance and Administration Officer on Site in the tasks provided by the FINANCE Functional Section of the ICP crisis cell

LOCATION


The Finance and Insurance Officer reaches the CMC Crisis Management Room of TotalEnergies Offices in Milan.

MISSION

- ▶ She/He assists the CMC Director in managing the financial aspects related to the accident (order traceability, insurance, contractual aspects), also with the support of the CCMC crisis cell.
- ▶ She/He interfaces with the Finance and Administration on site for assistance with ongoing activities.
- ▶ To anticipate subsequent requests from insurance companies, She/He requests, through the CMC Director:
 - ➔ Pictures of the event.
 - ➔ Implement a simplified procedure for validating purchases and contracts established as a matter of urgency, to subsequently be able to justify them.
- ▶ After the crisis, She/He participates in the final debriefing with the ICP crisis cell.

TOOLS

The Finance and Insurance Officer obtains and keeps any useful supporting documents.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 118 of 314	Rev. 02

JT29	JOB TICKETS	DIRETTORE RESPONSABILE D. Lgs.624/96
-------------	--------------------	---

JT29 - DIRETTORE RESPONSABILE (D.lgs. 624/96)

SYNTHESIS

If the event of an emergency affects the Mining Area, the Direttore Responsabile of the Tempa Rossa Oil Centre pursuant to Legislative Decree 624/1996 immediately informs the competent authority (UNMIG), by PEC of any event, accident also suspicious that could endanger the safety of people and deposits.

LOCATION


The Direttore Responsabile only if requested by the IC, She/He meets at the ICP Emergency Management Room of TEPIT Offices in Guardia Perticara.

MISSION

- ▶ Reports to the IC.
- ▶ Request information on the incident from the ICP Director.
- ▶ She/He ensures that UNMIG is informed of the emergency and transmits the requested information.
- ▶ Verify the application of emergency procedures according to the DSSC.
- ▶ After the crisis, take part in the debriefing.

TOOLS

The Direttore Responsabile obtains and keeps any useful supporting document.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 119 of 314	Rev. 02

JT30	JOB TICKETS	ICP/CMC ASSISTANT/S
-------------	--------------------	----------------------------

JT30 – ICP/CMC ASSISTANT(S)

SYNTHESIS

As necessary, the Incident Commander or the CMC Director may request the support of staff available in the office for assistance functions.

- ▶ participate in the secretarial tasks.
- ▶ perform the switchboard functions, i.e., answer incoming telephone calls, filter them, and sort/transmit them within the crisis cells ICP and CMC.

LOCATION


The Assistant reaches the ICP/CMC Emergency Management Room.

MISSION

- ▶ She/He ensures that the actions recommended in the Forms **FO2** “Immediate actions after ERP activation” are followed.
- ▶ She/He checks the proper working of the phones in the crisis room switchboard.
- ▶ She/He checks the proper working of the laptop presents in the crisis room.
- ▶ She/He checks that the PC/Telephone connections are active.
- ▶ She/He helps in the mobilization of crisis cell members through telephone contact (**RE1** – “Telephone Numbers and Useful Contacts”) or using the on-duty planning available in each crisis cell.
- ▶ She/He identifies those who call and write down their telephone coordinates before transmitting the calls to the people in the cell concerned.
- ▶ She/He redirects incoming calls according to the distribution of responsibilities contained in the **FO1-2** or **FO1-3** Forms. In case of doubt, refer to the ICP/CMC Director to identify the correct reference.
- ▶ She/He connects your laptop to the available base.
- ▶ She/He opens the dedicated e-mail box according to the cell you belong to
 - ➔ tepit.acp@totalenergies.com (ACP crisis cell).
 - ➔ tepit.icp@totalenergies.com (ICP crisis cell).
 - ➔ tepit.cmc@totalenergies.com (CMC crisis cell).
 - ➔ temparossa.totaleitalia@postecert.it
- ▶ She/He updates the list of those present in the crisis cell (ICP or CMC) according to the Forms **FO1** – “Components of the crisis cell”, then sends it to the other active crisis cells.
- ▶ She/He is available to members of the ICP or CMC crisis cell for secretarial work (computer search of documents, photocopies, etc.).
- ▶ She/He guarantees the supply of the crisis cell in drinks and meals.
- ▶ She/He reports to the ICP/CMC Director.
- ▶ After the crisis, She/He takes part in the debriefing.

TOOLS


- ▶ FO1 – “Components of the crisis cells”.
- ▶ FO2 – “First actions after the activation of ERP”.
- ▶ RE1 - Telephone numbers and useful contacts.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 120 of 314	Rev. 02

SR	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
-----------	--


Section SR

SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 121 of 314	Rev. 02

SR	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
-----------	--

SR	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
SR1	Industrial Accident - Toxic Gas Release.
SR2	Industrial Accident - Flammable Gas / Flash Fire Release.
SR3	Industrial Accident - Jet Fire.
SR4	Industrial Accident - Spill and Pool Fire.
SR5	Industrial Accident - Explosion / UVCE / VCE.
SR6	Industrial Accident - Tank Fire / Boil Over.
SR7	Industrial Accident - Top Major Scenarios - Cards for OC Safety Report top event simulation.
SR8	Accident with Serious Injury or Death.
SR9	Terrorist threat.
SR10	Vegetation fire outside the OC.
SR11	Natural Events (Earthquake/Landslide).
SR12	Transport Accident.
SR13	Fire in Oil Centre Buildings.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 122 of 314	Rev. 02

SR1	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	TOXIC GAS RELEASE
------------	--	--------------------------

SR1 - Industrial Accident - TOXIC GAS RELEASE

Oil Centre	Place / unit where the scenario is possible	Description of the generic scenario
Release of toxic gas with dispersion into the atmosphere, without ignition.	Unit 33 - Area H	Release of toxic gas (H ₂ S or SO ₂) on Claus treatment (SRU unit)
	Unit 32 - Area C	Release of toxic gas (H ₂ S) from the GSU
	Units 10, 24, 25 - Area D, P	Gas release from untreated reservoir or evaporation (flash) in case of loss of reservoir crude in reservoir crude receiving / processing units
	Unit 30, 31 - Area C	Release of toxic gas (H ₂ S) from the reservoir gas compression unit
	Units 44, 45 - Area Q, E	Release of toxic gas (H ₂ S) from Closed Drain and Slop Oil unit
	Unit 49 - Area L	Release of toxic gas (H ₂ S) from the Torch unit.

DESCRIPTION:


- ▶ Loss of Gas containing toxic substances, characterized by process pressure and temperature:
 - ➔ Directional jet of pressurized gas, not very sensitive to wind
 - ➔ Cloud formation. Possibility of dispersion according to weather conditions (wind, humidity, temperature, atmospheric stability, etc.)

DEVELOPMENT - ESCALATION:

- ▶ Fire / Explosion: H₂S is a flammable gas: LEL (Lower Explosive Limit) = 4% vol (4000 ppm)
- ▶ Intoxication or asphyxiation especially if accumulation in confined areas. H₂S is heavier than air and tends to accumulate at the bottom of poorly ventilated spaces.
- ▶ To evaluate the development of the scenario, depending on the unit involved, refer to the specific sheet "SR7 - Industrial Incident - TOP MAJOR SCENARIO PER UNIT".

PRINCIPLES OF PROTECTION:

- ▶ **Avoid triggering** (especially for high H₂S concentrations):
 - ➔ block any heat source.
 - ➔ Turn off the car engine and block traffic.
 - ➔ Switch off equipment not suitable for working in flammable atmospheres (ATEX Zone 1 - cat 2).
- ▶ **Isolate the source of release or limit it.**
- ▶ **Activate Emergency Isolation (ESD), if necessary.**
- ▶ **Activate Blow down – Depressurize, if necessary.**
- ▶ **Contain the material in a controlled area if possible.**
- ▶ **Always move upwind of the release point.**
- ▶ Pay attention to confined spaces in which heavy gases can accumulate (H₂S and SO₂ are heavier than air): **In the event of an injured person being present in areas at risk of toxic gases, alert the control**

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 123 of 314	Rev. 02

SR1	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	TOXIC GAS RELEASE
------------	--	--------------------------


room and do not try to rescue without the prior equipment with self-contained breathing apparatus, if adequately trained and trained in its use.

- ▶ Prevent anyone from entering the site (except for external rescue teams)
- ▶ Activate the Deluge systems in the area, if possible, to disperse the gas and mitigate the effects on a possible explosion.
- ▶ Once the audible alarm system (PA / GA) for toxic gas has been activated (continuous double tone signal and flashing Blue light):
 - ➔ **the personnel present on site wear the escape mask and go to the Muster point.**
 - ➔ **the personnel present in area N, go to the Muster Point (Canteen of Area N), and awaits the directives of the OSC/RSES.**
- ▶ To view the means of protection available, depending on the unit involved, refer to the specific sheet "SR7 - Industrial Accident - TOP MAJOR SCENARIO PER UNIT".

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 124 of 314	Rev. 02

SR1	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	TOXIC GAS RELEASE
------------	--	--------------------------

TOXIC GAS RELEASE	
Key information	Key actions
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Toxic or flammable gas alarm? • Gas detection and position. • Possible sources of ignition near leaks. • Wind direction, wind speed and weather conditions • Number of detectors indicating the gas and at what level • SIMOPS in progress? • Number of people on the site? • Activities in progress (hot work, drilling, entering tanks, etc.) • Degraded situations • Lost or missing? 	<p>Primary</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Call CCR number 100 • Activate toxic gas alarm. • PA/GA - Provide instructions • Avoid ignition • Wear the escape mask go to the Muster Point. • Stopping the unit and depressurizing the unit concerned. • Inform OSC/RSES with key information. • Intervention Team: mobilize first intervention team and medical team. <p>Central Control room</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Isolate Leak at Source (ESD). • Activate the main fire water pumps. • Activate the deluge system where available. • Evaluation of the escalation. <p>Intervention team</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gather and ready on Intervention Leader instruction. • On site: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Send the First Intervention Team and prepare a safe route map to send to OSC / RSES. ◦ Identify the source of the leak and isolate it. Pay attention to confined areas and lower areas where heavy gases can accumulate. ◦ Define the green zone ◦ Give first aid to victims, if possible. • Muster Points • POB count by the collection area manager • Pass the information to OSC / RSES. <p>ICP / CICP/CMC crisis cells</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contact the competent authorities
Escalation-Mitigation measures	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ignition potential of the gas cloud (fire, explosion) • Structural damage. • The collection point can be affected by the loss of HC. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fixed deluge systems and flooding fire extinguishing systems for gas dilution. • Switch off if necessary. • Approach over wind.
Escape routes & Meeting	Means of evacuation
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tempa Rossa staff will meet at the defined Muster Points or at the alternative Muster point announced by PA/GA. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Road transport.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 125 of 314	Rev. 02

SR1	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	TOXIC GAS RELEASE
------------	--	--------------------------

No.	TOXIC GAS RELEASE	Components* ACP Crisis Cell													
		Order	Action	ACP function and number of resources											
				RSES	LI	LS	MEL	EL	CCR SL	CCR Q	SIL	FIT	MED	ARE	
1	Constitution of the ACP Crisis Cell	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1											1
2	RSES - OSC	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1											2
3	Intervention Leader	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1										3
4	Installation Shutdown Leader	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h			1									4
5	Muster and Evacuation Leader	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h				1								5
7	ACP Event Logger	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h					1							7
Securing the implants - Apply REFLEX SHEET															
8	Shut down of the systems from the CCR if the automatic locks have not intervened	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h			1			1	2					8
9	Check that the automatic shut-down has been activated, otherwise activate it manually with the buttons in the field	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1				1	2					9
Safety of workers present															
10	Order the staff present to reach the Muster Points	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h				1		1						10
11	Order the POB count	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h				1							1	11
12	Check the attendance register	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h				1							1	12
13	Send the attendance register to the ICP crisis cell	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h				1							1	13
Relations between the field and ACP Crisis Cell															
14	Transmit all relevant information from the place of the event to the ACP Crisis	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h								1				14
15	Assessment of the situation and the need for additional means	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1	1										15
16	Direction of intervention actions	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1										16
17	Activate the emergency team	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1						1	6			17
18	Use self-contained breathing apparatus for interventions in confined spaces or to access the accident area	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1						1	6			18
19	Avoid sources of ignition	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1						1	6			19
20	Retrieve injured operators, if possible	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1						1	6			20
21	Identify the source of the leak	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1						1	6			21
22	Forbid access to unauthorized persons	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1						1	6			22
23	Isolate the leak manually, if the automatic devices have not intervened and if it is not dangerous. Approach upwind of release.	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1						1	6			23
24	In case of fire, if possible, use water / foam extinguishing devices	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1						1	6			24
25	Activate the medical emergency team	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h										3		25
26	If required, depressurize the equipment	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h			1			1	2					26
27	If necessary, activate the stop of close units	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1	1	1			1	2					27
28	Evaluate possible evolutions of the event	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1	1	1									28
Communications with the ICP Crisis Cell															
29	Inform the Gestore if not present	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1											29
30	Update the event log	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h					1							30
31	Organize the debriefing at the end of the crisis	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1											31
32	Demobilizing the ACP Crisis Cell	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1											32
33	Prepare a report of the event including an improvement plan if necessary	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1				1							33


(*) ON-SCENE COMMANDER (OSC): RSES (1)
Installation Shutdown Leader: LS (1)

Intervention Leader: LI (1)
Muster and Evacuation Leader: MEL (1)

Event Logger: EL (1)
CCR Shutdown Leader: CCR SL (1)
CCR Panel Operator: CCR Q (2)

Site Intervention Team Leader: SIL (1)
First Intervention Team: FIT (6)

Medical Team: MED (3)
Muster Counter: MC (1)

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 126 of 314	Rev. 02

SR2	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	FLAMMABLE GAS RELEASE - FLASH FIRE
------------	--	---

SR2 - Industrial Accident - FLAMMABLE GAS RELEASE - FLASH FIRE


Oil Centre	Place / unit where the scenario is possible	Description of the generic scenario
Release of flammable gas with dispersion into the atmosphere, and ignition in an unconfined area	Units 34, 36 - Area A, B, G	Release of gas (C1, C2) and LPG (C3, C4) from the LPG separation and treatment unit.
	Unit 35 - Area C	Release of flammable gas (C1, C2, C3, C4, etc.) from the gas drying unit.
	Unit 37 - Area A	Release of flammable gas (C1) from the compressor unit of gas for export.
	Unit 30, 31 - Area C	Gas release from reservoir (C1, C2, C3, C4, etc.) not treated by the gas compression unit.
	Units 10, 24, 25 - Area D, P	Untreated gas release from reservoir (C1, C2, C3, C4, etc.) or evaporation (flash) in case of loss of reservoir crude in the receiving / processing units of the crude oil from the reservoir.
	Unit 32 - Area C	Release of flammable gas (gas from reservoir C1, C2, C3, C4, etc.) from the GSU unit (removal of sulfur from the reservoir gas).
	Unit 60 - Area C	Release of flammable gas (C1, C2, C3, C4) from the Fuel Gas compressor unit.
	Unit 64, 68 - Area F	Release of flammable gas (Fuel Gas: C1, C2, C3, C4) from the electricity and steam production unit.
	Unit 33 - Area H	Release of flammable gas (fuel gas) to Claus treatment (SRU unit) and Tail gas treatment (TGTU unit).
	Units 44, 45 - Area Q, E	Flammable gas release from Closed Drain and Slop Oil unit.
	Unit 49 - Area L	Release of flammable gas from the Torch unit.

DESCRIPTION:

- ▶ Loss of Gas containing flammable substances, characterized by process pressure and temperature:
 - ➔ Directional jet of pressurized gas, not very sensitive to wind.
 - ➔ Cloud formation. Possibility of dispersion according to weather conditions (wind, humidity, temperature, atmospheric stability, etc.).

DEVELOPMENT - ESCALATION:

- ▶ Flash Fire is a short-lived phenomenon. However, in the case of Flash Fire, the Fire can spread to other units or areas.
- ▶ The Flash Fire can trigger other flammable gas clouds located in other areas.

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 127 of 314	Rev. 02

SR2	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	FLAMMABLE GAS RELEASE - FLASH FIRE
------------	--	---


- ▶ In the case of delayed ignition, the flammable gas cloud can accumulate inside plant units (areas with partial confinement) or inside confined areas (buildings, etc.). The initiation of these clouds can produce an explosion called UVCE (Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion) or VCE (Vapor Cloud Explosion).
- ▶ To evaluate the development of the scenario, depending on the unit involved, refer to the specific sheet "SR7 - Industrial Incident - TOP MAJOR SCENARIO PER UNIT".

PRINCIPLES OF PROTECTION:

- ▶ **Avoid triggering:**
 - ➔ **block any heat source.**
 - ➔ **turn off the car engine and block traffic.**
 - ➔ **switch off equipment not suitable for working in flammable atmospheres (ATEX Zone 1 - cat 2).**
- ▶ **Isolate the source of release or limit it.**
- ▶ **Activate Emergency Isolation (ESD), if necessary.**
- ▶ **Activate Blow down - Depressurize if necessary.**
- ▶ Contain the material in a controlled area if possible.
- ▶ Always move upwind of the release point.
- ▶ Pay attention to confined spaces in which heavy gases can accumulate (H₂S and SO₂ are heavier than air): In the event of an injured person being present in areas at risk of toxic gases, alert the control room and do not try to rescue without the prior equipment with self-contained breathing apparatus, if adequately trained and trained in its use.
- ▶ Prevent anyone from entering the site (except for external rescue teams).
- ▶ Activate the Deluge systems in the area, if possible, to disperse the gas and mitigate the effects on a possible explosion.
- ▶ Once the audible alarm system (PA / GA) for flammable gas has been activated (general alarm - intermittent tone and red-light flashing):
 - ➔ **the staff present in the field goes to the indicated Muster Point.**
 - ➔ **the staff present in area N, goes to the Muster Point, and awaits the directives of the OSC / RSES.**
 - ➔ **To view the means of protection available, depending on the unit involved, refer to the specific sheet "SR7 - Industrial Accident - TOP MAJOR SCENARIO PER UNIT".**


SPECIAL CASE OF LOSS OF LPG (liquid):

- ▶ In the units where LPG is processed in the liquid state (units 34, 36), the area is paved and curled so that, in the event of release, the spilled liquid is directed and collected in a special well (called impounding basins), positioned at a distance safety and protected by a 3% high expansion AFFFAR foam system.
- ▶ The LPG is then conveyed to these wells to drain the area below the equipment and limit their involvement in case of ignition. Furthermore, once conveyed inside the basin, it is possible to achieve controlled evaporation of the LPG.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 128 of 314	Rev. 02


SR2	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	FLAMMABLE GAS RELEASE - FLASH FIRE
------------	--	---

► Inside each LPG leakage collection well (impounding basins) there are 2 thermosensitive cables. In the event of 1oo2 detection of the cables inside the LPG collection wells, the alarm is activated. In the event of 2oo2, the high expansion foam extinguishing system located above the cockpit is activated.

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 129 of 314	Rev. 02

SR2	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	FLAMMABLE GAS RELEASE - FLASH FIRE
-----	---	------------------------------------

FLASH FIRE / FLASH GAS RELEASE	
Key information	Key actions
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Toxic or flammable gas alarm? • Gas detection and position. • Leak of GPL? • Possible sources of ignition near leaks. • Wind direction, wind speed and weather conditions • Number of detectors indicating the gas and at what level. • SIMOPS in progress? • Number of people on the site? • Activities in progress (hot work, drilling, entering tanks, etc.) • Degraded situations • Lost or missing? 	<p>Primary</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Call CCR number 100 • Activate general alarm. • PA/GA - Provide instructions • Avoid ignition • Wear the escape mask go to the Muster Point. • Stopping the unit and depressurizing the unit concerned. • Inform OSC/RSES with key information. • Intervention Team: mobilize first intervention team and medical team. <p>Central Control room</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Isolate Leak at Source (ESD) • Activate the main fire water pumps. • Activate the deluge system where available. • Evaluation of the escalation. <p>Intervention team</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gather and ready on Intervention Leader instruction. • In case of GPL leak, check if the liquid is collected in the Impounding basin. • On site: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Send the First Intervention Team and prepare a safe route map to send to OSC/RSES. ○ Identify the source of the leak and isolate it. Pay attention to confined areas and lower areas where heavy gases can accumulate. ○ Determine the green zone. ○ give first aid to victims if possible. <p>Muster Points</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • POB count by the Muster and Evacuation Leader • Pass the information to OSC / RSES. <p>ICP / CMC cell</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contact the competent authorities
Escalation-Mitigation measures	
Ignition potential of the gas cloud (fire, explosion) Structural damage. The collection point can be affected by the loss of HC	Fixed deluge systems and flooding fire extinguishing systems for gas dilution. Switch off if necessary. Approach over wind.
Escape routes & Meeting	Means of evacuation
Tempa Rossa staff will meet at the defined Muster Point or at the alternative Muster point announced by PA/GA.	Road transport.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 130 of 314	Rev. 02

SR2	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	FLAMMABLE GAS RELEASE - FLASH FIRE
-----	---	------------------------------------

No.	FLASH FIRE / FLASH GAS RELEASE	Components* ACP Crisis Cell													
		Order	Action	ACP function and number of resources											
				RSES	LI	LS	MEL	EL	CCR SL	CCR Q	SIL	FIT	MED	ARE	
1	Constitution of the ACP Crisis Cell	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1											1
2	RSES - OSC	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1											2
3	Intervention Leader	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1										3
4	Installation Shutdown Leader	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h			1									4
5	Muster and Evacuation Leader	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h				1								5
7	ACP Event Logger	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h					1							7
Securing the implants - Apply REFLEX SHEET															
8	Shut down of the systems from the CCR if the automatic locks have not intervened	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h			1			1	2					8
9	Check that the automatic shut-down has been activated, otherwise activate it manually with the buttons in the field	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1				1	2					9
Safety of workers present															
10	Order the staff present to reach the Muster Points	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h				1		1						10
11	Order the POB count	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h				1							1	11
12	Check the attendance register	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h				1							1	12
13	Send the attendance register to the ICP crisis cell	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h				1							1	13
Relations between the field and ACP Crisis Cell															
14	Transmit all relevant information from the place of the event to the ACP Crisis	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h								1				14
15	Assessment of the situation and the need for additional means	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1	1										15
16	Direction of intervention actions	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1										16
17	Activate the emergency team	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1						1	6			17
18	Use self-contained breathing apparatus for interventions in confined spaces or to access the accident area	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1						1	6			18
19	Avoid sources of ignition	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1						1	6			19
20	Retrieve injured operators, if possible	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1						1	6			20
21	Identify the source of the leak	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1						1	6			21
22	Forbid access to unauthorized persons	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1						1	6			22
23	Isolate the leak manually, if the automatic devices have not intervened and if it is not dangerous. Approach upwind of release.	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1						1	6			23
24	In case of fire, if possible, use water / foam extinguishing devices	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1						1	6			24
25	Activate the medical emergency team	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h										3		25
26	If required, depressurize the equipment	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h			1			1	2					26
27	If necessary, activate the stop of close units	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1	1	1			1	2					27
28	Evaluate possible evolutions of the event	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1	1	1									28
Communications with the ICP Crisis Cell															
29	Inform the Gestore if not present	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1											29
30	Update the event log	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h					1							30
31	Organize the debriefing at the end of the crisis	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1											31
32	Demobilizing the ACP Crisis Cell	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1											32
33	Prepare a report of the event including an improvement plan if necessary	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1				1							33


(*) ON-SCENE COMMANDER (OSC): RSES (1)
Installation Shutdown Leader: LS (1)

Intervention Leader: LI (1)
Muster and Evacuation Leader: MEL (1)

Event Logger: EL (1)
CCR Shutdown Leader: CCR SL (1)
CCR Panel Operator: CCR Q (2)

Site Intervention Team Leader: SIL (1)
First Intervention Team: FIT (6)

Medical Team: MED (3)
Muster Counter: MC (1)

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 131 of 314	Rev. 02

SR3	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	JET FIRE
------------	--	-----------------

SR3 - Industrial Accident - JET FIRE

Oil Centre	Place / unit where the scenario is possible	Description of the generic scenario
Release of flammable gas under pressure with ignition and production of a fiery jet (Jet Fire)	Units 34, 36 - Area A, B, G	Jet Fire following a leak of flammable gas under pressure from the LPG separation and treatment unit.
	Unit 35 - Area C	Jet Fire following a leak of flammable gas under pressure from the gas drying unit.
	Unit 37 - Area A	Jet Fire due to a leak of flammable gas under pressure from the compressor unit of gas for export.
	Unit 30, 31 - Area C	Jet Fire due to a leak of flammable gas under pressure from the gas compression unit.
	Units 10, 24, 25 - Area D, P	Jet Fire following loss of flammable gas under pressure from the receiving / processing units of the crude oil from the field.
	Unit 32 - Area C	Jet Fire following a leak of flammable gas under pressure from the GSU unit (removal of sulfur from the reservoir gas).
	Unit 60 - Area C	Jet Fire following a leak of flammable gas under pressure from the Fuel Gas compressor unit.
	Unit 64, 68 - Area F	Jet Fire following a leak of flammable gas under pressure from the electricity and steam production unit.

DESCRIPTION:


- ▶ Loss of gas containing flammable substances, characterized by pressure (min 2 bar) and process temperature:
 - ➔ Directional jet of pressurized gas, not very sensitive to wind.
 - ➔ Starting of the jet, immediate or delayed.

DEVELOPMENT - ESCALATION:

- ▶ Fire on other appliances or units.
- ▶ If the fire is not ignited, the pool of flammable liquid can evaporate (flash) and produce a cloud of flammable / toxic gas.
- ▶ Radiation towards other devices and capacities with increased pressure of the fluid inside and possible explosion.
- ▶ To evaluate the development of the scenario, depending on the unit involved, refer to the specific sheet "SR7 - Industrial Incident - TOP MAJOR SCENARIO PER UNIT".

PRINCIPLES OF PROTECTION:

- ▶ **Avoid triggering:**
 - ➔ block any heat source.
 - ➔ Turn off the car engine and block traffic.

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 132 of 314	Rev. 02

SR3	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	JET FIRE
------------	--	-----------------


➔ if it is possible to form a non-lit flammable cloud, turn off the devices not suitable for working in flammable atmosphere (ATEX Zone 1 - cat 2).

- ▶ **Isolate the source of release or limit it.**
- ▶ **Activate Emergency Isolation (ESD), if necessary.**
- ▶ **Activate Blow down - Depressurize if necessary.**
- ▶ Contain the material in a controlled area if possible.
- ▶ Always move upwind of the release point.
- ▶ Pay attention to confined spaces in which heavy gases can accumulate (H₂S and SO₂ are heavier than air): In the event of an injured person being present in areas at risk of toxic gases, alert the control room and do not try to rescue without the prior equipment with self-contained breathing apparatus, if adequately trained and trained in its use.
- ▶ Prevent anyone from entering the site (except for external rescue teams).
- ▶ **Activate the Deluge systems in the area, if present, to cool the appliances and neighboring capacities.**
- ▶ Once the audible alarm system (PA/GA) for flammable gas has been activated (general alarm - intermittent tone and red-light flashing):
 - ➔ the staff present in the field goes to the indicated muster point.
 - ➔ the staff present in area N, goes to the Muster Point (Canteen-Area N), and awaits the directives of the OSC/RSES.
- ▶ To view the means of protection available, depending on the unit involved, refer to the specific sheet "SR7 - Industrial Accident - TOP MAJOR SCENARIO PER UNIT".

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 133 of 314	Rev. 02

SR3	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	JET FIRE
------------	--	-----------------

JET FIRE	
Key information	Key actions
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Toxic gas or General alarm (flammable gas, fire)? • F&G survey: Type (gas, flame, heat), Number, Position, Level. • Wind direction, wind speed and weather conditions. • Flame Length • Appliances / Machines / Structures / Buildings impacted by fire. • SIMOPS in progress? • Number of people on the site? • Activities in progress (hot work, drilling, entering tanks, etc.) • Degraded situations • Lost or missing? 	<p>Primary</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Call CCR number 100 • Activate general alarm. • PA/GA - Provide instructions • If necessary (depending on the area), if the portable H₂S detector indicates the presence of toxic gas along the way, wear the escape mask to go immediately to the Muster Points. • Unit shutdown (ESD) and depressurization of the affected unit. • Inform OSC/ SES with key information • Intervention Team: mobilize first intervention team and medical team. <p>Control room</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Isolate Leak at Source (ESD) • Activate the main fire water pumps • Activate the deluge system where available • Evaluation of the escalation <p>Intervention team</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gather and ready on Intervention Leader instruction. • On site: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Send the First Intervention Team and prepare a safe route map to send to OSC/RSES. ○ Identify the source of the leak and isolate it. Pay attention to confined areas and lower areas where heavy gases can accumulate. ○ Define the green zone. ○ give first aid to victims if possible. <p>Muster Points</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • POB count by the Muster and Evacuation Leader • Pass the information to OSC / RSES. <p>ICP / CMC cell</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contact the competent authorities
Escalation-Mitigation measures	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Irradiation towards other devices/ capacities / machines. • If there is no ignition, a cloud of flammable / toxic gases can be formed. • Structural damage. • The collection point can be affected by the loss of HC. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fixed deluge systems and fire-fighting systems • Turn off if necessary (the best strategy in case of Jet Fire is to isolate the gas leak or depressurize). • Cool the close appliances exposed to thermal radiation by means of water-based fire-fighting systems (deluge, hydrants, water monitors): give priority to cooling the capacities (vessels, tanks) containing liquid. • Approach over wind.
Escape routes & Meeting	Means of evacuation
Tempa Rossa staff will meet at the defined Muster Point or at the alternative Muster point announced by PA/GA.	Road transport

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 134 of 314	Rev. 02

SR3	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	JET FIRE
------------	--	-----------------

No.	JET FIRE	Components* ACP Crisis Cell													
		Order	Action	ACP function and number of resources											
				RSES	LI	LS	MEL	EL	CCR SL	CCR Q	SIL	FIT	MED	ARE	
1	Constitution of the ACP Crisis Cell	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1											1
2	RSES - OSC	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1											2
3	Intervention Leader	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1										3
4	Installation Shutdown Leader	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h			1									4
5	Muster and Evacuation Leader	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h				1								5
7	ACP Event Logger	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h					1							7
Securing the implants - Apply REFLEX SHEET															
8	Shut down of the systems from the CCR if the automatic locks have not intervened	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h			1			1	2					8
9	Check that the automatic shut-down has been activated, otherwise activate it manually with the buttons in the field	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1				1	2					9
Safety of workers present															
10	Order the staff present to reach the Muster Points	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h				1		1						10
11	Order the POB count	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h				1							1	11
12	Check the attendance register	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h				1							1	12
13	Send the attendance register to the ICP crisis cell	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h				1							1	13
Relations between the field and ACP Crisis Cell															
14	Transmit all relevant information from the place of the event to the ACP Crisis	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h								1				14
15	Assessment of the situation and the need for additional means	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1	1										15
16	Direction of intervention actions	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1										16
17	Activate the emergency team	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1						1	6			17
18	Use self-contained breathing apparatus for interventions in confined spaces or to access the accident area	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1						1	6			18
19	Avoid sources of ignition	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1						1	6			19
20	Retrieve injured operators, if possible	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1						1	6			20
21	Identify the source of the leak	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1						1	6			21
22	Forbid access to unauthorized persons	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1						1	6			22
23	Isolate the leak manually, if the automatic devices have not intervened and if it is not dangerous. Approach upwind of release.	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1						1	6			23
24	If possible, use the water / foam extinguishing devices to cool the equipment adjacent to the jet fire	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1						1	6			24
25	Activate the medical emergency team	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h										3		25
26	If required, depressurize the equipment	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h			1			1	2					26
27	If necessary, activate the stop of close units	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1	1	1			1	2					27
28	Evaluate possible evolutions of the event	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1	1	1									28
Communications with the ICP Crisis Cell															
29	Inform the Gestore if not present	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1											29
30	Update the event log	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h					1							30
31	Organize the debriefing at the end of the crisis	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1											31
32	Demobilizing the ACP Crisis Cell	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1											32
33	Prepare a report of the event including an improvement plan if necessary	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1				1							33


(*) ON-SCENE COMMANDER (OSC): RSES (1)
Installation Shutdown Leader: LS (1)

Intervention Leader: LI (1)
Muster and Evacuation Leader: MEL (1)

Event Logger: EL (1)
CCR Shutdown Leader: CCR SL (1)
CCR Panel Operator: CCR Q (2)

Site Intervention Team Leader: SIL (1)
First Intervention Team: FIT (6)

Medical Team: MED (3)
Muster Counter: MC (1)

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 135 of 314	Rev. 02

SR4	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	SPILL - POOL FIRE
------------	--	--------------------------

SR4 - Industrial Accident - SPILL and POOL FIRE

Oil Centre	Place / unit where the scenario is possible	Description of the generic scenario
Release of flammable / combustible liquid with initiation and formation of a pool fire	Unit 26 - Area E	Crude oil fire near tank 30-TF-2601 A / B*.
	Unit 45 - Area E	Slop Oil Fire near tank 30-TR-4501*.
	Unit 40 - Area Q	Oil fire (supernatant) near tank 30-TR-4001*.
	Unit 63 - Area M	Diesel fire near tank 30-TR-6301*.
	Units 10, 24, 25 - Area D, P	Crude pool fire after release from the crude oil receiving / processing units from the field.
	Units 44, 45 - Area Q, E	Oil pool fire after release from Closed Drain and Slop Oil units.
	Unit 49 - Area L	Crude pool fire after release from Torch unit.
	Unit 65 - Chemical additive injection packages	Fire of flammable chemical additives.
	All units - All areas	Crude oil pool fire after release of lubricating oil from machines (pumps, compressors, fans, etc.).
	Unit 05 - Emergency Generators - Area M, S	Diesel fire in the emergency generator (30-GE-0501, 30-GE-0502).
	Electrical substations SS1 and SS2 - Electrical transformers - Area M, G	Pool fire of dielectric oil from electrical transformers
	Units 34, 36 - Area A, B, G	Liquid LPG release (C3, C4) from the LPG separation and treatment unit.

***NOTE: for fire in the tank or inside the containment basin, refer to sheet SR6: TANK FIRE / BOIL-OVER**

DESCRIPTION:

- ▶ Leakage of flammable / combustible liquid and formation of a pool in extension.
- ▶ The pool can be limited by curbs, containment basins or by the drainage system that allows to evacuate the spilled liquid.
- ▶ The pool can evaporate if the liquid has a temperature above the flash point and create a flammable cloud. In the case of LPG, the evaporation of the liquid is very important (1 volume of liquid produces about 250 volumes of gas).
- ▶ The pool can ignite and generate a fire (Pool Fire).

DEVELOPMENT - ESCALATION:

- ▶ If not ignited, the pool can evaporate and form a cloud of flammable and / or toxic vapors. The cloud can disperse towards the inside of the unit or towards other units and generate a Flash Fire or an Explosion (UVCE, VCE).
- ▶ If the pool is turned on, radiation to other appliances / capacities / machines and spread of fire to other appliances or units.
- ▶ If the fire is not ignited (or if it is extinguished after initially igniting), the pool of flammable liquid can evaporate (flash) and produce a cloud of flammable / toxic gas.


 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 136 of 314	Rev. 02

SR4	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	SPILL - POOL FIRE
------------	--	--------------------------

- ▶ Radiation towards other devices and capacities with increased pressure of the fluid inside and possible explosion.
- ▶ Development of toxic fumes and / or vapors (high toxicity of the fumes in case of fire of chemical additives).
- ▶ To evaluate the development of the scenario, depending on the unit involved, refer to the specific sheet “SR7 - Industrial Incident - TOP MAJOR SCENARIO PER UNIT”.

PRINCIPLES OF PROTECTION:


- ▶ **Avoid priming:**
 - ➔ block any heat source.
 - ➔ Turn off the car engine and block traffic.
 - ➔ switch off equipment not suitable for working in flammable atmospheres (ATEX Zone 1 - cat 2).
- ▶ Isolate the source of release or limit it.
- ▶ Depressurize if necessary.
- ▶ Contain the material in a controlled area if possible.
- ▶ **If the pool is not primed, provide for the possibility of applying a layer of foam to limit evaporation.** The foam can be applied via the monitors with foam reservoir or via the fixed devices (zone E).
- ▶ **If the pool is triggered, provide for the application of foam to put out the fire.** The foam can be applied via the monitors with foam reservoir or via the fixed devices (zone E).
- ▶ Always move upwind of the release point.
- ▶ Pay attention to confined spaces in which heavy gases can accumulate (H_2S and SO_2 are heavier than air): In the event of an injured person being present in areas at risk of toxic gases, alert the control room and do not try to rescue without the prior equipment with self-contained breathing apparatus, if adequately trained and trained in its use.
- ▶ Prevent anyone from entering the site (except for external rescue teams).
- ▶ Activate Emergency Isolation (ESD).
- ▶ Activate Blow down (depressurization).
- ▶ **Activate the Deluge systems in the area, if present, to cool the appliances and neighboring capacities.**
- ▶ Once the audible alarm system (PA/GA) for flammable gas has been activated (general alarm - intermittent tone and red-light signal):
 - ➔ the staff present in the field goes to the indicated muster point;
 - ➔ the staff present in area N, goes to the Muster Point, and awaits the directives of the OSC / RSES.
- ▶ **Make sure that the extinguishing water storage basin is closed to the receiving bodies (30-ESDV-57004 closed).**
- ▶ To view the means of protection available, depending on the unit involved, refer to the specific sheet “SR7 - Industrial Accident - TOP MAJOR SCENARIO PER UNIT”.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 137 of 314	Rev. 02

SR4	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	SPILL - POOL FIRE
------------	--	--------------------------


SPECIAL CASE OF LOSS OF LPG (liquid):

- ▶ In the units where LPG is processed in the liquid state (units 34, 36), the area is paved and curled so that, in the event of release, the spilled liquid is directed and collected in a special well (called impounding basins), positioned at a distance safety and protected by a 3% high expansion AFFFAR foam system.
- ▶ The LPG is then conveyed to these wells to drain the area below the equipment and limit their involvement in case of ignition. Furthermore, once conveyed inside the basin, it is possible to achieve controlled evaporation of the LPG.
- ▶ Inside each LPG leakage collection well (impounding basins) there are 2 thermosensitive cables. In the event of 1oo2 detection of the cables inside the LPG collection wells, the alarm is activated. In the event of 2oo2, the high expansion foam extinguishing system located above the cockpit is activated.

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 138 of 314	Rev. 02

SR4	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	SPILL - POOL FIRE
------------	--	--------------------------

SPILL and POOL FIRE	
Key information	Key actions
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Toxic gas or General alarm (flammable gas, fire)? • F&G survey: Type (gas, flame, heat), Number, Position, Level. • Wind direction, wind speed and weather conditions. • Is the pool triggered? Fire? • Pool Size and Flame Height • Appliances / Machines / Structures / Buildings impacted by fire. • 30-ESDV-57004 closed? • SIMOPS in progress? • Number of people on the site? • Activities in progress (hot work, drilling, entering tanks, etc.) • Degraded situations • Wounded or missing? 	<p>Primary</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Call CCR number 100 • Activate general alarm. • PA/GA - Provide instructions • If necessary (depending on the area), if the portable H₂S detector indicates the presence of toxic gas along the way, wear the escape mask to go immediately to the Muster Points. • Stopping the unit and depressurizing the unit concerned. • Inform OSC/RSES with key information • Intervention Team: mobilize first intervention and medical teams. <p>Central Control room</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Isolate Leak at Source (ESD) • Activate the main fire water pumps • Activate the deluge system to cool close appliances • Activate fixed extinguishing systems (foam systems) • Monitoring of foam reserves: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - zone E foam tanks: 30-VZ-0107 and 30-VZ-0108 (2x20m³). - tank per monitor: 1 m³ • Evaluation of the escalation • Make sure that the extinguishing water storage basin is closed to the receiving bodies (30-ESDV-57004 closed). <p>Intervention team</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gather and ready on Intervention Leader instruction. • On site: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Send the First Intervention Team and prepare a safe route map to send to OSC/RSES. ○ Identify the source of the leak and isolate it manually if possible. Pay attention to confined areas and lower areas where heavy gases can accumulate. ○ Prepare the fire attack by means of local devices (monitors, hydrants) as an alternative or in parallel to the fixed systems. ○ If the pool is not primed, use foam to limit evaporation. ○ In case of LPG leak, check if the liquid is collected in the Impounding basin and the activation of the high expansion foam system. ○ Determine the green zone ○ Give first aid to victims. • Muster Points • POB count by the collection area manager • Pass the information to OSC/RSES. <p>ICP / CICP/CMC crisis cells</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contact the competent authorities
Escalation-Mitigation measures	

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 139 of 314	Rev. 02

SR4	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	SPILL - POOL FIRE
------------	--	--------------------------

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Irradiation towards other devices / capacities / machines. • If there is no ignition, possible evaporation of the liquid and formation of a cloud of flammable / toxic gases. • Structural damage. • The Muster Points can be affected by the loss of HC and the development of fumes. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fixed deluge systems and fire-fighting systems • If necessary, extinguish with foam in case of HC fire • Approach over wind.
Escape routes & Meeting	Means of evacuation
Tempa Rossa staff will reach the defined Muster Point or at the alternative Muster point announced by PA/GA.	Road transport

SR4	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	SPILL - POOL FIRE
-----	---	-------------------

No.	POOL FIRE	Components* ACP Crisis Cell													
		Order	Action	ACP function and number of resources											
				RSES	LI	LS	MEL	EL	CCR SL	CCR Q	SIL	FIT	MED	ARE	
1	Constitution of the ACP Crisis Cell	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1											1
2	RSES - OSC	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1											2
3	Intervention Leader	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1										3
4	Installation Shutdown Leader	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h			1									4
5	Muster and Evacuation Leader	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h				1								5
7	ACP Event Logger	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h					1							7
Securing the implants - Apply REFLEX SHEET															
8	Shut down of the systems from the CCR if the automatic locks have not intervened	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h			1			1	2					8
9	Check that the automatic shut-down has been activated, otherwise activate it manually with the buttons in the field	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1				1	2					9
Safety of workers present															
10	Order the staff present to reach the Muster Points	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h				1		1						10
11	Order the POB count	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h				1							1	11
12	Check the attendance register	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h				1							1	12
13	Send the attendance register to the ICP crisis cell	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h				1							1	13
Relations between the field and PCA															
14	Transmit all relevant information from the place of the event to the ACP Crisis	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h								1				14
15	Assessment of the situation and the need for additional means	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1	1										15
16	Direction of intervention actions	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1										16
17	Activate the emergency team	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1						1	6			17
18	Use self-contained breathing apparatus for interventions in confined spaces or to access the accident area	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1						1	6			18
19	Avoid sources of ignition	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1						1	6			19
20	Retrieve injured operators, if possible	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1						1	6			20
21	Identify the source of the leak generating the spill	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1						1	6			21
22	Forbid access to unauthorized persons	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1						1	6			22
23	Isolate the leak manually, if the automatic devices have not intervened and if it is not dangerous. Approach upwind of release	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1						1	6			23
24	If possible, use water / foam extinguishing devices, also to cool the appliances adjacent to the pool fire	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1						1	6			24
25	Activate the medical emergency team	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h										3		25
26	If required, depressurize the equipment	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h			1			1	2					26
27	If necessary, activate the stop of close units	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1	1	1			1	2					27
28	Evaluate possible evolutions of the event	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1	1	1									28
Communications with the ICP Cell															
29	Inform the Gestore if not present	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1											29
30	Update the event log	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h					1							30
31	Organize the debriefing at the end of the crisis	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1											31
32	Demobilizing the ACP Crisis Cell	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1											32
33	Prepare a report of the event including an improvement plan if necessary	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1				1							33


(*) ON-SCENE COMMANDER (OSC): RSES (1)
Installation Shutdown Leader: LS (1)

Intervention Leader: LI (1)
Muster and Evacuation Leader: MEL (1)

Event Logger: EL (1)
CCR Shutdown Leader: CCR SL (1)
CCR Panel Operator: CCR Q (2)

Site Intervention Team Leader: SIL (1)
First Intervention Team: FIT (6)

Medical Team: MED (3)
Muster Counter: MC (1)

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 141 of 314	Rev. 02


SR5	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	EXPLOSION - UVCE - VCE
------------	--	-------------------------------

SR5 - Industrial Accident - EXPLOSION / UVCE / VCE

Oil Centre	Place / unit where the scenario is possible	Description of the generic scenario
Release of flammable gas with dispersion into the atmosphere, without immediate ignition, but with delayed ignition in confined / semi-confined area	Units 34, 36 - Area A, B, G	Release of gas (C1, C2) and LPG (C3, C4) from the LPG separation and treatment unit.
	Unit 35 - Area C	Release of flammable gas (C1, C2, C3, C4, etc) from the e unit gas drying.
	Unit 37 - Area A	Release of flammable gas (C1) from the compressor unit of gas for export.
	Unit 30, 31 - Area C	Gas release from reservoir (C1, C2, C3, C4, etc.) not treated by the gas compression unit.
	Units 10, 24, 25 - Area D, P	Untreated gas release from reservoir (C1, C2, C3, C4, etc.) or evaporation (flash) in case of loss of reservoir crude in the receiving / processing units of the crude oil from the reservoir.
	Unit 32 - Area C	Release of flammable gas (gas from reservoir C1, C2, C3, C4, etc.) from the GSU unit (removal of sulfur from the reservoir gas).
	Unit 60 - Area C	Release of flammable gas (C1, C2, C3, C4) from the Fuel Gas compressor unit.
	Unit 64, 68 - Area F	Release of flammable gas (Fuel Gas: C1, C2, C3, C4) from the electricity and steam production unit.
	Unit 33 - Area H	Release of flammable gas (fuel gas) to Claus treatment (SRU unit) and Tail gas treatment (TGTU unit).
	Units 44, 45 - Area Q, E	Flammable gas release from Closed Drain and Slop Oil unit.
	Unit 49 - Area L	Release of flammable gas from the Torch unit.

DESCRIPTION:

- ▶ The term "explosion" defines all those phenomena in which, in a very short time, there is a release of energy in the form of shock waves (overpressure waves) capable of producing significant damage to things and / or people.
- ▶ In the case of delayed ignition, the flammable gas cloud can accumulate inside plant units (areas with partial confinement) or inside confined areas (buildings, etc.).
- ▶ The initiation of these clouds can produce an explosion called UVCE (Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion) or VCE (Vapor Cloud Explosion).
- ▶ Two types of explosion can occur:
 - ➔ "Mechanical" explosion: bursting of a pressure vessel, increasing pressure in the pipe network.
 - ➔ It depends on the internal pressure.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 142 of 314	Rev. 02

SR5	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	EXPLOSION - UVCE - VCE
------------	--	-------------------------------


➔ Hydrocarbon Explosion: Presence of a high quantity of gaseous hydrocarbons within the flammability and ignition limits:

- it depends on the amount of gas and the dispersion of the cloud.
- Possible significant damage considering the size and location of the source.

DEVELOPMENT - ESCALATION:

- ▶ Release, fire, and damage to equipment even over long distances.
- ▶ To evaluate the development of the scenario, depending on the unit involved, refer to the specific sheet “SR7 - Industrial Incident - TOP MAJOR SCENARIO PER UNIT”.


SITE	FIRE ZONE / LAYOUT ZONE	UNITS	Design criteria	
			DLB - Ductility Level Blast	SLB - Strength Level Blast
SITE 1 Oil Centre	Fire Zone 3	Unit 01	0,25 barg 100 ms duration EW = 130 m/s	0,08 barg 100 ms duration EW = 80 m/s
		Unit 05		
		Unit 33		
		Unit 54		
		Unit 60		
		Unit 61		
		Unit 62		
		Unit 63		
		Unit 64		
		Unit 67		
		Unit 68		
SITE 1 Oil Centre	Fire Zone 2 Sub-zone E	Unit 26	0,25 barg 100 ms duration EW = 130 m/s	0,08 barg 100 ms duration EW = 80 m/s
		Unit 45		
		Unit 69		
	Fire Zone 2 Sub-zones A, B, C, D	Unit 24	0,45 barg 100 ms duration EW = 170 m/s	0,15 barg 100 ms duration EW = 100 m/s
		Unit 25		
		Unit 30		
		Unit 31		
		Unit 32		
		Unit 34		
		Unit 35		
		Unit 36		
		Unit 37		
		Unit 60		
		Unit 66		

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 143 of 314	Rev. 02

SR5	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	EXPLOSION - UVCE - VCE
------------	--	-------------------------------

► NOTE: For the Oil Centre, the appliances, structures, and buildings are sized to withstand an explosion estimated as credible, according to the following values:

SITE	FIRE ZONE / LAYOUT ZONE	UNITS	Design criteria	
			DLB - Ductility Level Blast	SLB - Strength Level Blast
SITE 1 Oil Centre	Fire Zone 1	Unit 1A/B/C/D/E/F Unit 10 Unit 34 Unit 36 Unit 37 Unit 38 Unit 40 Unit 44 Unit 49 Unit 54 Unit 60 Unit 68	0,25 barg 100 ms duration EW = 130 m/s	0,08 barg 100 ms duration EW = 80 m/s
	Flare stack	Unit 49	0,08 barg 100 ms duration EW = 80 m/s	0,03 barg (see remark) 100 ms duration
	Fire water tank	Unit 01	0,11 barg 100 ms duration	n.a.
	Crude tanks	Unit 26	0,13 barg 100 ms duration	n.a.

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 144 of 314	Rev. 02

SR5	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	EXPLOSION - UVCE - VCE
------------	--	-------------------------------

SITE	BUILDING IDENTIFICATION	Design criteria
SITE 1 Oil Centre	Technical building	0,18 barg 100 ms duration
	Electrical substation SS-2	0,20 barg 100 ms duration
	Fire water pumps building	0,19 barg 100 ms duration

PRINCIPLES OF PROTECTION:

- ▶ Suspend and leave them safely any work in progress in the affected area and surrounding areas.
- ▶ Move away from the event area, together with any third-party company personnel, moving to a safe area, communicating your position, situation, and the presence of any injured persons to the person in charge of reference.
- ▶ Where possible, intercept the line and / or equipment affected by residual leaks. Activate Emergency Isolation (ESD).
- ▶ **Activate Blow down - Depressurize if necessary.**
- ▶ Activate fixed fire-fighting devices for cooling units and neighboring equipment if available.
- ▶ Activate the Deluge systems in the area, if possible, to disperse the gas and mitigate the effects on a possible explosion.
- ▶ Always move upwind of the release point.
- ▶ Pay attention to confined spaces in which heavy gases can accumulate (H_2S and SO_2 are heavier than air): In the event of an injured person being present in areas at risk of toxic gases, alert the control room and do not try to rescue without the prior equipment with self-contained breathing apparatus, if adequately trained and trained in its use.
- ▶ Prevent anyone from entering the site (except for external rescue teams).
- ▶ Once the audible alarm system (PA/GA) for flammable gas has been activated (general alarm - intermittent tone and red-light signal):
 - ➔ the staff present in the field goes to the indicated muster point.
 - ➔ the staff present in area N, goes to the muster point, and awaits the directives of the OSC / RSES.
- ▶ To view the means of protection available, depending on the unit involved, refer to the specific sheet "SR7 - Industrial Accident - TOP MAJOR SCENARIO PER UNIT".

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 145 of 314	Rev. 02

SR5	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	EXPLOSION - UVCE - VCE
------------	--	-------------------------------

VCE/UVCE/EXPLOSION	
Key information	Key actions
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Activation of the fire pumps? LEL level and H₂S concentration in the various areas. Wind direction, weather conditions activation of ESD1? Blowdown activated? Number of people on the site Activities in progress (hot work, drilling, entering tanks, etc.) Degraded situations Wounded or missing? 	<p>Primary</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Call CCR number 100 Activate the General Alarms. PA/GA - Provide instructions If necessary (depending on the area), if the portable H₂S detector indicates the presence of toxic gas along the way, wear the escape mask and go immediately to the designated collection area. Stopping the unit and depressurizing the unit concerned. Intervention Team: mobilize first intervention team and medical team. <p>Control room</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Isolate the leak at source (ESD). Turn off potential sources of ignition. Evaluation of the escalation <p>Intervention team</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Gather and ready to the site intervention if there is no fire / explosion risk. <p>On site:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> If there is no fire / explosion risk, send the First Intervention Team and prepare a safe map to send to OSC / RSES <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identify the source of the leak and isolate it. Pay attention to confined areas and lower areas where heavy gases can accumulate. Define the green zone Give first aid to victims, if possible. <p>Muster Points</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> POB count by the collection area manager Pass the information to OSC / RSES. <p>ICP / CMC crisis cell</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Contact the competent authorities
Escalation-Mitigation measures	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ignition potential of the gas cloud (fire, explosion) Structural damage. The collection point can be affected by the loss of HC Impairment of escape routes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fixed deluge systems and flooding fire extinguishing systems for gas dilution Switch off if necessary Approach over wind.
Escape routes & Meeting	Means of evacuation
Tempa Rossa staff will meet at the defined Muster Point or at the alternative Muster point announced by PA/GA.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Road transport

SR5	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	EXPLOSION - UVCE - VCE
------------	--	-------------------------------

No.	EXPLOSION / UVCE / VCE	Components* ACP Crisis Cell													
		Order	Action	ACP function and number of resources											
				RSES	LI	LS	MEL	EL	CCR SL	CCR Q	SIL	FIT	MED	ARE	
1	Constitution of the ACP Crisis Cell	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1											1
2	RSES - OSC	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1											2
3	Intervention Leader	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1										3
4	Installation Shutdown Leader	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h			1									4
5	Muster and Evacuation Leader	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h				1								5
7	ACP Event Logger	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h					1							7
Securing the implants - Apply REFLEX SHEET															
8	Shut down of the systems from the Control Room if the automatic locks have not intervened	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h			1			1	2					8
9	Check that the automatic shut-down has been activated, otherwise activate it manually with the buttons in the field, etc.)	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1				1	2					9
Safety of workers present															
10	Order the staff present to reach the Muster Points	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h				1		1						10
11	Order the POB count	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h				1							1	11
12	Check the attendance register	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h				1							1	12
13	Send the attendance register to the ICP crisis cell	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h				1							1	13
Relations between the field and ACP Crisis Cell															
14	Transmit all relevant information from the place of the event to the ACP Crisis	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h				1				1				14
15	Assessment of the situation and the need for additional means	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1	1										15
16	Direction of intervention actions	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1										16
17	Activate the emergency team	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1						1	6			17
18	Use self-contained breathing apparatus for interventions in confined spaces or to access the accident area	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1						1	6			18
19	Avoid sources of ignition	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1						1	6			19
20	Retrieve injured operators, if possible	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1						1	6			20
21	Identify if there are any leaks after the explosion. Identify structures damaged by the explosion	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1						1	6			21
22	Forbid access to unauthorized persons	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1						1	6			22
23	Isolate the leak (s) manually if the automatic devices have not intervened and if it is not dangerous. Approach upwind of release	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1						1	6			23
24	In the event of a fire, if possible, use water / foam extinguishing devices, also to cool the appliances adjacent to the fire.	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1						1	6			24
25	Activate the medical emergency team	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h										5		25
26	If required, depressurize the equipment	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h			1			1	2					26
27	If necessary, activate the stop of close units	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1	1	1			1	2					27
28	Evaluate possible evolutions of the event	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1	1	1									28
Communications with the ICP Cell															
29	Inform the Gestore if not present	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1											29
30	Update the event log	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h					1							30
31	Organize the debriefing at the end of the crisis	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h												31
32	Demobilizing the ACP Crisis Cell	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1											32
33	Prepare a report of the event including an improvement plan if necessary	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1				1							33


(*) ON-SCENE COMMANDER (OSC): RSES (1)
Installation Shutdown Leader: LS (1)

Intervention Leader: LI (1)
Muster and Evacuation Leader: MEL (1)

Event Logger: EL (1)
CCR Shutdown Leader: CCR SL (1)
CCR Panel Operator: CCR Q (2)

Site Intervention Team Leader: SIL (1)
First Intervention Team: FIT (6)

Medical Team: MED (3)
Muster Counter: MC (1)

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 147 of 314	Rev. 02

S6	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	TANK FIRE - BOIL-OVER
-----------	--	------------------------------

SR6 - Industrial Accident - TANK FIRE / BOIL-OVER

Oil Centre	Place / unit where the scenario is possible	Description of the generic scenario
Tank Fire	Unit 26 - Area E	Tank Fire stabilized oil storage tank 30-TF-2601 A / B.
		Fire in the rim seal of the stabilized oil storage tank 30-TF-2601 A / B.
		Release of crude oil inside the containment basin of tanks 30-TF-2601 A / B and priming of the pool.
	Unit 45 - Area E	Tank Fire Storage Tank Slop Oil 30-TR-4501.
	Unit 40 - Area Q	Tank Fire inlet tank production water treatment unit 30-TR-4001 - Oil fire (supernatant).
	Unit 63 - Area M	Diesel fire in tank 30-TR-6301.
Boil Over	Unit 26 - Area E	Boil Over from stabilized oil storage tank.
	Unit 45 - Area E	Boil Over from Slop Oil storage tank.

DESCRIPTION:

Tank Fire:

- The tanks containing a flammable or combustible liquid are as follows:

TAG	FLUID	ROOF
30-TF-2601 A	Stabilized crude oil	Floating
30-TF-2601 B	Stabilized crude oil	Floating
30-TR-4501	SLOP Oil	Fixed (Conical)
30-TR-4001	Production water (supernatant oil)	Fixed (Conical)
30-TR-6301	Diesel fuel	Fixed (Conical)

- The fire scenario of a storage tank containing hydrocarbons can be presented according to the following types:

1. Fire limited to only the rim seal - most likely scenario.
2. Fire started on the seal and spread to the entire roof surface.
3. Fire started and developed on the entire surface of the tank.

- The spread of the fire to the entire surface of the roof can lead to the collapse of the roof.
- To evaluate the development of the scenario, depending on the unit involved, refer to the specific sheet "SR7 - Industrial Incident - TOP MAJOR SCENARIO PER UNIT".

Boil-Over:


- The Boil Over is a dangerous phenomenon characterized by thermal effects that occur during the combustion of hydrocarbons such as crude oil in tanks open at the top when, after a long-term stationary

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 148 of 314	Rev. 02

S6	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	TANK FIRE - BOIL-OVER
-----------	--	------------------------------

fire, there is a sudden increase in the intensity of the fire associated with the expulsion of the burning product from the tank and the formation of a massive fireball.

- ▶ The Boil Over can form where the hydrocarbon is in contact with the water, which is already present in the tank or is introduced during the extinguishing operations.
- ▶ The water element, having a higher density and specific weight, settles on the bottom of the container, nullifying the fire extinguishing action and evaporating instantly. The steam given off by the evaporation of the water expands instantly and expels the oil from the container upwards.
- ▶ Outside the container the oil greatly increases its contact surface with atmospheric air, thus accelerating combustion, and all this leads to the formation of a fireball.




DEVELOPMENT - ESCALATION:

- ▶ Generalized fire to the containment basin: Slop-Over (expulsion from the tank of burning product), Froth-Over (continuous expulsion from the tank of bubbling and burning product).
- ▶ Boil-Over.
- ▶ Explosion of other neighboring appliances.
- ▶ Intoxication or asphyxiation (hot fumes or toxic combustion products).


PRINCIPLES OF PROTECTION:

- ▶ Once the fire has started, proceed to extinguish it using fixed foam pourers present in area E:
 - ➔ autonomous foam system with automatic / manual activation for fire extinguishing of the sealing ring - Self Contained Foam Package for Rim Seal.
 - ➔ fixed foam monitors (low expansion AFF-AR at 3%) positioned on the perimeter wall of the basin, with remote control by means of a button on the control panel operating in the field - Remote Controlled Foam Monitor.
 - ➔ foam pourers (low expansion AFF-AR at 3%) positioned along the perimeter able to distribute the foam evenly in the basin - Foam Maker with Foam Pourer for Bund Area.
- ▶ The foam reserve guarantees the following discharge times:
 - ➔ 60 minutes for the basin fire.
 - ➔ 20 minutes for the generalized fire on the tank.
 - ➔ the quantity stored is equal to 40 m³, distributed on 2 tanks of 20 m³.
- ▶ The activation of the foam discharge can take place in the following ways:
 - ➔ manually locally, by opening the dedicated dilution valve. For monitors with remote control, in addition to the deluge valve, the discharge can also be activated from the control panel in the field.
 - ➔ remotely via button in the control room (Fire & Gas Matrix Panel) - ref. Reflex Sheet "IT - TPR - OC - EXT - 200048 - FIRE AT OIL CENTRE CRUDE STORAGE TANK".

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 149 of 314	Rev. 02


S6	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	TANK FIRE - BOIL-OVER
-----------	--	------------------------------

- ▶ Discharge interruption can only occur in the field on the dedicated deluge valve.
- ▶ The extinguishing intervention with foaming agent must be carried out upwind of the fire.
- ▶ Prevent anyone from entering the site (except for external rescue teams).
- ▶ Activate the emergency isolation of the tanks.
- ▶ Activate the Deluge systems in the area and the neighboring tank not affected by the fire. Activate the deluge system, if possible, to disperse the gas and mitigate the effects on a possible explosion.
- ▶ Once the audible alarm system (PA / GA) for the fire has been activated (intermittent tone signal and flashing Red light).
- ▶ **Make sure that the extinguishing water storage basin is closed to the receiving bodies (30-ESDV-57004 closed).**
- ▶ To view the means of protection available, depending on the unit involved, refer to the specific sheet "SR7 - Industrial Accident - TOP MAJOR SCENARIO PER UNIT".

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 150 of 314	Rev. 02


S6	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	TANK FIRE - BOIL-OVER
-----------	--	------------------------------

BOIL-OVER / TANK FIRE	
Key information	Key actions
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Toxic or flammable gas alarm? • Gas detection and position. • Possible sources of ignition near leaks. • Wind direction, wind speed and weather conditions • Number of detectors indicating the gas and at what level. • SIMOPS in progress? • Number of people on the site? • Activities in progress (hot work, drilling, entering tanks, etc.) • Degraded situations • Lost or missing? 	<p>Primary</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Call CCR number 100 • Activate general alarm. • PA/GA - Provide instructions • If necessary (depending on the area), if the portable H₂S detector indicates the presence of toxic gas along the way, wear the escape mask to go to the Muster Point. • Stopping the unit and depressurizing the unit concerned. • Inform OSC / RSES with key information • Intervention Team: mobilize first intervention team and medical team. <p>Control room</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Isolate Leak at Source (ESD) • Activate the main fire water pumps • Activate Deluge to cool close equipment • Activate fixed extinguishing systems (foam systems) • Monitoring of foam reserves: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - zone E foam tanks: 30-VZ-0107 and 30-VZ-0108 (2x20m3). - tank per monitor: 1 m3 • Evaluation of the escalation • Make sure that the extinguishing water storage basin is closed to the receiving bodies (30-ESDV-57004 closed). <p>Intervention team</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gather and ready on Intervention Leader instruction. • On site: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Send the First Intervention Team and prepare a safe route map to send to OSC / RSES. ○ Identify the source of the leak and isolate it manually if possible. Pay attention to confined areas and lower areas where heavy gases can accumulate. ○ Prepare the fire attack by means of local devices (monitors, hydrants) as an alternative or in parallel to the fixed systems. ○ Define the green zone ○ Give first aid to victims. <p>Muster Points</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • POB count by the collection area manager • Pass the information to OSC / RSES. <p>ICP / CMC crisis cells</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contact the competent authorities.
Escalation-Mitigation measures	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Irradiation towards other devices / capacities / machines. • If there is no ignition, possible evaporation of the liquid and formation of a cloud of flammable / toxic gases. • Structural damage. • The Muster Points can be affected by the loss of HC and the development of fumes. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fixed deluge systems and fire-fighting systems • If necessary, extinguish with foam in case of HC fire • Approach over wind.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 151 of 314	Rev. 02

S6	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	TANK FIRE - BOIL-OVER
-----------	--	------------------------------


Escape routes & Meeting	Means of evacuation
Tempa Rossa staff will meet at the defined Muster Point or at the alternative Muster point announced by PA/GA.	Road transport

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 152 of 314	Rev. 02


SR7	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO	UNIT 10
------------	--	--	----------------

SR7 - Industrial Accident - TOP MAJOR SCENARIO PER UNIT

UNIT 10




Risk Analysis	Worst case		Damage scenario	Distances of the damage scenario (worst case)
	Scenario reference	Scenario description		
TRA - Total	IS_OIL_0A1-01M_LRG_UNFF	Loss of containment - Gas release - Crude oil from well sites to inlet manifold - LARGE leak	Flash Fire Unisolated release 500 mm	RAD LFL: 235 m
	IS_OIL_0A1-01M_LRG_ISTX IS_OIL_0A1-01M_LRG_UNTX	Loss of containment - Gas release - Crude oil from well sites to inlet manifold - LARGE leak	Toxic dispersion Isolated / Unisolated release 500 mm	TOX 709 ppm: 210 m TOX 472 ppm: 250 m TOX 100 ppm: 435 m
	IS_OIL_0B1-01M_LRG_UNTX	Loss of containment - Gas release - Crude oil from well sites to test manifold - LARGE leak	Toxic dispersion Unisolated release 200 mm	TOX 709 ppm: 210 m TOX 472 ppm: 250 m TOX 100 ppm: 435 m
Seveso RdS - Oil Centre	Scenario 00	Release from inlet manifold 30-VP-1A01 ÷ 30-VP-1F01 for random rupture	Flash Fire 14.5 mm	RAD LFL: 11 m RAD ½ LFL: 15.5 m
			Pool Fire 14.5 mm	RAD 7 kW / m²: 18 m RAD 5 kW / m²: 20 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 23.5 m
			Toxic dispersion 14.5 mm	TOX 441 ppm: 8 m TOX 100 ppm: 16.5 m
	Scenario 61	Release of liquid hydrocarbons by random rupture of untreated 20 "crude line from inlet manifold Oil Centre to Unit 24 (30-VZ-2401)	Pool Fire 25.4 mm Not contained pool	RAD 7 kW / m²: 49.5 m RAD 5 kW / m²: 56 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 68 m
			Pool Fire 25.4 mm Pool under manifold 320 m2	RAD 7 kW / m²: 18 m RAD 5 kW / m²: 20 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 23.5 m
			Pool Fire 25.4 mm Pool under manifold 280 m2	RAD 7 kW / m²: 19 m RAD 5 kW / m²: 21.5 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 25.5 m
			Flash Fire 25.4 mm	RAD LFL: 35 m RAD ½ LFL: 46 m
			Toxic dispersion 25.4 mm	TOX 441 ppm: 27.5 m TOX 100 ppm: 48.5 m
The cartographic representation of the damage areas inside and outside the plant is reproduced in attachment LD9				

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 153 of 314	Rev. 02


SR7	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO	UNIT 10
------------	--	--	----------------

DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENTAL SCENARIOS	
TYPE OF EMERGENCY Product release from pressurized equipment in gas / vapor or liquid phase with delayed ignition and flash fire Product release from pressurized equipment in gas / vapor or liquid phase without trigger and toxic dispersion Release of product from pressurized equipment in liquid phase with formation of pools, ignition, and fire (pool fire) Release of product from equipment under pressure in the gas / vapor phase with ignition and jet fire	
SUBSTANCE INVOLVED CRUDE OIL / FLAMMABLE GAS / ACID GAS (H ₂ S)	
LOCATION: EQUIPMENT U10	CAUSE: Accidental release without priming or with delayed ignition. Accidental release and immediate trigger.
CONSEQUENCES	
IMMEDIATE: Dispersion of flammable / toxic substances Pool fire Jet set on fire	MORE: High lethality for people presents in the toxic or flammable cloud in case of delayed ignition. In case of non-interception, accumulation of gas and possible UVCE. Fire spread, irradiation, and consequent possible involvement of neighboring equipment.
DEVICES FOR PREVENTION, PROTECTION, MITIGATION	
FIRE FIGHTING SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT (IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167391) Fixed deluge system to protect the following equipment and machines (Deluge manifold DM-F1 / 2 - Deluge zone 1):30-VP-1A01, 30-VP-1B01, 30-VP-1C01, 30-VP-1D01, 30-VP-1E01 4 monitors, 4 powder fire extinguishers (12 kg) and 1 wheeled powder fire extinguishers (50 kg)	
DETECTION SYSTEMS (IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167311) Flame detectors: n ° 3 Toxic gas detectors (H ₂ S): n ° 17 Flammable gas detectors (propane): n ° 9 Fusible Plugs (Deluge System)	
CCR REFLEX SHEETS IT – TPR – OC – EXT – 200050 - Reflex Sheet Fire Zone 1	
MEANS OF PROTECTION: Use the Personal and Collective Protective Equipment as per procedure	EXTINGUISHING AGENT: Water / foam Dust
FIRST AID MEASURES: Wash with running water for at least 15 minutes. Call the doctor and transfer the subject to the emergency room. Remove contaminated clothes and rinse for 15 minutes, rinse with mild soap. In case of burns, wet for a long time with cold water or with sterile solution and then protect with gauze. Take the subject to an open and ventilated place. Carry out oxygen therapy, if not breathing, give artificial respiration (no mouth to mouth). Place it in a safe position. Rinse your mouth without swallowing. Drink water and do not induce vomiting.	

FIRE FIGHTING SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT (IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167391)



IT-TPR-30-EPC1-169383 OIL CENTRE - PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM FOR UNIT 01- DELUGE SYSTEM MANIFOLDS F1 F2 G1 G2 H1 H2 I1 I2





TotalEnergies EP Italia

Company Management System

INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE

2-PR-QHSE-022

Date 15/12/2021

Page 156 of 314

Rev. 02


SR7

**SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND
EMERGENCY PROCEDURES**


**INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT
TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO**

**UNIT
24-25**

UNIT 24-25




Risk Analysis	Worst case		Damage scenario	Distances of the damage scenario (worst case)
	Scenario reference	Scenario description		
TRA - Total	IS_OIL_002-01M_LRG_ISTX IS_OIL_002-01M_LRG_UNTX	Loss of containment - Gas release - Crude to inlet separator and slug catcher (30-VZ-2401) - LARGE leak	Toxic dispersion Isolated / Unisolated 500 mm	TOX 709 ppm: 380 m TOX 472 ppm: 615 m TOX 100 ppm: 1245 m
	IS_OIL_002-03L_LRG_UNFF	Loss of containment - Gas release - Crude in inlet separator and slug catcher (30-VZ-2401) - LARGE leak	Flash Fire Unisolated release 500 mm	RAD LFL: 270 m
	IS_OIL_006-01L_LRG_ISFF	Loss of containment - Gas release - Crude from inlet & test separators (30-VZ-2401 & 30-VZ-2402) to 2nd stage separator (30-VZ-2501) - LARGE leak	Flash Fire Isolated release 400 mm	RAD LFL: 235 m
	IS_OIL_006-01L_LRG_UNFF	Loss of containment - Gas release - Crude from inlet & test separators (30-VZ-2401 & 30-VZ-2402) to 2nd stage separator (30-VZ-2501) - LARGE leak	Flash Fire Unisolated release 400 mm	RAD LFL: 270 m
	IS_OIL_012-01L_LRG_UNFF	Loss of containment - Gas release - Oil to crude stripper (30-VC-2501) - LARGE leak	Flash Fire Unisolated release 300 mm	RAD LFL: 230 m
Seveso RdS - Oil Centre	Scenario 1	Release from separator 30-VZ-2401 for random rupture	Pool Fire 14.5 mm	RAD 7 kW / m ² : 19 m RAD 5 kW / m ² : 21.5 m RAD 3 kW / m ² : 25.5 m
			Toxic dispersion	TOX 441 ppm: 7.5 m

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 157 of 314	Rev. 02

SR7	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO	UNIT 24-25
-----	---	---	------------


	Scenario 2	Release from exchanger 30-ES-2402A / B due to overheating	14.5 mm	TOX 100 ppm: 24.5 m
			Flash Fire 49 mm	RAD LFL: 47 m RAD ½ LFL: 92 m
	Scenario 3	Release from exchanger 30-ES-2503A / B due to overtemperature	Pool Fire 49 mm	RAD 7 kW / m²: 21.5 m RAD 5 kW / m²: 24 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 28.5 m
			Pool Fire 49 mm	RAD 7 kW / m²: 39 m RAD 5 kW / m²: 43.5 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 51.5 m
	Scenario 4	Release from stage II separator 30-VZ-2501 for random rupture	Pool Fire 14.15 mm	RAD 7 kW / m²: 17 m RAD 5 kW / m²: 19 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 22.5 m
			Toxic dispersion 14.15 mm	TOX 441 ppm: 5 m TOX 100 ppm: 10.5 m
	Scenario 5	Release from desalter 30-VZ-2503/30-VZ-2504 for random rupture	Pool Fire 14.15 mm	RAD 7 kW / m²: 20 m RAD 5 kW / m²: 22 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 26.5 m
			Toxic dispersion 14.15 mm	TOX 441 ppm: 3.5 m TOX 100 ppm: 9 m
	Scenario 6	Release from column 30-VC-2501 for random rupture	Pool Fire 14.15 mm	RAD 7 kW / m²: 20 m RAD 5 kW / m²: 22 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 26 m
			Flash Fire 14.15 mm	RAD LFL: 9 m RAD ½ LFL: 11 m
			Toxic dispersion 14.15 mm	TOX 441 ppm: 5 m TOX 100 ppm: 9 m
	Scenario 7	Release from separator 30-VZ-2502 for random rupture	Flash Fire 10.01 mm	RAD LFL: 1.5m RAD ½ LFL: 3 m
	Scenario 61	Release of liquid hydrocarbons by random rupture of untreated 20 "crude line from inlet manifold Oil Centre to Unit 24 (30-VZ-2401)	Pool Fire 25.4 mm	RAD 7 kW / m²: 49.5 m RAD 5 kW / m²: 56 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 68 m
			Not contained pool	
			Pool Fire 25.4 mm	RAD 7 kW / m²: 18 m RAD 5 kW / m²: 20 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 23.5 m
			Pool under manifold 320 m2	
			Pool Fire 25.4 mm	RAD 7 kW / m²: 19 m RAD 5 kW / m²: 21.5 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 25.5 m
	Scenario 62	Release of crude by random rupture of 8 "-12" line treated crude for storage from Unit 25 (30-ES-2501) to Unit 26 (30-VZ-2601)	Pool under manifold 280 m2	
			Flash Fire 25.4 mm	RAD LFL: 35 m RAD ½ LFL: 46 m
			Toxic dispersion 25.4 mm	TOX 441 ppm: 27.5 m TOX 100 ppm: 48.5 m
	Scenario 62	Release of crude by random rupture of 8 "-12" line treated crude for storage from Unit 25 (30-ES-2501) to Unit 26 (30-VZ-2601)	Pool Fire 25.4 mm	RAD 7 kW / m²: 35 m RAD 5 kW / m²: 35.5 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 43 m
			Pool Fire 25.4 mm	

The cartographic representation of the damage areas inside and outside the plant is reproduced in attachment LD9

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 158 of 314	Rev. 02


SR7	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO	UNIT 24-25
------------	--	--	-----------------------

DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENTAL SCENARIOS	
TYPE OF EMERGENCY Product release from pressurized equipment in gas / vapor or liquid phase with delayed ignition and flash fire Product release from pressurized equipment in gas / vapor or liquid phase without trigger and toxic dispersion Release of product from pressurized equipment in liquid phase with formation of pools, ignition, and fire (pool fire) Release of product from equipment under pressure in the gas / vapor phase with ignition and jet fire	
SUBSTANCE INVOLVED CRUDE OIL / FLAMMABLE GAS / ACID GAS (H ₂ S)	
LOCATION: U24 and U25 EQUIPMENT	CAUSE: Accidental release without priming or with delayed ignition Accidental release and immediate trigger
CONSEQUENCES	
IMMEDIATE: Dispersion of flammable / toxic substances Pool fire Jet set on fire	MORE: High lethality for people presents in the toxic or flammable cloud in case of delayed ignition In case of non-interception, accumulation of gas and possible UVCE Fire spread, irradiation, and consequent possible involvement of neighboring equipment
DEVICES FOR PREVENTION, PROTECTION, MITIGATION	
FIRE FIGHTING SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT (IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167383) Fixed deluge system to protect the following equipment and machines (MANIFOLD DM-D1 / 2 and DM-E1 / 2 - Sub-deluge zone 2.4 and 2.5): 30-ES-2401 A / B / C / D - 30-ES-2502 A / B / C 30-VC-2501 30-VZ-2401- 30-VZ-2402 30-VZ-2501- 30-VZ-2502 - 30-VZ-2503 - 30-VZ-2504 30-PA-2501 A / B- 30-VZ-2401 - 30-PA-2502 A / B - 30-PA-2504 4 monitors, 2 hydrants, 14 powder fire extinguishers (12 kg) and 2 wheeled powder fire extinguishers (50 kg)	
DETECTION SYSTEMS (IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167303) Flame detectors: n ° 8 Toxic gas detectors (H ₂ S): n ° 110 Flammable gas detectors (propane): n ° 24 Linear gas detectors Fusible Plugs (Deluge System)	
CCR REFLEX SHEETS IT-TPR-OC-EXT-200054 - Reflex sheet Fire zone 2.4 IT-TPR-OC-EXT-200055 - Reflex sheet Fire zone 2.5	
MEANS OF PROTECTION: Use the Personal and Collective Protective Equipment as per procedure	EXTINGUISHING AGENT: Water / foam Dust
FIRST AID MEASURES: Wash with running water for at least 15 minutes. Call the doctor and transfer the subject to the emergency room. Remove contaminated clothes and rinse for 15 minutes, rinse with mild soap. In case of burns, wet for a long time with cold water or with sterile solution and then protect with gauze. Take the subject to an open and ventilated place. Carry out oxygen therapy, if not breathing, give artificial respiration (no mouth to mouth). Place it in a safe position. Rinse your mouth without swallowing. Drink water and do not induce vomiting.	

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 159 of 314	Rev. 02


SR7	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO	UNIT 24-25
------------	--	--	-----------------------

FIRE FIGHTING SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT (IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167383)



SR7	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO	UNIT 24-25
------------	--	--	-------------------

IT-TPR-30-EPC1-169382 OIL CENTRE - PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM FOR UNIT 01- DELUGE SYSTEM MANIFOLDS D1 D2 E1 E2





TotalEnergies EP Italia

Company Management System

INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE

2-PR-QHSE-022

Date 15/12/2021

Page 161 of 314

Rev. 02


SR7

**SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND
EMERGENCY PROCEDURES**


**INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT
TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO**

UNIT 26

UNIT 26




Risk Analysis	Worst case		Damage scenario	Distances of the damage scenario (worst case)
	Scenario reference	Scenario description		
TRA - Total	IS_OIL_056-01L_LRG_h_ISPF IS_OIL_056-01L_LRG_h_UNPF	Loss of containment - Liq release - Crude from export crude pipeline pumps (30-PA-2602A / B) to Oil Centre outlet - LARGE leak	Pool Fire Isolated / Unisolated release 500 mm	RAD 5 kW / m ² : 325 m RAD 3 kW / m ² : 350 m
	IS_OIL_056-01L_LRG_v_ISPF IS_OIL_056-01L_LRG_v_UNPF	Loss of containment - Liq release - Crude from export crude pipeline pumps (30-PA-2602A / B) to Oil Centre outlet - LARGE leak	Pool Fire Isolated / Unisolated release 500 mm	RAD 5 kW / m ² : 415 m RAD 3 kW / m ² : 490 m
	Liq-IS_OIL_074-A1L_BO Liq-IS_OIL_074-B1L_BO Probability << 10 ⁻⁶	Fire at Tank 30-TF-2601 A / B and Boil Over	Boil Over	RAD 5 kW / m ² : 620 m RAD 3 kW / m ² : 750 m
Seveso RdS - Oil Centre	Scenario 8	Release from separator 30-VZ-2601 for random rupture	Pool Fire - Circular fire - radiation to the ground	RAD 7 kW / m ² : 0 m RAD 5 kW / m ² : 15 m RAD 3 kW / m ² : 24 m
			Pool Fire - Circular corona fire - radiation at roof level 15 m	RAD 7 kW / m ² : 21 m RAD 5 kW / m ² : 23 m RAD 3 kW / m ² : 27 m
	Scenario 9	Fire on the roof of the tank 30-TF-2601A / B	Pool Fire - Roof fire - ground radiation	RAD 7 kW / m ² : 0 m RAD 5 kW / m ² : 58 m RAD 3 kW / m ² : 94 m
			Pool Fire - Roof fire - radiation at the roof height 15 m	RAD 7 kW / m ² : 54 m RAD 5 kW / m ² : 83 m RAD 3 kW / m ² : 98 m

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 162 of 314	Rev. 02

SR7	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO	UNIT 26
------------	--	--	----------------

	Scenario 10	Fire in the containment basin of tank 30-TF-2601A / B	Pool Fire - Fire containment basin - ground irradiation	RAD 7 kW / m ² : 90 m RAD 5 kW / m ² : 120 m RAD 3 kW / m ² : 145 m
			Pool Fire - Fire containment basin - irradiation at the height of the basin	RAD 7 kW / m ² : 97 m RAD 5 kW / m ² : 122 m RAD 3 kW / m ² : 145 m
	Scenario 62	Release of crude by random rupture of 8 "-12" line treated crude for storage from Unit 25 (30-ES-2501) to Unit 26 (30-VZ-2601)	Pool Fire 25.4 mm	RAD 7 kW / m ² : 35 m RAD 5 kW / m ² : 35.5 m RAD 3 kW / m ² : 43 m
	Scenario 63	Release of crude oil due to random rupture of 18 "-20" line treated crude downstream storage (delivery 30-PA-2602A / B) to pig trap 30-VP-2601	Pool Fire 25.4 mm	RAD 7 kW / m ² : 41 m RAD 5 kW / m ² : 45 m RAD 3 kW / m ² : 53.5 m


The cartographic representation of the damage areas inside and outside the plant is reproduced in attachment LD9


 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 163 of 314	Rev. 02


SR7	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO	UNIT 26
------------	--	--	----------------

DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENTAL SCENARIOS	
TYPE OF EMERGENCY Product release from pressurized equipment in gas / vapor or liquid phase with delayed ignition and flash fire Release of product from pressurized equipment in liquid phase with formation of pools, ignition, and fire (pool fire).	
SUBSTANCE INVOLVED CRUDE / FLAMMABLE GAS	
LOCATION: EQUIPMENT U26	CAUSE: Accidental release without priming or with delayed ignition. Accidental release and immediate trigger.
CONSEQUENCES	
IMMEDIATE: Dispersion of flammable substances Pool fire Jet set on fire	MORE: High lethality for people presents in the toxic or flammable cloud in case of delayed ignition. In case of non-interception, accumulation of gas and possible UVCE. Fire spread, irradiation, and consequent possible involvement of neighboring equipment.
DEVICES FOR PREVENTION, PROTECTION, MITIGATION	
FIRE FIGHTING SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT (IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167384 - IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167397 - IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167398) Fixed deluge system (MANIFOLDS DM-E1 / 2 and DM-H1 / 2 - Sub-deluge zones 2.6 and 2.7) to protect the following equipment and machines: 30-EC-2601 A / B - 30-EC-4501 - 30-ES-2601 A / B 30-TF-2601 A / B - 30-TR-4501 - 30-VZ-2601 - 30-VP-2601 30-PA-2601 A ÷ D - 30-PA-2602 A / B- 30-PA-4501 A / B 2 monitors, 7 hydrants, 10 powder fire extinguishers (12 kg) and 1 wheeled powder fire extinguishers (50 kg)	
DETECTION SYSTEMS (IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167304 - IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167324 - IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167327) Thermosensitive cables: n ° 4 Flame detectors: n ° 6 Toxic gas detectors (H ₂ S): n ° 11 Flammable gas detectors (propane): n ° 9 Liquid hydrocarbon leak detectors: n ° 2 Linear gas detectors Fusible plugs	
CCR REFLEX SHEETS IT-TPR-OC-EXT-200056 - Reflex sheet Fire zone 2.6 IT-TPR-OC-EXT-200066 - Reflex sheet Fire zone 2.7 IT-TPR-OC-EXT-200048 - Fire storage tanks reflex sheet	
MEANS OF PROTECTION: Use the Personal and Collective Protective Equipment as per procedure.	EXTINGUISHING AGENT: Water / foam Dust
FIRST AID MEASURES: Wash with running water for at least 15 minutes. Call the doctor and transfer the subject to the emergency room. Remove contaminated clothes and rinse for 15 minutes, rinse with mild soap. In case of burns, wet for a long time with cold water or with sterile solution and then protect with gauze. Take the subject to an open and ventilated place. Carry out oxygen therapy, if not breathing, give artificial respiration (no mouth to mouth). Place it in a safe position. Rinse your mouth without swallowing. Drink water and do not induce vomiting.	

FIRE FIGHTING SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT (IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167384 - IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167397 - IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167398)








SR7	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO	UNIT 26
------------	--	--	----------------

IT-TPR-30-EPC1-169382 OIL CENTRE - PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM FOR UNIT 01- DELUGE SYSTEM MANIFOLDS D1 D2 E1 E2
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-169383 OIL CENTRE - PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM FOR UNIT 01- DELUGE SYSTEM MANIFOLDS F1 F2 G1 G2 H1 H2 I1 I2





TotalEnergies EP Italia

Company Management System

INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE

2-PR-QHSE-022

Date 15/12/2021

Page 168 of 314

Rev. 02


SR7

**SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND
EMERGENCY PROCEDURES**


**INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT
TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO**

**UNIT
30-31**

UNIT 30-31




Risk Analysis	Worst case		Damage scenario	Distances of the damage scenario (worst case)
	Scenario reference	Scenario description		
TRA - Total	IS_OIL_011-01L_LRG_ISFF IS_OIL_011-01L_LRG_UNFF	Loss of containment - Gas release - HC liquid from VRU compressor suction scrubber (30-VZ-3101) - LARGE leak	Flash Fire Isolated / Unisolated release 100 mm	RAD LFL: 250 m
Seveso RdS - Oil Centre	Scenario 11	Release from compressor 30-KA-3002	Jet Fire 12 mm	RAD 7 kW / m²: 13 m RAD 5 kW / m²: 13.5 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 14.5 m
			Flash Fire 12 mm	RAD LFL: 5.7 m RAD ½ LFL: 10 m
			Toxic dispersion 12 mm	TOX 709 ppm: 20 m TOX 100 ppm: 115 m
	Scenario 12	Release from separator 30-VZ-3002 for random rupture	Flash Fire 14.15 mm	RAD LFL: 4 m RAD ½ LFL: 7 m
			Toxic dispersion 14.15 mm	TOX 441 ppm: 12 m TOX 100 ppm: 24 m
	Scenario 13	Release from compressor 30-KA-3101	Jet Fire 12 mm	RAD 7 kW / m²: 6 m RAD 5 kW / m²: 6.3 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 6.6 m
			Flash Fire 12 mm	RAD LFL: 3 m RAD ½ LFL: 5 m
	Scenario 14	Release from separator 30-VZ-3101 for random rupture	Toxic dispersion 12 mm	TOX 441 ppm: 4 m TOX 100 ppm: 12.5 m
			Jet Fire 10.01 mm	RAD 7 kW / m²: 11 m RAD 5 kW / m²: 12.5 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 14.5 m

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 169 of 314	Rev. 02

SR7	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO	UNIT 30-31
------------	--	--	-----------------------


			Flash Fire 10.01 mm	RAD LFL: 5 m RAD ½ LFL: 6 m
			Pool Fire 10.01 mm	RAD 7 kW / m²: 7 m RAD 5 kW / m²: 7.5 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 9 m
	Scenario 58	Release of acid gas by random rupture of the 8 "line from Unit 25 (30-VZ-2501) to Unit 31 (30-EA-3102)	Jet Fire 25.4 mm	RAD 7 kW / m²: in the flame RAD 5 kW / m²: in the flame RAD 3 kW / m²: in the flame
			Flash Fire 25.4 mm	RAD LFL: 4.5 m RAD ½ LFL: 8.5 m
			Toxic dispersion 25.4 mm	TOX 441 ppm: 15.5 m TOX 100 ppm: 33 m
	Scenario 59	Release of acid gas by random rupture of 8 "line from Unit 30 (30-VZ-3003) to Unit 32 (30-VF-3201)	Jet Fire 25.4 mm	RAD 7 kW / m²: 27.5 m RAD 5 kW / m²: 30.5 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 35 m
			Flash Fire 25.4 mm	RAD LFL: 12.5 m RAD ½ LFL: 22 m
			Toxic dispersion 25.4 mm	TOX 441 ppm: 45 m TOX 100 ppm: 290 m

The cartographic representation of the damage areas inside and outside the plant is reproduced in attachment LD9

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 170 of 314	Rev. 02


SR7	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO	UNIT 30-31
------------	--	--	-----------------------


DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENTAL SCENARIOS	
TYPE OF EMERGENCY Product release from pressurized equipment in gas / vapor phase with delayed ignition and flash fire Release of product from equipment under pressure in the gas / vapor phase without ignition and toxic dispersion Release of product from equipment under pressure in the gas / vapor phase with ignition and jet fire	
SUBSTANCE INVOLVED FLAMMABLE GAS / ACID GAS (H ₂ S)	
LOCATION: U30 EQUIPMENT; U31;	CAUSE: Accidental release without priming or with delayed ignition Accidental release and immediate trigger
CONSEQUENCES	
IMMEDIATE: Dispersion of flammable / toxic substances Jet set on fire	MORE: High lethality for people presents in the toxic or flammable cloud in case of delayed ignition In case of non-interception, accumulation of gas and possible UVCE Fire spread, irradiation and consequent possible involvement of neighboring equipment
DEVICES FOR PREVENTION, PROTECTION, MITIGATION	
FIRE FIGHTING SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT (IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167382 - IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167396) Fixed deluge system to protect the following equipment ((MANIFOLDS DM-C1 / 2 and DM-D1 / 2 - Sub-Deluge zone 2.3): 30-KA-3001 - 30-KA-3002 30-KA-3001 30-PA-3101A / B 30-VZ-3101 Water Mist System: 30-KZ-3102 A / B 7 monitors, 1 hydrant, 18 powder fire extinguishers (12 kg) and 3 wheeled powder fire extinguishers (50 kg)	
DETECTION SYSTEMS (IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167302 - IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167761) Flame detectors: n ° 17 Toxic gas detectors (H ₂ S): n ° 109 Flammable gas detectors (propane): n ° 36 Linear gas detectors Fusible plugs	
CCR REFLEX SHEETS IT-TPR-OC-EXT-200053 - Reflex sheet Fire zone 2.3 IT-TPR-OC-EXT-200065 - Reflex sheet toxic gas release 8 line between U30 and U32	
MEANS OF PROTECTION: Use the Personal and Collective Protective Equipment as per procedure	EXTINGUISHING AGENT: Water / foam Dust
FIRST AID MEASURES: Wash with running water for at least 15 minutes. Call the doctor and transfer the subject to the emergency room. Remove contaminated clothes and rinse for 15 minutes, rinse with mild soap. In case of burns, wet for a long time with cold water or with sterile solution and then protect with gauze. Take the subject to an open and ventilated place. Carry out oxygen therapy, if not breathing, give artificial respiration (no mouth to mouth). Place it in a safe position. Rinse your mouth without swallowing. Drink water and do not induce vomiting.	

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 171 of 314	Rev. 02

SR7	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO	UNIT 30-31
------------	--	--	-----------------------


FIRE FIGHTING SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT (IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167382 - IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167396)




 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 172 of 314	Rev. 02

SR7	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO	UNIT 30-31
------------	--	--	-------------------


IT-TPR-30-EPC1-169381 OIL CENTRE - PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM FOR UNIT 01 - DELUGE SYSTEM MANIFOLDS A1 A2 B1 B2 C1 C2
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-169382 OIL CENTRE - PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM FOR UNIT 01- DELUGE SYSTEM MANIFOLDS D1 D2 E1 E2



 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 173 of 314	Rev. 02


SR7	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO	UNIT 32
------------	--	--	----------------

UNIT 32



Risk Analysis	Worst case		Damage scenario	Distances of the damage scenario (worst case)
	Scenario reference	Scenario description		
TRA - Total	IS_OIL_021-01G_LRG_ISTX IS_OIL_021-01G_LRG_UNTX	Loss of containment - Gas release - Sour Gas from inlet compressor 2nd stage discharge scrubber (30-VZ-3003) to sweetening unit / feed gas filter separator (30-VF-3201) - LARGE leak	Toxic dispersion Isolated / Unisolated release 200 mm	TOX 709 ppm: 90 m TOX 472 ppm: 165 m TOX 100 ppm: 440 m
Seveso RdS - Oil Centre	Scenario 15	Flash-drum amine release 30-VZ-3201 by random rupture	Toxic dispersion 14.15 mm	TOX 441 ppm: 40 m TOX 100 ppm: 22 m
	Scenario 16	Release from 30-VC-3202 regenerator column due to random rupture	Toxic dispersion 14.15 mm	TOX 441 ppm: 13.5 m TOX 100 ppm: 29 m
	Scenario 17	30-VZ-3202 regenerating head accumulator release for random rupture	Toxic dispersion 14.15 mm	TOX 441 ppm: 16 m TOX 100 ppm: 29 m
	Scenario 18	Release from filter 30-VF-3201 for random rupture	Jet Fire 14.15 mm	RAD 7 kW / m²: 16.5 m RAD 5 kW / m²: 17 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 18.5 m
			Flash Fire 14.15 mm	RAD LFL: 7 m RAD ½ LFL: 16 m
			Toxic dispersion 14.15 mm	TOX 441 ppm: 65 m TOX 100 ppm: 135 m
	Scenario 59	Release of acid gas by random rupture of 8 "line from Unit 30 (30-VZ-3003) to Unit 32 (30-VF-3201)	Jet Fire 25.4 mm	RAD 7 kW / m²: 27.5 m RAD 5 kW / m²: 30.5 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 35 m
			Flash Fire 25.4 mm	RAD LFL: 12.5 m RAD ½ LFL: 22 m
			Toxic dispersion 25.4 mm	TOX 441 ppm: 45 m TOX 100 ppm: 290 m


The cartographic representation of the damage areas inside and outside the plant is reproduced in attachment LD9

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 174 of 314	Rev. 02

SR7	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO	UNIT 32
------------	--	--	----------------

DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENTAL SCENARIOS	
TYPE OF EMERGENCY Product release from pressurized equipment in gas / vapor phase with delayed ignition and flash fire Release of product from equipment under pressure in the gas / vapor phase without ignition and toxic dispersion Release of product from equipment under pressure in the gas / vapor phase with ignition and jet fire	
SUBSTANCE INVOLVED FLAMMABLE GAS / ACID GAS (H ₂ S)	
LOCATION: U32 EQUIPMENT;	CAUSE: Accidental release without priming or with delayed ignition Accidental release and immediate trigger
CONSEQUENCES	
IMMEDIATE: Dispersion of flammable / toxic substances Jet set on fire	MORE: High lethality for people presents in the toxic or flammable cloud in case of delayed ignition In case of non-interception, accumulation of gas and possible UVCE Fire spread, irradiation, and consequent possible involvement of neighboring equipment
DEVICES FOR PREVENTION, PROTECTION, MITIGATION	
FIRE FIGHTING SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT (IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167382 - IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167396) Unit 32 (Sub-Deluge zone 2.2) does not have devices protected by a deluge system. 7 monitors, 1 hydrant, 18 powder fire extinguishers (12 kg) and 3 wheeled powder fire extinguishers (50 kg)	
DETECTION SYSTEMS (IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167302 - IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167761) Flame detectors: n ° 17 Toxic gas detectors (H ₂ S): n ° 109 Flammable gas detectors (propane / methane): n ° 36 Linear gas detectors Fusible plugs	
CCR REFLEX SHEETS IT-TPR-OC-EXT-200053 - Reflex sheet Fire zone 2.3 IT-TPR-OC-EXT-200065 - Reflex sheet toxic gas release 8 line between U30 and U32	
MEANS OF PROTECTION: Use the Personal and Collective Protective Equipment as per procedure	EXTINGUISHING AGENT: Water / foam Dust
FIRST AID MEASURES: Wash with running water for at least 15 minutes. Call the doctor and transfer the subject to the emergency room. Remove contaminated clothes and rinse for 15 minutes, rinse with mild soap. In case of burns, wet for a long time with cold water or with sterile solution and then protect with gauze. Take the subject to an open and ventilated place. Carry out oxygen therapy, if not breathing, give artificial respiration (no mouth to mouth). Place it in a safe position. Rinse your mouth without swallowing. Drink water and do not induce vomiting.	


FIRE FIGHTING SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT (IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167382 - IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167396)




 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 176 of 314	Rev. 02

SR7	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO	UNIT 33
------------	--	--	----------------

UNIT 33




Risk Analysis	Worst case		Damage scenario	Distances of the damage scenario (worst case)
	Scenario reference	Scenario description		
TRA - Total	IS_OIL_059-01G_LRG_ISTX IS_OIL_059-01G_LRG_UNTX	Loss of containment - Gas release - Amine acid gas to thermal reactor burner 30-HF-3332 A / B - LARGE leak	Toxic dispersion Isolated / Unisolated release 350 mm	TOX 709 ppm: 210 m TOX 472 ppm: 250 m TOX 100 ppm: 435 m
Seveso RdS - Oil Centre	Scenario 19	30-HB-3331A recovery boiler release due to overpressure	Toxic dispersion H ₂ S 44.72 mm	TOX 441 ppm: 27 m TOX 100 ppm: 13.5 m
			Toxic dispersion SO ₂ 44.72 mm	TOX 627 ppm: 19 m TOX 100 ppm: 7 m
	Scenario 20	Release from sulfur capacitor 30-HB-3332A for overpressure	Toxic dispersion H ₂ S 42.43 mm	TOX 441 ppm: 29 m TOX 100 ppm: 13.5 m
			Toxic dispersion SO ₂ 42.43 mm	TOX 627 ppm: 19 m TOX 100 ppm: 7.5 m
	Scenario 21	Release of non-degassed sulfur from tank 30-TR-3311	Toxic dispersion - from vent 30-TR-3311 200 mm	TOX 441 ppm: 1 m TOX 100 ppm: 7 m
	Scenario 23	Release from hydrogenator reactor 30-VZ-3371 due to overtemperature	Toxic dispersion H ₂ S 72 mm	TOX 441 ppm: 3.5 m TOX 100 ppm: 11.5 m
	Scenario 24	Release from boiler 30-HB-3371 due to overpressure	Toxic dispersion H ₂ S 42.43 mm	TOX 441 ppm: 29 m TOX 100 ppm: 13.5 m
	Scenario 25	Quench column 30-VC-3371 release by random rupture	Toxic dispersion H ₂ S 50.99 mm	TOX LC50: 1.5 m TOX IDLH: 5.5 m
	Scenario 26	Release from amine regeneration column 30-VC-3373 by random rupture	Toxic dispersion H ₂ S 15.5 mm	TOX 441 ppm: 1.5 m TOX 100 ppm: 4.5 m
	Scenario 27	Release from KO-Drum acid gas 30-VZ-3311 by random rupture	Toxic dispersion H ₂ S 14.15 mm	TOX 441 ppm: 3.5 m TOX 100 ppm: 11 m
	Scenario 28	30-VZ-3373 regeneration column head accumulator release due to random rupture	Toxic dispersion H ₂ S 15.28 mm	TOX 441 ppm: 13.5 m TOX 100 ppm: 23.5 m
	Scenario 29	30-VC-3372 absorption column release by random rupture	Toxic dispersion H ₂ S 14.15 mm	TOX 441 ppm: 9 m TOX 100 ppm: 18 m

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 177 of 314	Rev. 02

SR7	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO	UNIT 33
------------	--	--	----------------

	Scenario 57	Release of acid gas due to random rupture of 12 "-14" line from Unit 32 (30-VZ-3202) to Unit 33 (30-VZ-3311)	Toxic dispersion H ₂ S 25.4 mm	TOX 441 ppm: 24 m TOX 100 ppm: 50 m
--	-------------	--	--	--


The cartographic representation of the damage areas inside and outside the plant is reproduced in attachment LD9

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 178 of 314	Rev. 02

SR7	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO	UNIT 33
------------	--	--	----------------

DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENTAL SCENARIOS	
TYPE OF EMERGENCY Product release from pressurized equipment in gas / vapor phase with delayed ignition and flash fire Release of product from equipment under pressure in the gas / vapor phase without ignition and toxic dispersion Release of product from equipment under pressure in the gas / vapor phase with ignition and jet fire	
SUBSTANCE INVOLVED FLAMMABLE GAS / ACID GAS (H ₂ S / SO ₂)	
LOCATION: U33 EQUIPMENT;	CAUSE: Accidental release without priming or with delayed ignition Accidental release and immediate trigger
CONSEQUENCES	
IMMEDIATE: Dispersion of flammable / toxic substances Jet set on fire	MORE: High lethality for people presents in the toxic or flammable cloud in case of delayed ignition In case of non-interception, accumulation of gas and possible UVCE Fire spread, irradiation, and consequent possible involvement of neighboring equipment
DEVICES FOR PREVENTION, PROTECTION, MITIGATION	
FIRE FIGHTING SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT (IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167387) There is NO fixed deluge system 4 monitors, 2 hydrants, 15 powder fire extinguishers (12 kg) and 2 wheeled powder fire extinguishers (50 kg)	
DETECTION SYSTEMS (IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167307) Flame detectors: n ° 7 Toxic gas detectors (H ₂ S): n ° 166 Toxic gas detectors (SO ₂): n ° 8 Flammable gas detectors (methane): n ° 27 Linear gas detectors Fusible plugs	
CCR REFLEX SHEETS IT-TPR-OC-EXT-200057 - Reflex sheet Fire zone 3	
MEANS OF PROTECTION: Use the Personal and Collective Protective Equipment as per procedure	EXTINGUISHING AGENT: Water / foam Dust
FIRST AID MEASURES: Wash with running water for at least 15 minutes. Call the doctor and transfer the subject to the emergency room. Remove contaminated clothes and rinse for 15 minutes, rinse with mild soap. In case of burns, wet for a long time with cold water or with sterile solution and then protect with gauze. Take the subject to an open and ventilated place. Carry out oxygen therapy, if not breathing, give artificial respiration (no mouth to mouth). Place it in a safe position. Rinse your mouth without swallowing. Drink water and do not induce vomiting.	

FIRE FIGHTING SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT (IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167387)





TotalEnergies EP Italia

Company Management System

INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE

2-PR-QHSE-022

Date 15/12/2021

Page 180 of 314

Rev. 02


SR7

**SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND
EMERGENCY PROCEDURES**


**INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT
TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO**

UNIT 34

UNIT 34




Risk Analysis	Worst case		Damage scenario	Distances of the damage scenario
	Scenario reference	Scenario description		
TRA - Total	IS_OIL_043-01L_MED_ISFF	LPG from SDV34210 (water wash outlet) to LPG metering system (30-UN-3401) - MEDIUM leak	Flash Fire Isolated release 65 mm	RAD LFL: 190 m
	IS_OIL_043-01L_MED_ISEX	LPG from SDV34210 (water wash outlet) to LPG metering system (30-UN-3401) - MEDIUM leak	Explosion Isolated release 65 mm	BLAST 50 mbar: 215 m BLAST 140 mbar: 85 m
Seveso RdS - Oil Centre	Scenario 30	Release from deethanizing column 30-VC-3401 due to random rupture	Flash Fire 10.01 mm	RAD LFL: 3 m RAD ½ LFL: 4.5 m
			Jet Fire 10.01 mm	RAD 7 kW / m²: in the flame RAD 5 kW / m²: 3.5 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 6 m
	Scenario 31	Release from debutanizer column 30-VC-3402 for random rupture	Flash Fire 14.15 mm	RAD LFL: 6 m RAD ½ LFL: 10.5 m
	Scenario 32	Release from LPG tank 30-VZ-3403 or 30-VZ-3607 for random rupture	Flash Fire 10.01 mm	RAD LFL: 3 m RAD ½ LFL: 4.5 m
			Jet Fire 10.01 mm	RAD 7 kW / m²: 17 m RAD 5 kW / m²: 18 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 20.5 m
	Scenario 33		Flash Fire 12.5 mm	RAD LFL: 13 m RAD ½ LFL: 19.5 m

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 181 of 314	Rev. 02

SR7	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO	UNIT 34
------------	--	--	----------------


	Scenario 34	Release from extractor 30-VC-3403 for random rupture	Pool Fire 12.5 mm	RAD 7 kW / m²: 13.5 m RAD 5 kW / m²: 15 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 17.5 m
		Release from dehydration column 30-VZ-3412B for random rupture	Flash Fire 12.5 mm	RAD LFL: 10 m RAD ½ LFL: 27.5 m
	Scenario 64	LPG release due to random rupture of 3 "line Export LPG in delivery 30-PA-3404 from 30-UN-3401 Metering System (Zone A) to tie-in for LPG export pipeline	Jet Fire 12.5 mm	RAD 7 kW / m²: 22.5 m RAD 5 kW / m²: 24.5 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 27.5 m
			Flash Fire 25.4 mm	RAD LFL: 41 m RAD ½ LFL: 61 m
			Pool Fire 25.4 mm	RAD 7 kW / m²: 46 m RAD 5 kW / m²: 51.5 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 62 m
			Jet Fire 25.4 mm	RAD 7 kW / m²: 43 m RAD 5 kW / m²: 51 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 65 m

The cartographic representation of the damage areas inside and outside the plant is reproduced in attachment LD9

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 182 of 314	Rev. 02


SR7	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO	UNIT 34
------------	--	--	----------------

DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENTAL SCENARIOS	
TYPE OF EMERGENCY Product release from pressurized equipment in gas / vapor phase with delayed ignition and flash fire Product release from pressurized equipment in gas / vapor phase with delayed ignition and explosion (VCE-UVCE) Release of product from equipment under pressure in the gas / vapor phase with ignition and jet fire	
SUBSTANCE INVOLVED FLAMMABLE GAS / LPG	
LOCATION: U34 EQUIPMENT;	CAUSE: Accidental release without priming or with delayed ignition Accidental release and immediate trigger
CONSEQUENCES	
IMMEDIATE: Dispersion of flammable substances Jet set on fire	MORE: High lethality for people presents in the flammable cloud in case of delayed ignition In case of non-interception gas accumulation and possible UVCE / VCE Fire spread, irradiation, and consequent possible involvement of neighboring equipment
DEVICES FOR PREVENTION, PROTECTION, MITIGATION	
FIRE FIGHTING SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT (IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167381, IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167380) Fixed deluge system to protect the following equipment (MANIFOLDS DM-A1 / 2 and DM-B1 / 2 - Sub-Deluge zone 2.1): 30-PA-3401A / B - 30-PA-3402A / B - 30-PA-3405A / B 30-VZ-3402 30-PA-3601A / B 30-VZ-3601 - 30-ES-3608 30-KB-3701A / B 9 monitors / hydrants, 0 hydrants, 25 powder fire extinguishers (12 kg) and 4 wheeled powder fire extinguishers (50 kg)	
DETECTION SYSTEMS (IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167301, IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167300) Thermosensitive cables: n ° 6 Flame detectors: n ° 25 Toxic gas detectors (H ₂ S): n ° 10 Flammable gas detectors (propane / methane): n ° 65 Linear gas detectors: 4 Fusible plugs	
CCR REFLEX SHEETS IT-TPR-OC-EXT-200051 - Reflex sheet Fire zone 2.1 IT-TPR-LG-EXT-200009 - Reflex sheet jet fire from 30PA3404 to LPG metering	
MEANS OF PROTECTION: Use the Personal and Collective Protective Equipment as per procedure	EXTINGUISHING AGENT: Water / foam Dust
FIRST AID MEASURES: Wash with running water for at least 15 minutes. Call the doctor and transfer the subject to the emergency room. Remove contaminated clothes and rinse for 15 minutes, rinse with mild soap. In case of burns, wet for a long time with cold water or with sterile solution and then protect with gauze. Take the subject to an open and ventilated place. Carry out oxygen therapy, if not breathing, give artificial respiration (no mouth to mouth). Place it in a safe position. Rinse your mouth without swallowing. Drink water and do not induce vomiting.	

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 183 of 314	Rev. 02


SR7	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO	UNIT 34
------------	--	--	----------------

FIRE FIGHTING SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT (IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167381, IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167380)



SR7	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO	UNIT 34
------------	--	--	----------------

IT-TPR-30-EPC1-169381 OIL CENTRE - PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM FOR UNIT 01 - DELUGE SYSTEM MANIFOLDS A1 A2 B1 B2 C1 C2





TotalEnergies EP Italia

Company Management System

INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE

2-PR-QHSE-022

Date 15/12/2021

Page 185 of 314

Rev. 02


SR7

**SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND
EMERGENCY PROCEDURES**


**INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT
TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO**

UNIT 35

UNIT 35




Risk Analysis	Worst case		Damage scenario	Distances of the damage scenario
	Scenario reference	Scenario description		
Seveso RdS - Oil Centre	Scenario 35	Release from 30-ES-3502 for overpressure	Flash Fire 20 mm	RAD LFL: 13 m RAD ½ LFL: 43.5 m
			Jet Fire 20 mm	RAD 7 kW / m²: 24 m RAD 5 kW / m²: 25 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 28 m
	Scenario 36	Release from 30-VZ-3501A / B for overpressure	Flash Fire 24.49 mm	RAD LFL: 17 m RAD ½ LFL: 41 m
			Jet Fire 24.49 mm	RAD 7 kW / m²: 28.5 m RAD 5 kW / m²: 30 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 33 m
The cartographic representation of the damage areas inside and outside the plant is reproduced in attachment LD9				

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 186 of 314	Rev. 02


SR7	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO	UNIT 35
------------	--	--	----------------

DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENTAL SCENARIOS	
TYPE OF EMERGENCY Product release from pressurized equipment in gas / vapor phase with delayed ignition and flash fire Release of product from equipment under pressure in the gas / vapor phase with ignition and jet fire	
SUBSTANCE INVOLVED FLAMMABLE GAS / LPG	
LOCATION: U35 EQUIPMENT;	CAUSE: Accidental release without priming or with delayed ignition Accidental release and immediate trigger
CONSEQUENCES	
IMMEDIATE: Dispersion of flammable substances Jet set on fire	MORE: High lethality for people presents in the flammable cloud in case of delayed ignition In case of non-interception, accumulation of gas and possible UVCE Fire spread, irradiation, and consequent possible involvement of neighboring equipment
DEVICES FOR PREVENTION, PROTECTION, MITIGATION	
FIRE FIGHTING SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT (IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167382) Unit 35 (Sub-Deluge zone 2.2) does not have devices protected by a deluge system. N ° 3 monitors / hydrants, n ° 1 hydrants, n ° 10 powder fire extinguishers (12 kg) and n ° 2 wheeled powder fire extinguishers (50 kg)	
DETECTION SYSTEMS (IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167301) Thermosensitive cables Flame detectors Flammable gas detectors (propane / methane) Linear gas detectors Fusible plugs	
CCR REFLEX SHEETS IT-TPR-OC-EXT-200052 - Reflex sheet Fire zone 2.2	
MEANS OF PROTECTION: Use the Personal and Collective Protective Equipment as per procedure	EXTINGUISHING AGENT: Water / foam Dust
FIRST AID MEASURES: Wash with running water for at least 15 minutes. Call the doctor and transfer the subject to the emergency room. Remove contaminated clothes and rinse for 15 minutes, rinse with mild soap. In case of burns, wet for a long time with cold water or with sterile solution and then protect with gauze. Take the subject to an open and ventilated place. Carry out oxygen therapy, if not breathing, give artificial respiration (no mouth to mouth). Place it in a safe position. Rinse your mouth without swallowing. Drink water and do not induce vomiting.	

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 187 of 314	Rev. 02

SR7	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO	UNIT 35
------------	--	--	----------------

FIRE FIGHTING SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT (IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167382 - IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167396)





TotalEnergies EP Italia

Company Management System

INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE

2-PR-QHSE-022

Date 15/12/2021

Page 188 of 314

Rev. 02


SR7

**SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND
EMERGENCY PROCEDURES**


**INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT
TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO**

UNIT 36

UNIT 36




Risk Analysis	Worst case		Damage scenario	Distances of the damage scenario
	Scenario reference	Scenario description		
TRA - Total	IS_OIL_023-03L_LRG_ISJF IS_OIL_023-03L_LRG_UNJF	Loss of containment - Gas release - Liquid in HP Gas separator (30-VZ-3602) - LARGE leak	Jet Fire Isolated / Unisolated release 100 mm	RAD 5 kW / m ² : 865 m RAD 3 kW / m ² : 745 m
	IS_OIL_023-03L_LRG_ISFF IS_OIL_023-03L_LRG_UNFF	Loss of containment - Gas release - Liquid in HP Gas separator (30-VZ-3602) - LARGE leak	Flash Fire Isolated / Unisolated release 100 mm	RAD LFL: 235 m
	IS_OIL_023-03L_MED_ISFF IS_OIL_023-03L_MED_UNFF	Loss of containment - Gas release - Liquid in HP Gas separator (30-VZ-3602) - MEDIUM leak	Flash Fire Isolated / Unisolated release 65 mm	RAD LFL: 230 m
	IS_OIL_030-03L_LRG_ISFF IS_OIL_030-03L_LRG_UNFF	Loss of containment - Gas release - Oil in LP Gas separator (30-VZ-3601) - LARGE leak	Flash Fire Isolated / Unisolated release 100 mm	RAD LFL: 290 m
	IS_OIL_036-02L_LRG_ISJF IS_OIL_036-02L_LRG_UNJF	Loss of containment - Gas release - Propane in propane receiver (30-VZ-3605) - LARGE leak	Jet Fire Isolated / Unisolated release 200 mm	RAD 5 kW / m ² : 400 m RAD 3 kW / m ² : 465 m
	IS_OIL_037-01L_LRG_ISJF IS_OIL_037-01L_LRG_UNJF	Loss of containment - Gas release - Propane from propane receiver (30-VZ-3605) to deethaniser O / H condenser (30-ES-3402) - LARGE leak	Jet Fire Isolated / Unisolated release 200 mm	RAD 5 kW / m ² : 400 m RAD 3 kW / m ² : 465 m
	IS_OIL_037-01L_LRG_ISFF IS_OIL_037-01L_LRG_UNFF	Loss of containment - Gas release - Propane from propane receiver (30-VZ-3605) to deethaniser O / H condenser (30-ES-3402) - LARGE leak	Flash Fire Isolated / Unisolated release 200 mm	RAD LFL: 265 m
Seveso RdS - Oil Centre	Scenario 36	Release from compressor 30-KC-3601	Flash Fire 24.49 mm	RAD LFL: 17 m RAD ½ LFL: 41 m

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 189 of 314	Rev. 02

SR7	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO	UNIT 36
------------	--	--	----------------

			Jet Fire 24.49 mm	RAD 7 kW / m²: 28.5 m RAD 5 kW / m²: 30 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 33 m
	Scenario 37	Release from separator 30-VZ-3603 for random rupture	Flash Fire 11 mm	RAD LFL: 4 m RAD ½ LFL: 7 m
			Jet Fire 11 mm	RAD 7 kW / m²: in the flame RAD 5 kW / m²: in the flame RAD 3 kW / m²: in the flame
	Scenario 38	Release from separator 30-VZ-3603 for random rupture	Flash Fire 14.15 mm	RAD LFL: 3 m RAD ½ LFL: 4.5 m
			Jet Fire 14.15 mm	RAD 7 kW / m²: 11.5 m RAD 5 kW / m²: 12.5 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 15 m
	Scenario 39	Release from separator 30-VZ-3604 for random rupture	Flash Fire 14.15 mm	RAD LFL: 9 m RAD ½ LFL: 13 m
			Jet Fire 14.15 mm	RAD 7 kW / m²: 18 m RAD 5 kW / m²: 20 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 22.5 m
	Scenario 40	Cavitation propane refrigeration pump 30-PA-3602A / B	Flash Fire 8.5 mm	RAD LFL: 10 m RAD ½ LFL: 23 m
			Jet Fire 8.5 mm	RAD 7 kW / m²: 24.5 m RAD 5 kW / m²: 26.5 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 29.5 m
	Scenario 41	Release from separator 30-VZ-3602 for random rupture	Flash Fire 12.25 mm	RAD LFL: 5 m RAD ½ LFL: 8 m
			Jet Fire 12.25 mm	RAD 7 kW / m²: 10 m RAD 5 kW / m²: 9 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 8.5 m
	Scenario 42	Release from separator 30-VZ-3601 for random rupture	Flash Fire 12.25 mm	RAD LFL: 5 m RAD ½ LFL: 9 m
			Jet Fire 12.25 mm	RAD 7 kW / m²: in the flame RAD 5 kW / m²: in the flame RAD 3 kW / m²: in the flame
	Scenario 43	Release from propane tank 30-VZ-3605 for random rupture	Flash Fire 12.25 mm	RAD LFL: 19 m RAD ½ LFL: 27 m
			Jet Fire 12.25 mm	RAD 7 kW / m²: 23 m RAD 5 kW / m²: 25 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 28 m
	Scenario 65	Propane release by random line rupture 2 "cooling propane distribution system 30-PA-3602 to 30-VZ-3605	Flash Fire 50 mm	RAD LFL: 19.5 m RAD ½ LFL: 31.5 m
			Jet Fire 50 mm	RAD 7 kW / m²: 21.5 m RAD 5 kW / m²: 26 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 34 m
	Scenario 67	Release of LPG (propane) due to random rupture of exhaust hose	Flash Fire 7 mm	RAD LFL: 17 m RAD ½ LFL: 22 m
			Jet Fire 7 mm	RAD 7 kW / m²: 26 m RAD 5 kW / m²: 28 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 29 m

The cartographic representation of the damage areas inside and outside the plant is reproduced in attachment LD9

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 190 of 314	Rev. 02


SR7	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO	UNIT 36
------------	--	--	----------------

DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENTAL SCENARIOS	
TYPE OF EMERGENCY Product release from pressurized equipment in gas / vapor phase with delayed ignition and flash fire Release of product from equipment under pressure in the gas / vapor phase with ignition and jet fire	
SUBSTANCE INVOLVED FLAMMABLE GAS / LPG	
LOCATION: U36 EQUIPMENT;	CAUSE: Accidental release without priming or with delayed ignition Accidental release and immediate trigger
CONSEQUENCES	
IMMEDIATE: Dispersion of flammable substances Jet set on fire	MORE: High lethality for people presents in the flammable cloud in case of delayed ignition In case of non-interception, accumulation of gas and possible UVCE Fire spread, irradiation, and consequent possible involvement of neighboring equipment
DEVICES FOR PREVENTION, PROTECTION, MITIGATION	
FIRE FIGHTING SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT (IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167381) Fixed deluge system to protect the following equipment (MANIFOLDS DM-A1 / 2 and DM-B1 / 2 - Sub-Deluge zone 2.1): 30-PA-3401A / B - 30-PA-3402A / B - 30-PA-3405A / B 30-VZ-3402 30-PA-3601A / B 30-VZ-3601 - 30-ES-3608 30-KB-3701A / B Water Mist Plant: 30-KC-3601 9 monitors / hydrants, 0 hydrants, 25 powder fire extinguishers (12 kg) and 4 wheeled powder fire extinguishers (50 kg)	
DETECTION SYSTEMS (IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167301) Thermosensitive cables Flame detectors Toxic gas detectors (H ₂ S) Flammable gas detectors (propane / methane) Linear gas detectors Fusible plugs	
CCR REFLEX SHEETS IT-TPR-OC-EXT-200051 - Reflex sheet Fire zone 2.1	
MEANS OF PROTECTION: Use the Personal and Collective Protective Equipment as per procedure	EXTINGUISHING AGENT: Water / foam Dust
FIRST AID MEASURES: Wash with running water for at least 15 minutes. Call the doctor and transfer the subject to the emergency room. Remove contaminated clothes and rinse for 15 minutes, rinse with mild soap. In case of burns, wet for a long time with cold water or with sterile solution and then protect with gauze. Take the subject to an open and ventilated place. Carry out oxygen therapy, if not breathing, give artificial respiration (no mouth to mouth). Place it in a safe position. Rinse your mouth without swallowing. Drink water and do not induce vomiting.	



SR7	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO	UNIT 36
------------	--	--	----------------

IT-TPR-30-EPC1-169381 OIL CENTRE - PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM FOR UNIT 01 - DELUGE SYSTEM MANIFOLDS A1 A2 B1 B2 C1 C2





TotalEnergies EP Italia

Company Management System

INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE

2-PR-QHSE-022

Date 15/12/2021

Page 193 of 314

Rev. 02


SR7

**SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND
EMERGENCY PROCEDURES**

**INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT
TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO**

UNIT 37

UNIT 37



Risk Analysis	Worst case		Damage scenario	Distances of the damage scenario
	Scenario reference	Scenario description		
Seveso RdS - Oil Centre	Scenario 44	Release from compressor 30-KB-3701A / B	Flash Fire 12 mm	RAD LFL: 7.5 m RAD ½ LFL: 13.5 m
			Jet Fire 12 mm	RAD 7 kW / m²: 16 m RAD 5 kW / m²: 17 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 18 m
	Scenario 45	Release from separator 30-VZ-3701A / B for random rupture	Flash Fire 14.15 mm	RAD LFL: 5 m RAD ½ LFL: 8.5 m
			Jet Fire 14.15 mm	RAD 7 kW / m²: in the flame RAD 5 kW / m²: 7 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 9 m
	Scenario 60bis	Catastrophic rupture of the 6 "High pressure fuel gas line from SDV37293A / B to 30-ESDV-60003	Jet Fire 150 mm	RAD 7 kW / m²: 35 m RAD 5 kW / m²: 42 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 55 m
			Flammable dispersion 150 mm	RAD LFL: 37 m RAD ½ LFL: 56 m
	Scenario 66	Release of export gas due to random rupture of 6 "line Export gas in delivery 30-KB-3701 from 30-UN-3701 Metering System (Zone B) to tie-in for GAS export pipeline	Jet Fire 25.4 mm	RAD 7 kW / m²: 38 m RAD 5 kW / m²: 41 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 45.5 m
			Flammable dispersion 25.4 mm	RAD LFL: 18 m RAD ½ LFL: 30 m

The cartographic representation of the damage areas inside and outside the plant is reproduced in attachment LD9


 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 194 of 314	Rev. 02

SR7	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO	UNIT 37
------------	--	--	----------------

DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENTAL SCENARIOS	
TYPE OF EMERGENCY Product release from pressurized equipment in gas / vapor phase with delayed ignition and flash fire Release of product from equipment under pressure in the gas / vapor phase with ignition and jet fire	
SUBSTANCE INVOLVED FLAMMABLE GAS / LPG	
LOCATION: U37 EQUIPMENT;	CAUSE: Accidental release without priming or with delayed ignition Accidental release and immediate trigger
CONSEQUENCES	
IMMEDIATE: Dispersion of flammable substances Jet set on fire	MORE: High lethality for people presents in the flammable cloud in case of delayed ignition In case of non-interception, accumulation of gas and possible UVCE Fire spread, irradiation and consequent possible involvement of neighboring equipment
DEVICES FOR PREVENTION, PROTECTION, MITIGATION	
FIRE FIGHTING SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT (IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167381, IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167380) Fixed deluge system to protect the following equipment (MANIFOLDS DM-A1 / 2 and DM-B1 / 2 - Sub-Deluge zone 2.1): 30-PA-3401A / B - 30-PA-3402A / B - 30-PA-3405A / B 30-VZ-3402 30-PA-3601A / B 30-VZ-3601 - 30-ES-3608 30-KB-3701A / B Water Mist System: 9 monitors / hydrants, 0 hydrants, 25 powder fire extinguishers (12 kg) and 4 wheeled powder fire extinguishers (50 kg)	
DETECTION SYSTEMS (IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167301) Thermosensitive cables Flame detectors Toxic gas detectors (H ₂ S) Flammable gas detectors (methane) Linear gas detectors Fusible plugs	
CCR REFLEX SHEETS IT-TPR-OC-EXT-200051 - Reflex sheet Fire zone 2.1	
MEANS OF PROTECTION: Use the Personal and Collective Protective Equipment as per procedure	EXTINGUISHING AGENT: Water / foam Dust
FIRST AID MEASURES: Wash with running water for at least 15 minutes. Call the doctor and transfer the subject to the emergency room. Remove contaminated clothes and rinse for 15 minutes, rinse with mild soap. In case of burns, wet for a long time with cold water or with sterile solution and then protect with gauze. Take the subject to an open and ventilated place. Carry out oxygen therapy, if not breathing, give artificial respiration (no mouth to mouth). Place it in a safe position. Rinse your mouth without swallowing. Drink water and do not induce vomiting.	



IT-TPR-30-EPC1-169381 OIL CENTRE - PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM FOR UNIT 01 - DELUGE SYSTEM MANIFOLDS A1 A2 B1 B2 C1 C2





TotalEnergies EP Italia

Company Management System

INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE

2-PR-QHSE-022

Date 15/12/2021

Page 197 of 314

Rev. 02


SR7

**SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND
EMERGENCY PROCEDURES**


**INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT
TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO**

UNIT 40

UNIT 40




Risk Analysis	Worst case		Damage scenario	Distances of the damage scenario
	Scenario reference	Scenario description		
Seveso RdS - Oil Centre	Scenario 46	Release from 30-VC-4001 stripping column for random rupture	Flash Fire 12.25 mm	RAD LFL: 1 m RAD ½ LFL: 2 m
			Toxic dispersion H ₂ S 12.25 mm	TOX 441 ppm: 6.5 m TOX 100 ppm: 13 m
	Scenario 47	Fire of oil supernatant in process water tank 30-TR-4001	Pool Fire - Tank fire - ground irradiation	RAD 7 kW / m²: 0 m RAD 5 kW / m²: 26 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 34 m
			Pool Fire - Fire of the tank - radiation at the roof level 13.5 m	RAD 7 kW / m²: 27 m RAD 5 kW / m²: 30 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 35.5 m
The cartographic representation of the damage areas inside and outside the plant is reproduced in attachment LD9				

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 198 of 314	Rev. 02


SR7	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO	UNIT 40
------------	--	--	----------------

DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENTAL SCENARIOS	
TYPE OF EMERGENCY Product release from pressurized equipment in gas / vapor or liquid phase with delayed ignition and flash fire Product release from pressurized equipment in gas / vapor or liquid phase without trigger and toxic dispersion Release of product from pressurized equipment in liquid phase with formation of pools, ignition and fire (pool fire) Release of product from equipment under pressure in the gas / vapor phase with ignition and jet fire	
SUBSTANCE INVOLVED SLOP / FLAMMABLE GAS / ACID GAS (H ₂ S)	
LOCATION: U40 EQUIPMENT	CAUSE: Accidental release without priming or with delayed ignition Accidental release and immediate trigger
CONSEQUENCES	
IMMEDIATE: Dispersion of flammable / toxic substances Pool fire Jet set on fire	MORE: High lethality for people presents in the toxic or flammable cloud in case of delayed ignition In case of non-interception, accumulation of gas and possible UVCE Fire spread, irradiation, and consequent possible involvement of neighboring equipment
DEVICES FOR PREVENTION, PROTECTION, MITIGATION	
FIRE FIGHTING SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT (IT-TPR-30-EPC1-168305) There is NO fixed deluge system for unit 40. Fixed deluge system to protect the following neighboring equipment (MANIFOLDS DM-F1 / 2 Deluge zone 1): 30-PA-4903 B 30-VZ-4904 Water Mist System: 30-KZ-4001 A / B 3 monitors / hydrants, 1 hydrant, 5 powder fire extinguishers (12 kg) and 0 wheeled powder fire extinguishers (50 kg)	
DETECTION SYSTEMS (IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167312 - IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167329 - IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167762) Flame detectors: n ° 1 Toxic gas detectors (H ₂ S): n ° 50 Flammable gas detectors (propane): n ° 11 Linear gas detectors Fusible plugs	
CCR REFLEX SHEETS IT-TPR-OC-EXT-200050 - Reflex Sheet Fire Zone 1	
MEANS OF PROTECTION: Use the Personal and Collective Protective Equipment as per procedure	EXTINGUISHING AGENT: Water / foam Dust
FIRST AID MEASURES: Wash with running water for at least 15 minutes. Call the doctor and transfer the subject to the emergency room. Remove contaminated clothes and rinse for 15 minutes, rinse with mild soap. In case of burns, wet for a long time with cold water or with sterile solution and then protect with gauze. Take the subject to an open and ventilated place. Carry out oxygen therapy, if not breathing, give artificial respiration (no mouth to mouth). Place it in a safe position. Rinse your mouth without swallowing. Drink water and do not induce vomiting.	

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 199 of 314	Rev. 02

SR7	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO	UNIT 40
-----	---	--	---------

FIRE FIGHTING SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT (IT-TPR-30-EPC1-168305)





TotalEnergies EP Italia

Company Management System

INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE

2-PR-QHSE-022

Date 15/12/2021

Page 200 of 314

Rev. 02


SR7

**SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND
EMERGENCY PROCEDURES**


**INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT
TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO**

UNIT 44

UNIT 44




Risk Analysis	Worst case		Damage scenario	Distances of the damage scenario
	Scenario reference	Scenario description		
Seveso RdS - Oil Centre	Not identified			


 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 201 of 314	Rev. 02

SR7	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO	UNIT 44
------------	--	--	----------------

DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENTAL SCENARIOS	
TYPE OF EMERGENCY Product release from pressurized equipment in gas / vapor or liquid phase with delayed ignition and flash fire Product release from pressurized equipment in gas / vapor or liquid phase without trigger and toxic dispersion Release of product from pressurized equipment in liquid phase with formation of pools, ignition and fire (pool fire)	
SUBSTANCE INVOLVED SLOP / FLAMMABLE GAS / ACID GAS (H ₂ S)	
LOCATION: EQUIPMENT U44	CAUSE: Accidental release without priming or with delayed ignition Accidental release and immediate trigger
CONSEQUENCES	
IMMEDIATE: Dispersion of flammable / toxic substances Pool fire	MORE: High lethality for people presents in the toxic or flammable cloud in case of delayed ignition In case of non-interception, accumulation of gas and possible UVCE Fire spread, irradiation, and consequent possible involvement of neighboring equipment
DEVICES FOR PREVENTION, PROTECTION, MITIGATION	
FIRE FIGHTING SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT (IT-TPR-30-EPC1-168305) Fixed deluge system to protect the following equipment (MANIFOLDS DM-F1 / 2 Deluge zone 1): 30-PA-4903 A / B 30-VZ-4904 N ° 2 monitors / hydrants, n ° 0 hydrants, n ° 4 powder extinguishers (12 kg) and n ° 1 wheeled powder fire extinguishers (50 kg)	
DETECTION SYSTEMS (IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167312 - IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167329 - IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167762) Flame detectors: n ° 1 Toxic gas detectors (H ₂ S): n ° 50 Flammable gas detectors (propane): n ° 11 Linear gas detectors Fusible plugs	
CCR REFLEX SHEETS IT-TPR-OC-EXT-200050 - Reflex Sheet Fire Zone 1	
MEANS OF PROTECTION: Use the Personal and Collective Protective Equipment as per procedure	EXTINGUISHING AGENT: Water / foam Dust
FIRST AID MEASURES: Wash with running water for at least 15 minutes. Call the doctor and transfer the subject to the emergency room. Remove contaminated clothes and rinse for 15 minutes, rinse with mild soap. In case of burns, wet for a long time with cold water or with sterile solution and then protect with gauze. Take the subject to an open and ventilated place. Carry out oxygen therapy, if not breathing, give artificial respiration (no mouth to mouth). Place it in a safe position. Rinse your mouth without swallowing. Drink water and do not induce vomiting.	


FIRE FIGHTING SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT (IT-TPR-30-EPC1-168305)



 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 204 of 314	Rev. 02

SR7	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO	UNIT 45
------------	--	--	----------------

UNIT 45




Risk Analysis	Worst case		Damage scenario	Distances of the damage scenario
	Scenario reference	Scenario description		
Seveso RdS - Oil Centre	Scenario 48	Fire of oil supernatant on slop collection tank 30-TR-4501	Pool Fire - Tank fire - ground irradiation	RAD 7 kW / m²: 21 m RAD 5 kW / m²: 26.5 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 34.5 m
			Pool Fire - Fire of the tank - radiation at the roof level 13.5 m	RAD 7 kW / m²: 27 m RAD 5 kW / m²: 30 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 35.5 m
The cartographic representation of the damage areas inside and outside the plant is reproduced in attachment LD9				

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 205 of 314	Rev. 02


SR7	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO	UNIT 45
------------	--	--	----------------

DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENTAL SCENARIOS	
TYPE OF EMERGENCY Product release from pressurized equipment in gas / vapor or liquid phase with delayed ignition and flash fire Release of product from pressurized equipment in liquid phase with formation of pools, ignition and fire (pool fire) Release of product from equipment under pressure in the gas / vapor phase without ignition and toxic dispersion	
SUBSTANCE INVOLVED CRUDE OIL / FLAMMABLE GAS / ACID GAS (H ₂ S)	
LOCATION: U45 EQUIPMENT	CAUSE: Accidental release without priming or with delayed ignition Accidental release and immediate trigger
CONSEQUENCES	
IMMEDIATE: Dispersion of flammable / toxic substances Pool fire	MORE: High lethality for people presents in the toxic or flammable cloud in case of delayed ignition In case of non-interception, accumulation of gas and possible UVCE Fire spread, irradiation, and consequent possible involvement of neighboring equipment
DEVICES FOR PREVENTION, PROTECTION, MITIGATION	
FIRE FIGHTING SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT (IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167384 - IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167397 - IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167398) Fixed deluge system (MANIFOLDS DM-E1 / 2 and DM-H1 / 2 - Sub-deluge zones 2.6 and 2.7) to protect the following equipment and machines: 30-EC-2601 A / B - 30-EC-4501 - 30-ES-2601 A / B 30-TF-2601 A / B - 30-TR-4501 - 30-VZ-2601 - 30-VP-2601 30-PA-2601 A ÷ D - 30-PA-2602 A / B- 30-PA-4501 A / B N ° 2 monitors / hydrants, n ° 7 hydrants, n ° 10 powder fire extinguishers (12 kg) and 1 wheeled powder fire extinguishers (50 kg)	
Zone E DETECTION SYSTEMS (IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167304 - IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167324 - IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167327) Thermosensitive cables: n ° 4 Flame detectors: n ° 6 Toxic gas detectors (H ₂ S): n ° 11 Flammable gas detectors (propane): n ° 9 Liquid hydrocarbon leak detectors: n ° 2 Linear gas detectors Fusible plugs	
CCR REFLEX SHEETS IT-TPR-OC-EXT-200056 - Reflex sheet Fire zone 2.6 IT-TPR-OC-EXT-200066 - Reflex sheet Fire zone 2.7 IT-TPR-OC-EXT-200048 - Fire storage tanks reflex sheet	
MEANS OF PROTECTION: Use the Personal and Collective Protective Equipment as per procedure	EXTINGUISHING AGENT: Water / foam Dust
FIRST AID MEASURES: Wash with running water for at least 15 minutes. Call the doctor and transfer the subject to the emergency room. Remove contaminated clothes and rinse for 15 minutes, rinse with mild soap. In case of burns, wet for a long time with cold water or with sterile solution and then protect with gauze. Take the subject to an open and ventilated place. Carry out oxygen therapy, if not breathing, give artificial respiration (no mouth to mouth). Place it in a safe position. Rinse your mouth without swallowing. Drink water and do not induce vomiting.	


FIRE FIGHTING SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT (IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167384 - IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167397 - IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167398)




SR7	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO	UNIT 45
------------	--	--	----------------




IT-TPR-30-EPC1-169382 OIL CENTRE - PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM FOR UNIT 01- DELUGE SYSTEM MANIFOLDS D1 D2 E1 E2




IT-TPR-30-EPC1-169383 OIL CENTRE - PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM FOR UNIT 01- DELUGE SYSTEM MANIFOLDS F1 F2 G1 G2 H1 H2 I1 I2




 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 210 of 314	Rev. 02

SR7	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO	UNIT 49
------------	--	--	----------------

UNIT 49




Risk Analysis	Worst case		Damage scenario	Distances of the damage scenario
	Scenario reference	Scenario description		
TRA - Total	Is_OIL_051-02G_LRG_ISTX Is_OIL_051-02G_LRG_UNTX	Loss of containment - Gas release - Gas from LP / acid flare KO drum (30-VZ-4903) to LP / acid flare package (30-UZ-4903) - LARGE leak	Toxic dispersion Isolated / Unisolated release 600 mm	Not defined
Seveso RdS - Oil Centre	Scenario 49	30-FH-4901 High Pressure Wet Torch Release Off	Flammable dispersion	RAD LFL: 139 m RAD ½ LFL: 232 m
			Toxic dispersion H ₂ S	TOX 441 ppm: 60 m TOX 100 ppm: 205 m
	Scenario 50	Release from high pressure cold torch 30-FH-4902 turned off	Flammable dispersion	RAD LFL: 120 m RAD ½ LFL: 220 m
	Scenario 51	Low pressure acid torch release 30-FH-4903 turned off	Toxic dispersion H ₂ S	TOX 441 ppm: 120 m TOX 100 ppm: 310 m
	Scenario 52	Irradiation and dispersion of flare combustion products	Irradiation at ground level	RAD 7 kW / m²: 0 m RAD 5 kW / m²: 0 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 0 m
			Irradiation at an altitude of 10 m	RAD 7 kW / m²: 0 m RAD 5 kW / m²: 0 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 135 m
			Irradiation at an altitude of 50 m	RAD 7 kW / m²: 0 m RAD 5 kW / m²: 85 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 200 m
			Toxic dispersion SO ₂	TOX 627 ppm: 15 m TOX 100 ppm: 265 m
The cartographic representation of the damage areas inside and outside the plant is reproduced in attachment LD9				

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 211 of 314	Rev. 02


SR7	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO	UNIT 49
------------	--	--	----------------

DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENTAL SCENARIOS	
TYPE OF EMERGENCY Product release from pressurized equipment in gas / vapor or liquid phase with delayed ignition and flash fire Product release from pressurized equipment in gas / vapor or liquid phase without trigger and toxic dispersion Release of product from pressurized equipment in liquid phase with formation of pools, ignition and fire (pool fire)	
SUBSTANCE INVOLVED SLOP / FLAMMABLE GAS / ACID GAS (H ₂ S)	
LOCATION: EQUIPMENT U49	CAUSE: Accidental release without priming or with delayed ignition Accidental release and immediate trigger
CONSEQUENCES	
IMMEDIATE: Dispersion of flammable / toxic substances Pool fire	MORE: High lethality for people present in the toxic or flammable cloud in case of delayed ignition In case of non-interception, accumulation of gas and possible UVCE Fire spread, irradiation, and consequent possible involvement of neighboring equipment
DEVICES FOR PREVENTION, PROTECTION, MITIGATION	
FIRE FIGHTING SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT (IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167388) Fixed deluge system to protect the following equipment (MANIFOLDS DM-I1 / 2 Deluge zone 1): 30-VZ-4901; 30-PA-4901 A / B; 30-VZ-4902; 30-PA-3403; 30-PA-3602; 30-VP-3701; 30-VP-3801; 30-VZ-4903; 30-PA-4902 A / B N ° 2 monitors / hydrants, n ° 1 hydrants, n ° 4 powder extinguishers (12 kg) and n ° 1 wheeled powder extinguishers (50 kg)	
DETECTION SYSTEMS (IT-TPR-30-EPC1- 167308) Flame detectors: n ° 2 Toxic gas detectors (H ₂ S): n ° 20 Flammable gas detectors (propane): n ° 6 Fusible plugs	
CCR REFLEX SHEETS IT-TPR-OC-EXT-200050 - Reflex Sheet Fire Zone 1	
MEANS OF PROTECTION: Use the Personal and Collective Protective Equipment as per procedure	EXTINGUISHING AGENT: Water / foam Dust
FIRST AID MEASURES: Wash with running water for at least 15 minutes. Call the doctor and transfer the subject to the emergency room. Remove contaminated clothes and rinse for 15 minutes, rinse with mild soap. In case of burns, wet for a long time with cold water or with sterile solution and then protect with gauze. Take the subject to an open and ventilated place. Carry out oxygen therapy, if not breathing, give artificial respiration (no mouth to mouth). Place it in a safe position. Rinse your mouth without swallowing. Drink water and do not induce vomiting.	

FIRE FIGHTING SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT (IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167388)




IT-TPR-30-EPC1-169383 OIL CENTRE - PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM FOR UNIT 01- DELUGE SYSTEM MANIFOLDS F1 F2 G1 G2 H1 H2 I1 I2




 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 214 of 314	Rev. 02

SR7	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO	UNIT 60
------------	--	--	----------------

UNIT 60




Risk Analysis	Worst case		Damage scenario	Distances of the damage scenario
	Scenario reference	Scenario description		
Seveso RdS - Oil Centre	Scenario 53	Release from separator 30-VZ-6001 for overpressure	Jet Fire 24.49 mm	RAD 7 kW / m²: 19.5 m RAD 5 kW / m²: 21 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 23 m
			Flammable dispersion 24.49 mm	RAD LFL: 9.5 m RAD ½ LFL: 16 m
	Scenario 54	Release from compressor 30-KB-6001	Jet Fire 11 mm	RAD 7 kW / m²: 9 m RAD 5 kW / m²: 9.5 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 10 m
			Flammable dispersion 11 mm	RAD LFL: 4.5 m RAD ½ LFL: 8 m
	Scenario 60	Release of fuel gas due to random rupture of the 6 "line from 30-ESDV-60003 to 30-UZ-6403A / B	Jet Fire 25.4 mm	RAD 7 kW / m²: 18.5 m RAD 5 kW / m²: 21 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 25.5 m
			Flammable dispersion 25.4 mm	RAD LFL: 11 m RAD ½ LFL: 19 m
	Scenario 60bis	Catastrophic rupture of the 6 "High pressure fuel gas line from SDV37293A / B to 30-ESDV-60003	Jet Fire 150 mm	RAD 7 kW / m²: 35 m RAD 5 kW / m²: 42 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 55 m
			Flammable dispersion 150 mm	RAD LFL: 37 m RAD ½ LFL: 56 m
The cartographic representation of the damage areas inside and outside the plant is reproduced in attachment LD9				

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 215 of 314	Rev. 02


SR7	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO	UNIT 60
------------	--	--	----------------

DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENTAL SCENARIOS	
TYPE OF EMERGENCY Product release from pressurized equipment in gas / vapor phase with delayed ignition and flash fire Release of product from equipment under pressure in the gas / vapor phase with ignition and jet fire	
SUBSTANCE INVOLVED FLAMMABLE GAS / LPG	
LOCATION: U60 EQUIPMENT;	CAUSE: Accidental release without priming or with delayed ignition Accidental release and immediate trigger
CONSEQUENCES	
IMMEDIATE: Dispersion of flammable substances Jet set on fire	MORE: High lethality for people presents in the flammable cloud in case of delayed ignition In case of non-interception, accumulation of gas and possible UVCE Fire spread, irradiation, and consequent possible involvement of neighboring equipment
DEVICES FOR PREVENTION, PROTECTION, MITIGATION	
FIRE FIGHTING SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT (IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167382) Fixed deluge system to protect the following equipment (MANIFOLDS DM-C1 / 2 - Sub-Deluge zone 2.1): 30-KB-6001 N ° 3 monitors / hydrants, n ° 1 hydrants, n ° 10 powder fire extinguishers (12 kg) and n ° 2 wheeled powder fire extinguishers (50 kg)	
DETECTION SYSTEMS (IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167301) Thermosensitive cables Flame detectors Flammable gas detectors (methane) Linear gas detectors Fusible plugs	
CCR REFLEX SHEETS IT-TPR-OC-EXT-200051 - Reflex sheet Fire zone 2.1	
MEANS OF PROTECTION: Use the Personal and Collective Protective Equipment as per procedure	EXTINGUISHING AGENT: Water / foam Dust
FIRST AID MEASURES: Wash with running water for at least 15 minutes. Call the doctor and transfer the subject to the emergency room. Remove contaminated clothes and rinse for 15 minutes, rinse with mild soap. In case of burns, wet for a long time with cold water or with sterile solution and then protect with gauze. Take the subject to an open and ventilated place. Carry out oxygen therapy, if not breathing, give artificial respiration (no mouth to mouth). Place it in a safe position. Rinse your mouth without swallowing. Drink water and do not induce vomiting.	


 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 216 of 314	Rev. 02

SR7	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO	UNIT 60
------------	--	--	----------------

FIRE FIGHTING SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT (IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167382 - IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167396)



IT-TPR-30-EPC1-169381 OIL CENTRE - PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM FOR UNIT 01 - DELUGE SYSTEM MANIFOLDS A1 A2 B1 B2 C1 C2





TotalEnergies EP Italia

Company Management System

INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE

2-PR-QHSE-022

Date 15/12/2021

Page 218 of 314

Rev. 02


SR7

**SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND
EMERGENCY PROCEDURES**


**INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT
TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO**

UNIT 64-68

UNIT 64-68



Risk Analysis	Worst case		Damage scenario	Distances of the damage scenario
	Scenario reference	Scenario description		
Seveso RdS - Oil Centre	Scenario 55	Release from gas treatment section to turbine 30-UZ-6403A / B	Jet Fire 12.25 mm	RAD 7 kW / m²: 10 m RAD 5 kW / m²: 10.5 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 11.5 m
			Flammable dispersion 12.25 mm	RAD LFL: 5 m RAD ½ LFL: 8.5 m
	Scenario 60	Release of fuel gas due to random rupture of the 6 "line from 30-ESDV-60003 to 30-UZ-6403A / B	Jet Fire 25.4 mm	RAD 7 kW / m²: 18.5 m RAD 5 kW / m²: 21 m RAD 3 kW / m²: 25.5 m
			Flammable dispersion 25.4 mm	RAD LFL: 11 m RAD ½ LFL: 19 m
The cartographic representation of the damage areas inside and outside the plant is reproduced in attachment LD9				

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 219 of 314	Rev. 02

SR7	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO	UNIT 64-68
------------	--	--	-------------------

DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENTAL SCENARIOS	
TYPE OF EMERGENCY Product release from pressurized equipment in gas / vapor phase with delayed ignition and flash fire Release of product from equipment under pressure in the gas / vapor phase with ignition and jet fire	
SUBSTANCE INVOLVED FLAMMABLE GAS / LPG	
LOCATION: U64-68 EQUIPMENT;	CAUSE: Accidental release without priming or with delayed ignition Accidental release and immediate trigger
CONSEQUENCES	
IMMEDIATE: Dispersion of flammable substances Jet set on fire	MORE: High lethality for people presents in the flammable cloud in case of delayed ignition In case of non-interception, accumulation of gas and possible UVCE Fire spread, irradiation, and consequent possible involvement of neighboring equipment
DEVICES FOR PREVENTION, PROTECTION, MITIGATION	
FIRE FIGHTING SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT (IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167385) There is NO fixed deluge system for unit 64 and 68. Water Mist System: 30-G-6401 A / B Inerting system: 30- HB-6801A / B / C 5 monitors / hydrants, 2 hydrants, 12 powder fire extinguishers (12 kg) and 1 wheeled powder fire extinguishers (50 kg)	
DETECTION SYSTEMS (IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167301) Flame detectors: 3 Toxic gas (H ₂ S) detectors: 7 Flammable (methane) gas detectors: 21	
CCR REFLEX SHEETS IT-TPR-OC-EXT-200057 - Reflex sheet Fire zone 3	
MEANS OF PROTECTION: Use the Personal and Collective Protective Equipment as per procedure	EXTINGUISHING AGENT: Water / foam Dust
FIRST AID MEASURES: Wash with running water for at least 15 minutes. Call the doctor and transfer the subject to the emergency room. Remove contaminated clothes and rinse for 15 minutes, rinse with mild soap. In case of burns, wet for a long time with cold water or with sterile solution and then protect with gauze. Take the subject to an open and ventilated place. Carry out oxygen therapy, if not breathing, give artificial respiration (no mouth to mouth). Place it in a safe position. Rinse your mouth without swallowing. Drink water and do not induce vomiting.	





TotalEnergies EP Italia

Company Management System

INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE

2-PR-QHSE-022

Date 15/12/2021

Page 221 of 314

Rev. 02


SR7

**SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND
EMERGENCY PROCEDURES**


**INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT
TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO**

UNIT 66

UNIT 66




Risk Analysis	Worst case		Damage scenario	Distances of the damage scenario
	Scenario reference	Scenario description		
Seveso RdS - Oil Centre	Scenario 56	Release of flammable gases from vent on 30-VZ-6601	Flammable dispersion 12.25 m	RAD LFL: 14.5 m RAD ½ LFL: 22.5 m
The cartographic representation of the damage areas inside and outside the plant is reproduced in attachment LD9				

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 222 of 314	Rev. 02

SR7	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT TOP MAJOR ACCIDENTAL SCENARIO	UNIT 66
------------	--	--	----------------

DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENTAL SCENARIOS	
TYPE OF EMERGENCY Product release from pressurized equipment in gas / vapor phase with delayed ignition and flash fire	
SUBSTANCE INVOLVED FLAMMABLE GAS / LPG	
LOCATION: U66 EQUIPMENT;	CAUSE: Accidental release without priming or with delayed ignition Accidental release and immediate trigger
CONSEQUENCES	
IMMEDIATE: Dispersion of flammable substances	MORE: High lethality for people presents in the flammable cloud in case of delayed ignition In case of non-interception, accumulation of gas and possible UVCE
DEVICES FOR PREVENTION, PROTECTION, MITIGATION	
FIRE FIGHTING SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT (IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167383) There is NO fixed deluge system for unit 66. 4 monitors / hydrants, 2 hydrants, 14 powder fire extinguishers (12 kg) and 2 wheeled powder fire extinguishers (50 kg)	
DETECTION SYSTEMS (IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167303) Flame detectors: n ° 8 Toxic gas detectors (H ₂ S): n ° 110 Flammable gas detectors (propane / methane): n ° 24 Linear gas detectors Fusible Plugs (Deluge System)	
CCR REFLEX SHEETS IT-TPR-OC-EXT-200054 - Reflex sheet Fire zone 2.4 IT-TPR-OC-EXT-200055 - Reflex sheet Fire zone 2.5	
MEANS OF PROTECTION: Use the Personal and Collective Protective Equipment as per procedure	EXTINGUISHING AGENT: Water / foam Dust
FIRST AID MEASURES: Wash with running water for at least 15 minutes. Call the doctor and transfer the subject to the emergency room. Remove contaminated clothes and rinse for 15 minutes, rinse with mild soap. In case of burns, wet for a long time with cold water or with sterile solution and then protect with gauze. Take the subject to an open and ventilated place. Carry out oxygen therapy, if not breathing, give artificial respiration (no mouth to mouth). Place it in a safe position. Rinse your mouth without swallowing. Drink water and do not induce vomiting.	

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 223 of 314	Rev. 02

SR8	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	ACCIDENT WITH SERIOUS INJURY - DEATH
------------	--	---

SR8 - ACCIDENT WITH SERIOUS INJURY / DEATH

NATURE OF THE ACCIDENT

The accidents that can potentially lead to an ACCIDENT with SERIOUS INJURY or DEATH are:

- ▶ fire, explosion, acute intoxication.
- ▶ Transport accident.
- ▶ Any other serious injury related to an activity on site.

Possible unfavorable developments:

- ▶ aggravation of injury.
- ▶ Contamination, contagion.
- ▶ Death.

in case of activation of a medical evacuation (MEDEVAC), refer to the following procedure:

3-PR-QHSE-019 - SITE MEDICAL ASSISTANCE AND EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICE (MEDEVAC)

SERIOUS WORK ACCIDENT - ESSENTIAL ACTIONS

ACP crisis cell actions:

- alert the RSES and mobilize the medical team/First Intervention Team and first aid vehicles.
- At the doctor's decision, alert the emergency services (118) - use the MEDEVAC Procedure.
- Pending the arrival of help, make the balance of injured/deads.
- inform the ICP Director.

ICP crisis cell actions:

- collect additional information from the RSES as appropriate, from the doctor on the site:
 - circumstance of the accident.
 - Number of people injured.
 - Additional means required.
- Display the main information on one or more billboards posted on the wall or on a screen (chronogram, monitoring of vehicles, victims, etc.).
- Contact the mayor (s) concerned (from the municipality to which the victim belongs and from the municipality of Corleto Perticara).
- evaluate and organize the most appropriate response to the situation.
- Accompany the victims' families to hospitals.
- Manage communication with the family members of the injured party (s).
- inform the CMC Director.


CMC crisis cell actions:

- Complete the communication with the authorities with respect to what has already been communicated by the ICP crisis cell.
- Manage communication with local/national media.
- Inform the partners.

DEATH IN THE WORKPLACE - ESSENTIAL ACTIONS

ACP crisis cell actions:

- alert the RSES and mobilize the Medical Team/First Intervention Team and first aid vehicles.
- Isolate the scene of the death and prohibit access.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 224 of 314	Rev. 02

SR8	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	ACCIDENT WITH SERIOUS INJURY - DEATH
------------	--	---


- Do not eliminate material elements useful for any investigation.
- Inform any witnesses to remain at the disposal of the judicial authorities.
- Stop all activities in progress and secure installations.
- inform the ICP Director.

ICP crisis cell actions:

- collect additional information from the RSES as appropriate, from the doctor on the site:
 - circumstance of the accident.
 - Number of people injured.
 - Additional means required.
- Contact the Carabinieri and the mayor (mayors) concerned (from the Municipality to which the victim belongs and from the Municipality of Corleto Perticara).
- Evaluate and organize the most appropriate response to the situation.
- Accompany the victims' families to hospital.
- Manage communication with family members of the victim (s).
- inform the CMC Director.

CMC crisis cell actions:

- Complete the communication with the authorities with respect to what has already been communicated by the ICP cell.
- Manage communication with local/national media.
- Securing information with HQ.
- Inform the partners.

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 225 of 314	Rev. 02

SR9	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	TERRORIST THREAT
------------	--	-------------------------

SR9 - TERRORIST THREAT

NATURE OF THE ACCIDENT

The incidents that can potentially constitute a TERRORIST THREAT are:

- ▶ telephone terrorist threat, with written or recorded message.
- ▶ Discovery of a suspicious package.

Possible unfavorable developments:

- ▶ explosion, fire of the installations due to the domino effect.

Emergency management in the event of a terrorist threat will also be carried out in accordance with the Site Security Plan (2-PLA-SUR-001).

TERRORIST THREAT - ESSENTIAL ACTIONS

ACP crisis cell actions - upon receipt of a terrorist threat at the Oil Centre:


- inform the ICP Director.
- Inform the Security service and alert the police (Carabinieri).
- If requested by IC, activate the General alarm.
- If requested by IC, secure the plants.
- If requested by IC, evacuate non-essential personnel.
- If requested by IC, remove the remaining personnel from the plants and offices.
- Provide logistical support for the intervention of the police.

ICP crisis cell actions

- in the event of a telephone alert, fill in the form "**FO8** - Management of a telephone terrorist threat".
- If the threat to the plant is considered credible, proceed with the safety of the plant.
- If there is a credible threat to the buildings in Area N, evacuate personnel from the building for a radius of more than 100 meters.
- Provide logistical support to the plant.
- Provide logistical assistance to the bomb squad.
- Inform the CMC Director.

CMC crisis cell actions:

- alert the DGEP by telephone.
- Manage communication with local/national media.
- Inform the partners.
- Contact the person on call for security of the Group and send him the "**FO8** - MANAGEMENT OF A TELEPHONE TERRORIST THREAT", duly completed by the person who received the call, so that they can be analyzed.
- report to the DGEP or to the cell in Paris, if activated.

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 226 of 314	Rev. 02

SR10	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	VEGETATION FIRE OUTSIDE THE OC
-------------	--	---------------------------------------

SR10 - VEGETATION FIRE OUTSIDE THE OIL CENTRE

NATURE OF THE ACCIDENT

Although the possibility of an accident inside the Centro Olio plant induced by forest fires or vegetation outside the fence was not considered reasonably credible due to the extended distances between the equipment and the fence and the absence of significant wooded areas adjacent to the plant, in the event of a fire in vegetation outside the plant, the plant provides for an emergency intervention procedure.

- ▶ Bush fire adjacent to the fence of the plant.
- ▶ Fire of wooded areas within the areas around the plant.

Possible unfavorable developments:

- ▶ Production of hazardous fumes for plant personnel.
- ▶ Blocking of the road network accessing the plant.
- ▶ Propagation of the fire to other TEPIT plants (wells, isolation valves of underground transport pipelines).
- ▶ Propagation of the fire at the Centro Olio plant (unlikely hypothesis).


EXTERNAL VEGETATION FIRE - ESSENTIAL ACTIONS

ACP crisis cell actions - when a fire is observed or reported outside the plant:

- Call the CCR (number 100), which informs the RSES.
- RSES evaluates whether to send the first intervention team by means of the mobile fire-fighting vehicle (pick-up).
- Inform the Fire Brigade Command of Potenza and acknowledge the instructions.
- inform the ICP Director.
- provide logistical support to the intervention of the Fire Brigade.

ICP crisis cell actions

- the ICP Director follows the evolution of the situation and evaluates the activation of the ICP crisis cell.


 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 227 of 314	Rev. 02

SR11	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	EARTHQUAKE/LANDSLIDE
-------------	--	-----------------------------

SR11 – NATURAL EVENTS (EARTHQUAKE/LANDSLIDE)

SEISMIC RISK

The order of the President of the Council of Ministers 20/3/2003 n. 3274 "First elements regarding general criteria for the seismic classification of the national territory and technical regulations for constructions in seismic areas", modified by the Basilicata Region with the Regional Council Resolution No. 731 of 19/11/2003 which places the municipality of Corleto Perticara, in which the Tempa Rossa Oil Centre is in seismic zone 2.



The design of Tempa Rossa Oil Centre in static or seismic conditions for Site Preparation and for all installations was carried out in compliance with following legislation (see note):

- Technical Standards for Construction (NTC08) – “Norme Tecniche per le Costruzioni” -DM 14/01/2008, published in GUN 29 of 04/02/2008, in force since 30/06/2009.
- Instructions for the application of the NTC08 standard, “Istruzioni per l'applicazione delle Norme Tecniche per le Costruzioni” - Ministerial Circular 02/02/2009 No. 617”, issued by the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport.

Note - The standard above mentioned have been replaced on 2018/2019 by the following:


- Technical Standards for Construction (NTC18) – Aggiornamento delle “Norme Tecniche per le Costruzioni”-DM 17/01/2018, published in GUN 42 of 20/02/2018, in force since 22/03/2018.
- Instructions for the application of the NTC18 standard, Istruzioni per l'applicazione delle “Norme Tecniche per le Costruzioni” - Ministerial Circular 21/01/2019 No. 7, issued by the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport.

These standards shall be followed for new constructions or modification of existing facilities.

Additional info relating to behavior and actions during an earthquake are listed at the end of this scenario.

After plant start-up and now in operation mode, applying the concept of Return on Experience (REX) the earthquake scenario has been reviewed and upgraded:

- Considering a conservative approach to protect personnel, environment and asset.
- Tailoring main actions, after the alert/alarm raising, to secure installation (in production mode) as detailed below.

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 228 of 314	Rev. 02

SR11	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	EARTHQUAKE/LANDSLIDE
-------------	--	-----------------------------

DESCRIPTION:

Scenario, alert system and actions are related to:

1. Earthquake.
2. Landslide as consequence of:
 - a) Earthquake.
 - b) Intense/long meteorological event.

Risks associated to Tempa Rossa facilities, and in particular flowlines, pipelines, potentially exposed to landslide, superficial soil erosion, riverbank erosion were also identified into the HAZID (TRA- technological risk assessment).

Indeed, Tempa Rossa area was set under observation by a geotechnical-structural monitoring system to study the slope stability phenomena since wells, flowlines and Oil Centre areas are prone to landslides and earthquakes. Several actions have been put in place since Site Preparation phase to mitigate/ slope instability. It is well known that landslide phenomena can be activated (or reactivated) by rainfalls, which, by increasing the piezometric levels, cause a reduction in the resistant forces available in the geotechnical units. Therefore, in many areas, the mitigation design, in addition to slope re-profiling, retaining structures and excavations, envisaged the adoption of drainage systems (draining trenches or piles) to reduce and maintain stable piezometric levels and improve soil strength.

At the same time of the design phases a Monitoring System was planned, activated since the construction steps and implemented immediately after works completion. The Monitoring system, currently in operation, executes readings to control both structures behavior and slopes where the instability has been occurred in the past: the frequency of data assessment is on monthly basis on the lead of Geoscience Direction.

An additional early warning system (EWS) is installed in TR-1 well-site. For all other areas in the Oil Centre dedicated and similar additional systems are in project phase.

For above reasons and applying a conservative approach in the Mining Concession “Gorgoglione”, if an EARTQUAKE or LANDSLIDE EVENT will occur with possibility to affect at least an area or unit, the flowlines or the pipeline, to prevent any hazardous outcomes associated to a potential loss of containment or any risk on personnel or asset, please follow these instructions:

RAISE ALERT/ALARM

In case of earthquake the shock will be the “First event” that can raise the emergency level and activate the ERP.

In case of landslide the alert/alarm raising with activation of the ERP could be consequence of:

- a) the earthquake (as above).
- b) Info coming from geoscience technician or any anomaly highlighted on site by Sorvegliante or any other technician or Operating Personnel (example - any anomaly on structures and slopes).


MAIN ACTIONS

1. Inform the **CCR** about the anomaly

Note:

- In case of earthquake the CCR will receive the alert directly by the shock wave itself.
- In case of landslide the info will arrive via EWS call (for TR-1 well) or by anyone on site.

2. The CCR panel operator will inform immediately Shift Supervisor/RSES.
3. The RSES or his substitute (Operating Authority or Shift Supervisor) will inform the geotechnical expert to assess quickly and to decide for preventive actions to implement:
 - a) ESD-1 for Oil Centre or LPG Centre or both.
 - b) Shut down for single well-site or flowline, all well-sites and flowlines or export pipelines.
4. In case the hazardous event will cause an industrial accident at Oil Centre, the related Scenario Reflex Sheet SR1-SR2 or SR7 will be used.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 229 of 314	Rev. 02

SR11	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	EARTHQUAKE/LANDSLIDE
-------------	--	-----------------------------

5. In case of hydrocarbon spillages, RSES or his substitute will alert the environmental emergency service and activate the Tempa Rossa Oil Spill Contingency Plan (IT-TPR-GE-SET-000039).
6. After the event occurred, as preventive action, the RSES or his substitute will assess to reduce the crude oil into one or more flowlines, pigging and flushing with water, to mitigate the impacts of any potential spillage, the RSES will activate the procedure taking as reference “IT-TPR-1A-FOPS-200040 - Emergency Pigging procedure TR1”, applicable to all well sites.

SITE ACCESS

In case of earthquake access roads shall be closed and security will manage the access to Oil Centre for key personnel (production or maintenance operators, disciplines experts, etc.):

- RSES or his substitute will inform the Muster and Evacuation Leader to guarantee the above-mentioned aspects.
- Roads shall be forbidden to access by unauthorized personnel (Ponte Tre Archi, TE-1 road, Guardia access road, Gorgoglione access road). In this case RSES will liaise with ICP to inform external authorities.

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 230 of 314	Rev. 02

SR11	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	EARTHQUAKE/LANDSLIDE
-------------	--	-----------------------------

NATURAL EVENT LANDSLIDE/EARTHQUAKE	
Key information	Key actions
SIMOPS in progress? Production Phase? Number of people on the site (Oil Center? TR1 well site or other wells?) Activities in progress (hot work, drilling, etc.) at Oil Centre or at Wells? Downgraded situations?	<p>Primary</p> <p>CCR to be activated/ informed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • a) by the natural event (earthquake). • b) by landslide monitoring/early warning system (EWS). • c) by anyone or by Call from number 100 (or external). <p>CCR Panel Operator shall immediately inform the Shift Supervisor/RSES.</p> <p>The Shift Supervisor or RSES shall inform the geotechnic expert (if activated by the landslide monitoring/EWS)</p> <p>PA/GA- To provide instructions.</p> <p>Central Control room</p> <p>Under instructions of RSES:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Activate the ESD-1 for Oil Centre or LPG Centre or for both. • Activate the shutdown for TR1 Well or other concerned well or all wells or concerned area of the Oil Centre. <p>Evaluation of the escalation</p> <p>First Intervention team</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Activate the First Intervention Team. • Activate the Sorvegliante (Landside TR1 or another well-site). <p>On site:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Send First intervention Team and prepare a safe route map to send to OSC / RSES. ○ Define the green zone. ○ Perform survey with discipline experts if possible (conditions are safe): preventive check by First Intervention Team with Breathing apparatus to confirm the absence of any leak is mandatory before authorizing additional personnel entry on site or in area of event. <p>Muster Points</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Oil Centre: POB count by the Muster and Evacuation Leader. • TR1 Well: POB Count by the Sorvegliante. <p>Pass the information to OSC / RSES.</p> <p>ICP/CMC cell</p> <p>Contact the competent authorities</p>
Escalation-Mitigation measures	
Loss of containment Damages of Asset Injury of personnel	
Escape routes & Muster Point	Means of evacuation
Tempa Rossa staff will meet at the defined Muster Points or at the alternative Muster point announced by PA/GA.	Road transport- to be assessed as per impact of the natural event (area affected or not safe for circulation). To be checked situation if access roads are closed but possible in the opposite way avoiding any bottleneck.

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 231 of 314	Rev. 02

SR11	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	EARTHQUAKE/LANDSLIDE
-------------	--	-----------------------------

ADDITIONAL INFO

NATURE OF THE EARTHQUAKE ACCIDENT

An earthquake is a clearly perceptible natural event that does not need a particular type of alert (alarm, siren, etc.) to be notified.

Since the plant has been designed to withstand seismic stresses, it should in any case be kept in mind that you must not proceed to leave the room or working area in which you are located unless the GENERAL Alarm is activated with PA/GA automatically or by the RSES.

For those who are inside the plant:

DURING THE SHOCK - SUMMARY OF ESSENTIAL ACTIONS

- ▶ If you are inside the building, quickly protect yourself from falling objects and / or parts of structures by placing yourself near the most "solid" points of the structure such as load-bearing walls, architraves, doorways or under tables and / o desks; keep away from windows and glass doors (they could explode), from tall cabinets, from partitions (non-bearing walls between adjacent rooms) and from external walls. If the PA / GA is activated, follow the directives communicated.
- ▶ If you are outdoors, you need to move away from plants and buildings, look for a place free from objects that can fall. If the PA / GA is activated, follow the directives communicated.

AT THE END OF THE SHOCK - SUMMARY OF THE ESSENTIAL ACTIONS

ACP crisis cell actions:

- Inform the RSES, if not already alerted.
- RSES verifies the presence of injured persons and victims.
- RSES checks for damage to plants, structures, and buildings.
- Check the POB.
- inform the ICP Director.

ICP crisis cell actions:

- collect additional information from the RSES as appropriate.
- Activate the ICP Crisis Cell.
- contact the competent authorities through the Local/Regional Authorities Liaison
- Manage communication with the family members of the injured party (s).
- Inform the CMC Director.
- Inform Managing Director for CCMC and CMC Crisis Cells activation

CMC crisis cell actions:

- summarize the information obtained so far from the ICP Director.
- Manage communication with the support of CCMC Crisis Cell.
- Inform the JV Partners.
- Report to the CSC crisis cell in Paris, if activated.

SR11	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	EARTHQUAKE/LANDSLIDE
-------------	--	-----------------------------

No.	EARTHQUAKE/LANDSLIDE	Components ACP													
		Order	Action	ACP function and number of resources											
				RSES	LI	LS	MEL	EL	CCR SL	CCR Q	SIL	FIT	MED	ARE	
1	Constitution of the Crisis Cell "Advance Command Post" (ACP)	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1											1
2	RSES - OSC	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1											2
3	Intervention Leader	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1										3
4	Installation Shutdown Leader	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h			1									4
5	Muster and Evacuation Leader	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h				1								5
7	Event Logger	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h					1							7
Securing the Oil Center															
8	ESD-1	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h			1			1	2					8
Securing the TR1 Well or other Wells - Apply Emergency Pigging Procedure															
9	ESD-1 or shutdown of the concerned well	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h			1			1	2					9
10	Test Separator and Flowline preparation	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h			1			1	2					10
11	Line-Up for Pig Receiver	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h			1			1	2					11
12	Line-Up for Pig Launcher	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h			1			1	2					12
13	Pigging	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h			1			1	2					13
Safety of workers present															
14	Order the staff present to reach the Muster Points (Oil Centre, Wells or both)	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1			1							1	14
15	Order the staff count	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h				1							1	15
16	Check the attendance register	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h				1							1	16
17	Send the attendance register to the ICP cell	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1			1							1	17
Relations between Sites and ACP Crisis Cell															
18	Transmit all relevant information from the place of the event to the ACP	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h				1				1				18
19	Assessment of the situation and the need for additional means	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1	1										19
20	Direction of intervention actions	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1										20
21	Activate the First Intervention team (using breathing apparatus)	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1						1	6			21
22	Activate the Team of experts	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1											22
23	Forbid access to unauthorized persons	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h		1						1	6			23
24	If required, depressurize the equipment	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h			1			1	2					24
25	Activate the medical emergency team	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h								1				25
26	Evaluate possible evolutions of the event	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1	1	1									26
Communications with the ICP Crisis Cell															
27	Inform the Gestore or his delegate	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1											27
28	Update the event log	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h					1							28
29	Organize the debriefing at the end of the crisis	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1											29
30	Demobilizing the ACP Crisis Cell	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1											30
31	Prepare a report of the event including an improvement plan if necessary	<input type="checkbox"/> h	<input type="checkbox"/> h	1				1							31

(*) ON-SCENE COMMANDER (OSC): RSES (1)
Installation Shutdown Leader: LS (1)

Intervention Leader: LI (1)
Muster and Evacuation Leader: MEL (1)

Event Logger: EL (1)
CCR Shutdown Leader: CCR SL (1)
CCR Panel Operator: CCR Q (2)

Site Intervention Team Leader: SIL (1)
First Intervention Team: FIT (6)

Medical Team: MED (3)
Muster Counter: MC (1)

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 233 of 314	Rev. 02

SR12	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	TRANSPORT INCIDENT
-------------	--	---------------------------

SR12 - TRANSPORT INCIDENT

NATURE OF ACCIDENTS

Accidents associated with TRANSPORT activities that may occur inside the Tempa Rossa Oil Centre Plant or outside for activities associated with the Oil Centre are:

- ▶ Accident of tankers during the transport of substances produced / generated on the Oil Centre (liquid sulfur, production water or contaminated drainage water, salts resulting from the treatment of production water, other liquid waste).
- ▶ Vehicle accident during the transport of chemical substances (additives, chemicals) or lubricating oils coming from storage in Dumping Area 05 or from outside.
- ▶ Accident of tankers during the transport of substances supplied to the Oil Centre (Propane, Diesel, LPG, etc.).
 - Any accident during collective or individual transport within or in the immediate vicinity of our sites involving vehicles belonging to the Company or our contractors.

SUMMARY OF ESSENTIAL ACTIONS

ACP crisis cell actions - in the event of a road, tanker, or mechanical vehicle accident on TEPIT sites:

- alert the RSES and mobilize the medical team and first aid vehicles.
- In the event of a fuel / oil / hazardous substance leak, contain the leak with absorbent materials (sand, absorbents, etc.).
- Keep powder fire extinguishers or the mobile vehicle (pickup) equipped with foam within reach.
- Do not extract the victims, except in the event of a fire hazard to the vehicle.
- Take stock of the victims, help them breathe, comfort them.
- Upon decision of the doctor, alert the emergency services (tel. 118).
- **if there are people trapped, seriously injured, or intoxicated or who risk being involved in a fire, activate the ACP and ICP crisis cells (ref. BP2).**
- alert the environmental emergency service (IT-TPR-GE-SET-000039-Tempa Rossa Oil Spill Contingency Plan).

ACP crisis cell actions - Car, bus or mechanical vehicle accidents outside, but close to the factory:


- alert the RSES and mobilize the doctor and first aid vehicles.
- RSES alerts the local emergency services (call 118 in case of injuries, 113 for traffic and investigations, 115 if it is necessary to extract the people who have been trapped or in case of fire danger).
- Mark the area to avoid further accidents (triangle, torches).
- In case of loss of fuel / oils / dangerous substances, contain with absorbent materials (earth, sand, absorbents).
- Do not extract the victims, except in the event of a fire hazard to the vehicle.
- Take stock of the victims, help them breathe.
- If there are victims, alert the police.
- Alert the person in charge of the transport / procurement contract if the accident involves the company or a contractor to which contracted works are entrusted.

ACP crisis cell actions - Collective transport accident:

- In the event of an accident involving collective means of transport (shuttle) in which TEPIT personnel may be, the ICP or CMC crisis cell will contact all the entities necessary for an audit.

ICP crisis cell actions:

- collect additional information from the RSES as appropriate, from the doctor on the site:
 - circumstance of the accident.
 - number of people injured.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 234 of 314	Rev. 02


SR12	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	TRANSPORT INCIDENT
-------------	--	---------------------------

- additional means required.

- Display the main information on one or more billboards posted on the wall or on a screen (chronogram, monitoring of vehicles, victims, etc.).
- Contact the Mayor (Mayors) concerned (of the territorially competent Municipality and of the Municipality of Corleto Perticara if the accident occurred on the Oil Centre).
- Evaluate and organize the most appropriate response to the situation.
- Accompany the victims' families to hospitals.
- Manage communication with the family members of the injured party (s).
- inform the CMC Director.

CMC crisis cell actions:

- summarize the information obtained so far from the ICP Director and expose it to the members of the CMC about:
 - circumstance of the accident.
 - number of people injured.
 - additional means required.
- Complete the communication with the authorities with respect to what has already been communicated by the ICP cell.
- Manage communication with local and local/national media.
- Inform the partners.

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 235 of 314	Rev. 02

SR12	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	FIRE IN OIL CENTRE BUILDINGS
-------------	--	-------------------------------------

SR13 – FIRE IN OIL CENTRE BUILDINGS

NATURE OF THE ACCIDENT

Although the possibility of the fire accident inside the Oil Centre Buildings was not considered reasonably credible in the previous review of the Internal Emergency Response Plan, following hypothesis have been included in this scenario:

- ▶ Fire in unmanned building: Substation SS-2 (out of normal working hours).
- ▶ Fire in normally manned building: Administration buildings (Area N offices, Canteen, workshop) or technical building SS-1.

MAIN DESIGN CONSIDERATION:

Fire detection inside the buildings of Oil Centre (see “CAUSE AND EFFECT MATRIX FOR FIRE AND GAS DETECTION SYSTEM – BUILDINGS - IT-TPR-00-EPC1-167217”) is structured as follows:

FIRE CONTROL PANELS – (AUTRONICA PANELS)- acquiring all addressable fire equipment detectors from building:

- a. **Smoke detectors** - Voting is required (2 out of N, $N \geq 3$) where fixed extinguishing system is activated by smoke detectors.
- b. **VESDA system** - “**A Very Early Smoke Detection**” System is additionally provided in all Technical Rooms (Electrical room, Instrument Technical Room, Instrument Computer Room, Telecom Equipment Room and HVAC room). In buildings with Air Handling Units (i.e., SS-1, SS-2 and Fire Water Station Buildings in the Oil Centre and Electrical Sub-Stations in well sites) smoke detectors are provided upstream and downstream of AHU.
- c. **MAC** - Manual Alarm Call points are part of the fire and gas detection system.

TOTAL FLOODING PANEL – INERGEN Extinguisher System – Present in all technical rooms. This system is normally active in all “unmanned” building (as SS-2).

Possible unfavorable developments:

- ▶ The automatic system designed to raise the alarm and extinguish immediately the fire doesn’t work.
- ▶ Workers presents on the building will use the fire-extinguishers in place, but this do not stop the fire.
- ▶ Fire on the building concerned has an escalation to be faced with activation of this emergency plan (unlikely hypothesis).

FIRE INTO THE BUILDINGS - ESSENTIAL ACTIONS


When a fire or smoke occur in SS-2 (or other unmanned building):

ACP crisis cell actions:

- Call the CCR (#100), which informs the Shift Supervisor or RSES.
- CCR panel operator will verify the activation of INERGEN system.
- RSES will assess if necessary, ACP activation and inform ICP commander.
- RSES evaluates whether to send the first intervention team to assess the situation on site and verify absence of workers or injured people inside.
- RSES will assess the impact of unavailability of SS-2 (or building concerned by the fire) vs the production and credible escalation to decide if reduce or stop the production.

ICP crisis cell actions:

- the ICP Director follows the evolution of the situation and evaluates the activation of the ICP crisis cell.

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 236 of 314	Rev. 02

SR12	SPECIFIC SCENARIOS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	FIRE IN OIL CENTRE BUILDINGS
-------------	--	-------------------------------------

When a fire or smoke occur in OC-2 Building (Area N offices, canteen or workshop): in this case there is the possibility that ACP Emergency Management Room will be not available and ACP members will have to meet in SS-1 Meeting Room.

ACP crisis cell actions

- Call the CCR (#100), which informs the RSES or Shift Supervisor (e.g., night shift).
- CCR panel operator will verify the activation of alarm or PA/GA system.
- RSES will assess if necessary, ACP crisis cell activation (in SS-1) and inform the Incident Commander.
- RSES evaluates whether to send the First Intervention Team to assess the situation in OC-2 area and verify absence of workers or injured people inside

ICP crisis cell actions

- the ICP Director follows the evolution of the situation and evaluates the activation of the ICP crisis cell.


When a fire or smoke occur in SS-1 Building: this case very unlikely, it needs to proceed with all plant shutdown (ESD-1) and activate the complete site evacuation by the RSES in contact with Incident Commander and HSSE Director.

ACP crisis cell actions

- CCR information quickly to RSES or Shift Supervisor (e.g., night shift).
- CCR panel operator will verify the activation of alarm or PA/GA system.
- RSES will assess if necessary, ACP crisis activation and inform Incident Commander.
- RSES evaluates whether to send the First Intervention Team to assess the situation in SS-1 and verify absence of workers or injured people inside.
- RSES will assess for ESD-1 putting all installation in safe mode.
- RSES will assess if activate complete site evacuation raising the continuous alarm.

ICP crisis cell actions


- the Incident Commander follows the evolution of the situation and evaluates the activation of the ICP cell.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 237 of 314	Rev. 02

FO	FORMS
-----------	--------------


Section FO

FORMS

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 238 of 314	Rev. 02

FO	FORMS
-----------	--------------

FO	FORMS
FO1	Crisis Cell Components
FO2	First actions after the activation of the ERP
FO3	Message transmission cards (ICS 213)
FO4	Register of Events and Actions (ICS 233)
FO5	Consequences and Impacts Control Form
FO6	Stakeholder Control Board
FO7	Incident Status (ICS 201)
FO8	Management of a telephone terrorist threat
FO9	Press release template
FO10	PEC communication modules External Emergency Plan
FO11	Emergency drill registration
FO12	RLSA and Contractors consultation reports
FO13a	Victims' Follow-up
FO13b	Injured/Victim Identification & Status

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 239 of 314	Rev. 02


FO	FORMS
-----------	--------------

FO1 - COMPONENTS OF THE CRISIS CELLS

FORM TO FILL IN ON ARRIVAL IN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ROOMS AND TO BE UPDATED AT EACH HANDOVER.

FO1-1 Members of the ACP crisis cell


Role	Holder	Substitute	Signature	Date & Time
On- Scene Commander				
Installation Shutdown Leader				
Intervention Leader				
Muster and Evacuation Leader				
ACP Event Logger				
Process and Reporting Officer				
Medical Team Leader				
OTHER (if necessary)				
Role	Signature			Date & Time
Assistant/s.				
IT				
Contractor or Sub-Contractor				

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 240 of 314	Rev. 02

FO	FORMS
-----------	--------------

FO1-2 Members of the ICP crisis cell

Role	Owner	Substitute	Signature	Date & Time
CORE TEAM				
ICP Director/Incident Commander				
Local/Regional Authorities Liaison				
ICP/ACP FOPS Liaison Officer				
ICP Event Logger				
HSE Officer				
Logistics and General Services Officer				
Site Finance and Administration Officer				
Site Maintenance Support Officer				
STAND BY TEAM				
Injured/Victims' families/next of kin assistance Officer				
Export / Relations with Eni Officer				
Drilling Expert				
Marketing and Shipping Officer				
Telecom & Informatic Services (IT) Officer				
Direttore Responsabile (D. Lgs 624/96)				
OTHER (if necessary)				
Role	Signature			Date & Time
ICP Assistant/s				
Contractor or Sub-Contractor				

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 241 of 314	Rev. 02

FO	FORMS
-----------	--------------

FO1-3 Members of the CMC Crisis Cell

Role	Owner	Substitute	Signature	Date & Time
CMC Director				
Relations with Joint Venture Partners Officer				
Finance and Insurance Officer				
OTHER (if necessary)				
Role	Signature		Date & Time	
CMC Assistant/s				

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 242 of 314	Rev. 02

FO	FORMS
-----------	--------------


FO2 - FIRST ACTIONS AFTER THE ACTIVATION OF THE ERP

FO2-1 - FIRST ARRIVAL CHECK-LIST

The material useful for crisis management is contained in the cabinets of the emergency management Rooms.

The first person to arrive at the ACP, ICP or CMC Emergency Management Room:

- ▶ If requested by crisis cell Director, contacts the members of the ACP, ICP and CMC cell respectively. See the common directory: [W: \ Entity \ 120-CRISIS MANAGEMENT](#). The planning of on-duty personnel is also available in each crisis cell.
- ▶ Requests that all urgent messages be sent to him.
- ▶ Takes all useful documents from the cabinets (Internal Emergency Response Plan, External Emergency Response Plan, maps, etc.).
- ▶ Checks if the IT media working properly, and if necessary, requires the support of the Telecom and Informatic Services-JT 24 (IT) Officer.
- ▶ To the walls of the ICP/CMC Emergency Management Room are affixed the following posters (**previously printed in A1/A0 size**):
 - Fact Chart (ICP crisis cell).
 - Impacts / Consequences (ICP/CMC crisis cells).
 - Stakeholders Chart (ICP/CMC crisis cells).
 - Action List (ICP crisis cell).
- ▶ Begins to compile the list of facts, noting the opening time of the room.
- ▶ Inform the people who arrive about the situation, until the Director of crisis cell arrives.
- ▶ receives and notes all incoming calls.


 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 243 of 314	Rev. 02

FO	FORMS
-----------	--------------

FO2-2 - IMMEDIATE ACTIONS AFTER CRISIS CELLS ACTIVATION

The following actions must be performed immediately after the crisis cells activation

- ▶ Consolidate the Form **FO2-1** "First arrival checklist" and assign any actions still to be performed.
- ▶ Consolidate the Form **FO1** "Components of the Crisis Cells" when the crisis cell is completed.
- ▶ Collect all the documentation received and quickly analyze it.
- ▶ List the points that need further investigation, clarification, or confirmation.
- ▶ Organize an initial briefing, as soon as the activation of the crisis cells is effective, to bring all members to the same level of information.
- ▶ At the end of the initial briefing, set the time of the first time-out.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 245 of 314	Rev. 02


FO	FORMS
-----------	--------------


FO4 - REGISTER OF EVENTS AND ACTIONS

FO4-1 – FACTS CHART

In the ICP Emergency Management Room the following poster is used to analyze the facts (FISA Method).

Card to be printed in advance in A1 / A0 format



 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 246 of 314	Rev. 02

FO	FORMS
-----------	--------------


FO4-2 – ACTION PLAN

Card to be printed in advance in A1 / A0 format

Target:

1. It is used by the Incident Commander to assign and track tasks / actions to the ICP cell members.
2. It is duplicated and provided to the members of the ICP cell, providing them with the open activities / actions that need to be completed.

Note: This module can also be used by Section managers to keep track of tasks / actions within a single Section.

		OPEN ACTION TRACKER – REGISTRO AZIONI							
1. Incident Name – Nome <u>Incidente</u>		2. Date - Data:						ICS 233	
3. Item No.	4. Item - <u>Azione</u>	5. For - Per	6. Status - <u>Stato</u>	7. Start Date – <u>Inizio</u>	8. Briefed – visto dal <u>responsabile</u>	9 Target Date	10. Actual Date		
1									
2									
3									
4									
5									
6									
7									
8									
9									
10									
11									
12									
13									
14									
15									
16									
17									
18									
19									
20									
21									
22									
23									
24									
25									
26									
27									
11. Prepared By: <u>Document Unit Leader</u> – Preparato da: <u>Responsabile Unità</u> :								ICS 233	


FO	FORMS
-----------	--------------

FO5 - CONSEQUENCES AND IMPACTS CONTROL FORM

In the ICP/CMC Emergency Management Room, the following poster is used to identify the actual and potential impacts of the emergency.

Poster to be printed in advance in A1 / A0 size

Impacts mapping (P.E.A.R.L)		
ACTUAL IMPACTS		POTENTIAL IMPACTS
	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin: 5px auto; width: 80%;">People</div>	
	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin: 5px auto; width: 80%;">Environment</div>	
	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin: 5px auto; width: 80%;">Assets / clients</div>	
	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin: 5px auto; width: 80%;">Reputation</div>	
	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin: 5px auto; width: 80%;">Liabilities</div>	

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 248 of 314	Rev. 02


FO	FORMS
-----------	--------------

FO6 – STAKEHOLDERS' CONTROL BOARD

In the ICP/CMC Emergency Management Room, the following board is to identify the parties interested in the event:

- ▶ internal: Employees, Total Group, etc.
- ▶ external: Authorities, Neighbours, Partners, etc.

Card to be printed in advance in A1 / A0 size

Stakeholders mapping 			
Stakeholder	Name and function of the contact	Internal counterpart	Notes
INTERNAL			
EXTERNAL			
Other:			



INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE

Rev. 02

FORMS

Date / time:

Current and planned objectives:

Current and planned actions, strategies, and tactics:

Actions:

Prepared by: _____ Role: _____ Signature: _____

Page 2

Date/Time:



INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE

Rev. 02


FORMS

Date / Time:

Current organization (describe the emergency organization with the names of the persons assigned to the function):


Prepared by: _____ Role: _____ Signature: _____

Page 3 Date/Time: _____

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 252 of 314	Rev. 02

FO	FORMS
-----------	--------------

Incident Name:				Date / Time:	
Summary of Resources:					
Resource	Type / Quantity	Date / Time Requested	Availability Scheduled on the site (Time)	Arrived	Notes (location / assignment / status)
				<input type="checkbox"/>	
				<input type="checkbox"/>	
				<input type="checkbox"/>	
				<input type="checkbox"/>	
				<input type="checkbox"/>	
				<input type="checkbox"/>	
				<input type="checkbox"/>	
				<input type="checkbox"/>	
				<input type="checkbox"/>	
				<input type="checkbox"/>	
				<input type="checkbox"/>	
				<input type="checkbox"/>	
				<input type="checkbox"/>	
				<input type="checkbox"/>	
				<input type="checkbox"/>	
Prepared by: _____				Role: _____	
Page 4				Date / Time: _____	
Signature: _____					

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 254 of 314	Rev. 02

FO	FORMS
-----------	--------------

Are you speaking on behalf of an organization? (which) In your name?

When will the bomb go off? (date and time, write down the exact words)


Where exactly is it? (write down the exact words)

What kind of detonator is it?

Other statements: (write down exact words)

Time at which the interlocutor hung up the phone:


(let him hang up first)

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 255 of 314	Rev. 02

FO	FORMS
-----------	--------------

Analysis after the telephone call

The interlocutor:			
Gender: Male Female			
Approximate age:			
National call? international?			
His voice: write down all the peculiarities			
<input type="checkbox"/> Quick	<input type="checkbox"/> Chiara	<input type="checkbox"/> Disguised / Altered	
<input type="checkbox"/> Slow	<input type="checkbox"/> Stuttering	<input type="checkbox"/> Other	
His language: write down all the particularities.			
<input type="checkbox"/> Polite	<input type="checkbox"/> Simple	<input type="checkbox"/> International	<input type="checkbox"/> Blasphemous
<input type="checkbox"/> Local accent	<input type="checkbox"/> Foreign accent	<input type="checkbox"/> Defects of pronunciation:	
His attitude:			
<input type="checkbox"/> calm	<input type="checkbox"/> Excited	<input type="checkbox"/> Furious / Angry	
<input type="checkbox"/> They laugh	<input type="checkbox"/> Measured	<input type="checkbox"/> Other:	
I am able / am not able to imitate the unusual characteristics of my interlocutor's voice			
His voice was / was not familiar to me.			
Write down the voices or background sounds if you have heard them:			


 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 256 of 314	Rev. 02

FO	FORMS
-----------	--------------

FO9 - PRESS RELEASE TEMPLATE

COMUNICATO STAMPA N°
L'INCIDENTE
Natura
Luogo
Giorno e ora d'inizio del sinistro
Come è accaduto l'incidente
Valutazione della gravità dell'incidente
Vittime/Feriti
Impatti ambientali
Controllo del sinistro, misure di salvaguardia
Indagini in corso, analisi per determinare le cause
Quali sono gli impieghi dei prodotti coinvolti?

CONTATTO STAMPA
Nome del Mezzo di informazione: _____
Nome, funzione del giornalista: _____
Telefono: _____
Email: _____
Sito internet: _____

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 257 of 314	Rev. 02

FO	FORMS
-----------	--------------

FO10 - PEC COMMUNICATION MODULES EXTERNAL EMERGENCY PLAN

MODULE 1 - Reporting of ATTENTION STATE by the Gestore to the Authorities.

Prefettura UTG di Potenza – Piano Emergenza Esterna dello Stabilimento Centro Olio Tempa Rossa

– Modello n. 1 –

**-Segnalazione stato di attenzione da parte dello Stabilimento TOTAL -
- Centro Olio Tempa Rossa -**

da Centro Olio Tempa Rossa a:

Comando VVF Potenza	Tel. 0971/638110-638109	com.salaop.potenza@cert.vigilfuoco.it
Prefettura di Potenza- UTG	Tel. 0971/41911	emergenze.prefpz@pec.interno.it
Regione Basilicata	Tel. 0971/668400 Tel. 800073665	sala.operativa@regione.basilicata.it ufficio.protezione.civile@certregione.basilicata.it
Sindaco Comune di Corleto P.	Tel. 0971/963711 Sindaco Cell. 3392535970	comune.corleto@cert.ruparbasilicata.it
Sindaco Comune di Guardia P.	Tel. 0971/964004 Sindaco Cell. 3881010000	comuneguardia@cert.ruparbasilicata.it
Sindaco Comune di Gorgoglione	Tel. 0835/560078 Sindaco Cell. 3272465633	protocollo@pec.comune.gorgoglione.mt.it
Comando Provinciale Carabinieri Potenza	Tel. 0971/391217	tpz20950@pec.carabinieri.it
Comando Compagnia Carabinieri Viggiano	Tel. 0975/61080	tpz31701@pec.carabinieri.it

Segnaliamo ☐ accadimento ☐ chiusura ⁽¹⁾ STATO DI ATTENZIONE occorso in data odierna alle ore _____ del _____ di tipo: _____

Eventuale sostanza coinvolta: _____

Velocità del vento: ☐ Bassa ☐ Media ☐ Alta

Direzione del vento e posizione di massima dell'origine della scenario: _____


Note: _____

Il Responsabile dell'Impianto _____

Trasmette ⁽²⁾ _____

Alle ore _____ del _____

1) Identificare il termine appropriato in rapporto alla valutazione effettuata.
2) Precisare cognome e nome delle persone che trasmettono e ricevono i messaggi

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 258 of 314	Rev. 02

FO	FORMS
-----------	--------------

MODULE 2 - Reporting of An ACCIDENT by the Gestore to the Authorities.

Prefettura UTG di Potenza – Piano Emergenza Esterna dello Stabilimento Centro Oli Tempa Rossa

– Modello n. 2 –

- Segnalazione incidente da parte dello Stabilimento TOTAL -
- Centro Olio Tempa Rossa -

Da Centro Olio a:

Comando VVF Potenza	Tel. 0971/638110-638109	com.salsop.potenza@cert.vigilfuoco.it
Prefettura di Potenza- UTG	Tel. 0971/41911	emergenze.prefpz@pec.interno.it
Regione Basilicata	Tel. 0971/668400 Tel. 800073665	sala.operativa@regione.basilicata.it ufficio.protezione.civile@certregione.basilicata.it
Sindaco Comune di Corleto P.	Tel. 0971/965711 Sindaco Cell. 3392535970	comune.corleto@cert.ruparbasilicata.it
Sindaco Comune di Guardia P.	Tel. 0971/964004 Sindaco Cell. 3881010000	comuneguardia@cert.ruparbasilicata.it
Sindaco Comune di Gorgoglione	Tel. 0833/560078 Sindaco Cell. 3272465633	protocollo@pec.comune.gorgoglione.mt.it

Segnaliamo l'incidente occorso in data odierna alle ore ____ del ____ di tipo:

☐ Incendio ☐ Esplosione ☐ Rilascio di sostanza pericolosa

Sostanza coinvolta: _____

Velocità del vento: ☐ Bassa ☐ Media ☐ Alta


Direzione del vento e posizione di massima dell'origine della scenario:

Note:

Il Responsabile dell'impianto: _____

Trasmette ⁽¹⁾ _____
alle ore _____ del _____

1) Precisare cognome e nome delle persone che trasmettono e ricevono i messaggi

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 259 of 314	Rev. 02

FO	FORMS
-----------	--------------

FO11 - EMERGENCY EXERCISE REGISTRATION

Date	Time	Exercise type (TT, ID, FD, ED, FSE)	Place/ Zone/ Unit	Simulated scenario	Comments / Suggestions for improvement	Name and Signature Exercise Manager


TT: "Tabletop" exercise

ID: Initiation drill

FD: Functional drill

ED: Evacuation drill

FSE: Full-scale exercise.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 260 of 314	Rev. 02

FO	FORMS
-----------	--------------

FO12 - RLSA CONSULTATION



TotalEnergies EP Italia

Guardia Perticara, 04.11.2021

OGGETTO: Verbale di avvenuta consultazione dei Rappresentanti dei Lavoratori per la Sicurezza e l'Ambiente (RLSA), ai sensi del DM 6 giugno 2016, n. 138 "Regolamento recante la disciplina delle forme di consultazione, sui piani di emergenza interna (PEI), del personale che lavora nello stabilimento", ai sensi dell'articolo 20, comma 5, del D.lgs. 105/2015.

In data 04 novembre 2021, alle ore 14:00 nella sede dell'azienda TotalEnergies EP Italia S.p.A. sita in Zona PIP snc, Guardia Perticara (PZ), si è tenuto un incontro fra il Gestore dello Stabilimento Centro Olio Tempa Rossa, Sig. Brian WELINDER, il Sig. Ferruccio Ferrucci in qualità di RSPP / Direttore HSSE ed i Rappresentanti dei Lavoratori per la Sicurezza e l'Ambiente, Sigg. Raffaele Carlomagno, Tommaso Di Donato (collegati in video conferenza) e Laura Leonarda Genovese.

Nell'incontro, i Rappresentanti dei Lavoratori per la Sicurezza e l'Ambiente sono stati consultati in ordine alla Revisione n. 2 del Piano di Emergenza Interna del Centro Olio Tempa Rossa, reso disponibile in bozza agli stessi in data 20.10.2021, evidenziando i principali aspetti oggetto della revisione tramite una presentazione allegata al presente verbale:

- Azioni correttive da prima visita ispettiva Seveso art. 27 D. Lgs.105/2015.
- Variazione composizione delle Cellule di Crisi "Advanced Command Post" e "Incident Command Post".
- Aggiornamento scenario di Incidente SR11 (eventi naturali) e inserimento nuovo scenario SR13, Incendio negli edifici (SS1, SS2, Uffici Amministrativi Area N) ubicati presso il Centro Olio Tempa Rossa.

I Rappresentanti dei Lavoratori per la Sicurezza e l'Ambiente (RLSA), hanno quindi espresso il loro parere favorevole.

I Rappresentanti dei Lavoratori
per la Sicurezza e l'Ambiente.

Il Gestore dello Stabilimento.

Sede legale: Via Rombon, 11 - 20134 Milano (Italy)

Tel.: +39 02 640 681


www.it.total.com

Denominazione sociale: TOTALENERGIES EP ITALIA S.p.A. con socio unico

Cap. Soc. € 10.120.000 i.v. - C.F./P.Iva/N. iscr. Reg. Imprese di Milano - Monza - Brianza - Lodi: 10569621006

Iscrizione R.E.A. n° MI - 2630615


Società soggetta all'attività di direzione e coordinamento della TotalEnergies Holdings Europe S.A.S. (Controllata da TotalEnergies SE)


 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 261 of 314	Rev. 02

FO	FORMS
-----------	--------------

FO13a – VICTIMS' FOLLOW-UP

In the **ACP and ICP Emergency Management Rooms**, the following poster is used to keep track of injured/dead/missing people during the emergency situation.

Victims' follow-up									 TotalEnergies
	First notification	Identity	First notification	First medical assistance provided	Hospitalization	Affiliation	Children	Family	Evolution
Casualty n°		Lastname : Firstname : Age :	Injured <input type="checkbox"/> Dead <input type="checkbox"/> Missing <input type="checkbox"/>	Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Firefighters <input type="checkbox"/> Emergency Medical Services <input type="checkbox"/>	Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Where :	Employee <input type="checkbox"/> Contractor <input type="checkbox"/> Visitor <input type="checkbox"/>	How many : Age(s) :	Notified Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Who : Phone :	
Casualty n°		Lastname : Firstname : Age :	Injured <input type="checkbox"/> Dead <input type="checkbox"/> Missing <input type="checkbox"/>	Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Firefighters <input type="checkbox"/> Emergency Medical Services <input type="checkbox"/>	Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Where :	Employee <input type="checkbox"/> Contractor <input type="checkbox"/> Visitor <input type="checkbox"/>	How many : Age(s) :	Notified Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Who : Phone :	
Casualty n°		Lastname : Firstname : Age :	Injured <input type="checkbox"/> Dead <input type="checkbox"/> Missing <input type="checkbox"/>	Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Firefighters <input type="checkbox"/> Emergency Medical Services <input type="checkbox"/>	Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Where :	Employee <input type="checkbox"/> Contractor <input type="checkbox"/> Visitor <input type="checkbox"/>	How many : Age(s) :	Notified Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Who : Phone :	

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 262 of 314	Rev. 02

FO	FORMS
----	-------


FO13b - INJURED/VICTIM IDENTIFICATION & STATUS

The following form shall be fill in by Medical Doctor.

Name		Company	
Age / DOB		Date	
Brief History		Location	


PRIMARY SURVEY		Time:
Spinal Column	# Normal	# Possible Injury
Airway	# Clear	# Obstructed
Breathing	# Spontaneous	# Difficulty
Circulation/ Hemorrhage	# External	# Internal
	# None/Slight	
	# Moderate	
	# Severe	# Possible
Disability responds to	# Alert	# Pain
	# Visual stimuli	# Unresponsive

SECONDARY SURVEY			
Eye Opening	Spontaneous		
	To Voice		
	To Pain		
	None		
Verbal Response	Oriented		
	Confused		
	Inappropriate		
	Incomprehensible		
	None		
Motor Response	Obeys command		
	Localizes pain		
	Withdrawal (pain)		
	Flexion (pain)		
	Extension (pain)		
	None		
Pupils	React	# R	# L
	Constricted	# R	# L
	Normal	# R	# L
	Dilated	# R	# L
Comments			

VITAL SIGN	
Breathing frequency	
Heart rate	
Blood Pressure	
Body temperature	
Mark the image and put code as mentioned below	
	

C = Close Fracture	O = Open Fracture
B = Burn (shade the area)	F = Foreign Body
L = Laceration	A = Abrasion
E = Ecchymosis (bruising)	


Analgesia	# Drugs	Dose	Time
Splinting	# Bandage		
	# Splint		
	# Other (Specify)		

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 263 of 314	Rev. 02

MA	ERP MANAGEMENT
-----------	-----------------------

Section MA


ERP MANAGEMENT

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 264 of 314	Rev. 02

MA	ERP MANAGEMENT
-----------	-----------------------

MA	ERP MANAGEMENT
-----------	-----------------------

MA1	Training and Exercises
MA2	Update procedure
MA3	Glossary

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 265 of 314	Rev. 02

MA	ERP MANAGEMENT
-----------	-----------------------

MA1 – TRAINING AND EXERCISES

INFORMATION

Each worker receives adequate information on:

- ▶ fire risks associated with the activity carried out in Tempa Rossa Oil Center.
- ▶ Fire risks related to the specific tasks performed.
- ▶ Toxic gas risks.
- ▶ Fire prevention and protection measures adopted in the workplace.
- ▶ Location of Muster Points and escape routes.
- ▶ Procedures to be adopted in case of fire.
- ▶ The names of the workers in charge of applying fire prevention, firefighting, emergency management and first aid measures.
- ▶ Name of the head of the company's prevention and protection service.

The information on the risks of major accidents and on the measures to prevent or limit their consequences for people and environment was provided in an understandable and exhaustive way to each worker, also regarding any specific needs, using the more appropriate forms of communication, as required by Legislative Decree no. 105/15, Appendix 1 to Annex B.

Adequate information is provided to maintenance workers and contractors to ensure that they are aware of the general safety measures of the OC, of the actions to be taken in the event of a fire and of the evacuation procedures.

The information is based on risk assessment and is provided to the worker upon hiring. It is also updated and shared with staff every time there is a change in the technical-organizational structure of the OC that involves a change in the assessment itself.

THIRD COMPANIES

The workers of third-party companies who operate within the OC shall follow the training course (partly provided by their employer) with a final learning test.

Upon issuing the company badge, proof of possession by the worker of adequate work experience and in the oil sector is required.


All the training activities provided are available on paper or on IT support at the HSSE Direction which deals with the management of training pursuant to Legislative Decree 105/15 as specified in the procedure SGS-04 "Management of awareness, information and training for HSE".

Occasional visitors are informed of the essential aspects of this Plan through the brochure: "Safe access to the OC".

TRAINING

In compliance with art. 6, paragraph 3, and art. 7 of Decreto del Ministero dell'Interno 10.03.1998, the personnel of the OC attended the Training Course, provided for activities at high risk of fire (Annex IX DM 10/3/98), lasting 16 hours.

Of the course and the relative certificates of technical competence referred to in art. 3, paragraph 3, of the Law of 28 November 1996, n. 609, as required by current legislation, documentary evidence is kept at the HSSE Direction.

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 266 of 314	Rev. 02

MA	ERP MANAGEMENT
-----------	-----------------------

In accordance with Annex B, of Legislative Decree 105/15 and subsequent amendments, contractors are trained on this ERP through a specific training course upon entry with quarterly verification of learning and periodic consultation / training meetings on the documentation made available to them (PEI, Annex 5, Safety Report), as well as participation in periodic simulation and evacuation activities. The personnel in charge of first aid measures attend training courses in accordance with the provisions of Ministerial Decree 388.

EMERGENCY TEAM DRILLS / EXERCISES

Tests monthly are also carried out so that the First Intervention Team is prepared to intervene for each type of event identified in the Safety Report of the OC, in the way indicated by the Scenario Cards for the simulation reported in SR #.

Following each exercise, the HSE Superintendent will prepare the report relating to the test carried out, in which the tested scenario, the participants, the type of simulation and any notes are reported, to keep track of the exercises carried out and identify any areas for improvement. (**FO11** Form).

Prior notice of the planning of the exercises is given to the competent authorities for possible participation as observers.

The Programs relating to the training of operating personnel are available at the OC (HSE Superintendent).

Specific training and exercises are provided to workers involved in fire prevention, firefighting and more generally in the management of emergencies in accordance with the provisions of art. 7 of the Ministerial Decree 10.03.98.

Training is envisaged that includes the following minimum contents:

- 1) Fire and fire prevention (4 hours).
- 2) Fire protection (4 hours).
- 3) Procedures to be adopted in the event of a fire (4 hours).
- 4) Practical exercises (4 hours).

Firefighting PPE (suit, jacket, gloves, helmet and boots) are subjected to monthly checks by the HSE Superintendent and noted on a dedicated register (which also shows the number of washes). For breathing apparatus, the maintenance is monitored by the HSE Superintendent and is recorded in the APVR register.

In addition, there is "rescue" training with self-contained breathing apparatus

TRAINING FOR OPERATORS AND FIRST AID PERSONNEL

Specific training and exercise are provided to workers assigned to first aid in accordance with the provisions of Ministerial Decree 388/2003 in relation to the "educational objectives and minimum contents of the training of workers designated to first aid for group a company's".

The periodic updating of the operators is ensured in accordance and with the periodicity provided for by Ministerial Decree 388/2003.

TotalEnergies INTERNAL TRAINING FOR ICP CRISIS CELL MEMBERS

Some specific training is envisaged on the application of methods and criteria common to the TotalEnergies Group in the management of emergencies. To train the members of the ICP crisis cell in

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 267 of 314	Rev. 02

MA	ERP MANAGEMENT
-----------	-----------------------


the IMS (Incident Management System) methodology, the following training modules are organized, provided with resources within TotalEnergies and in e-learning:

Subject	Cod Training	Description
Key people in emergency management (ICP crisis cell).	IMS 300	Training lasting 3 days with a qualified trainer.
All the staff (ICP crisis cell).	IMS 200	Training with web platform (e-learning).
	IMS 100	Training with web platform (e-learning).

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT EXERCISES

Exercises for crisis cells are organized periodically. The following table describes the types of exercises.

Type	Description	Crisis Cells involved	Periodicity
TABLE-TOP (Exercise for command posts)	It is the most effective type of exercise in training staff on their responsibilities, using plant plans and procedures. The Tabletop exercise is discussion-based session where crisis cells' team members meet in a meeting room or emergency room to discuss their roles and responsibilities during a particular emergency when a scenario is presented. A facilitator guides participant through a discussion of one or more scenarios. They are asked to use the means at their disposal (e.g., Job Tickets, check list, forms, etc..) to describe the action they would take in a particular emergency, testing Internal/External Emergency Response Plans in a non-threatening environment. All participants describe their activities, which allow for the sharing of ideas and therefore they can identify possible overlaps of responsibilities or lacks in the organization. No emergency response equipment and no intervention team are required to simulate a response to an incident. This exercise lasts from 1 to 3 hours, depending on the goal, the number of participants and the number of scenarios. The Tabletop exercise can be carried out with partial crisis cells involvement.	ACP ICP CMC	6 months
INITIATION DRILL (Learning exercise)	This exercise focuses on acquiring new procedures or using equipment. Participants are not required to perform the exercise perfectly or with full knowledge of the procedure or equipment. They are asked to take their time to assimilate and learn about the procedure or equipment.	ACP	Each time the ERP is changed
FUNCTIONAL DRILL	This tutorial is designed to test one or more components of an emergency response system without involving other elements. This is an effective drill for communication systems, alarm systems, medical, fire or intervention response preparation. People must perform the exercises correctly and on schedule. It is intended to test one emergency function at a time. It can be done to exercise the ACP Intervention Team or the Medical Team.	ACP	2 weeks
EVACUATION DRILL	It can be considered a Functional Drill, but if done for the whole plant it is a category of its own. This is a very specific tutorial that must be	ACP	1 month

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 268 of 314	Rev. 02

MA	ERP MANAGEMENT
-----------	-----------------------

(evacuation / evacuation test)	completed within a prescribed time frame. It can be combined with another type of exercise, but it also has great value on its own. Exercise to be carried out for example when changing teams. During the exercise, the functional test of the PA / GA sirens is carried out (see later)		
FULL-SCALE EXERCISE - LARGE-SCALE EXERCISE - LSE (Full-scale exercise)	The full-scale exercise (LARGE-SCALE EXERCISE - LSE) is the most complete and complex exercise. All levels of the emergency management organization participate and possibly outside the emergency response organizations. This exercise requires a lot of planning and coordination. It can request support from the TotalEnergies Group and, at least every 3 years, the LSE is supervised by a TotalEnergies Group specialist. At a minimum, 1 Large-Scale Exercise per year should be organized	ACP ICP CMC	1 years

Each crisis cell Director (ACP; ICP; CMC) defines a program of exercises with the support of the HSSE Direction.

Periodic exercises shall be registered via the **FO11** Form.

The Responsible of the exercise, once the registration form has been completed, communicates it to the HSSE Direction.

The Register will be managed and kept by the HSSE Direction.


FUNCTIONING TEST OF THE SIRENS

During the monthly Evacuation Drill, the PA/GA system emergency sirens are tested functionally (General / Fire / Flammable Alarm, Toxic Gas Alarm and External Emergency Alarm).

Before each test, the community around the Tempa Rossa Oil Centre shall be informed through prior communication to the Mayors (Corleto P., Guardia P. and Gorgoglione).

TESTS OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN CRISIS CELLS

All the crisis cells are brought together on a weekly basis with the aim of testing the communication systems, sharing the main activities in progress on the Site and informing about any absences of the Owners and substitutes in charge of the function.

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 269 of 314	Rev. 02

MA	ERP MANAGEMENT
-----------	-----------------------

MA2 - UPDATE PROCEDURES

The Internal Emergency Response Plan is normally reviewed annually and is updated by the Gestore, with the support of the HSSE Director, as needed and after consulting the staff working in the Oil Centre, including the staff of all companies. contractors with medium / long-term framework contract (respectively through RLSA and construction site managers), in any case with at least three-year frequency as required by Art. 20 paragraph 3 of Legislative Decree 105/15.

The consultation is then recorded through special minutes reported in **FO12** and archived at the HSSE Direction.

To consultation, the Gestore makes the following information available to the workers' representatives for safety at least fifteen days before the meeting:

- a) the elements of the risk analysis used for the preparation of the internal emergency response plan.
- b) the internal emergency response plan scheme.
- c) any other element useful for understanding the internal emergency plana and in any case any relevant document.

Before adopting, reviewing, or updating the ERP, the Gestore and/or the HSSE Director meet the workers' safety representatives (RLSA) who can make observations or proposals on the ERP.


The reports of the meeting are drawn up, signed by all the participants, which is deposited at the HSSE Direction available to the competent authorities referred to in Articles 10 and 27 of Legislative Decree no. 105 of 2015 and are part of the ERP.

For any consultation need, an original copy of the same is kept and made available at the RSES office.


The Gestore considers the observations received as part of the activities for the preparation, revision and updating of the ERP.

The ERP is in any case updated when the following contingencies occur:

- ▶ whenever significant organizational, plant engineering and / or risk level / scenario changes occur in the Oil Centre.
- ▶ In fulfillment of regulatory changes.
- ▶ In the event of objective evidence emerging from the investigation activities following events, anomalies, near misses, accidents.
- ▶ In relation to the results of the debriefing of the training and emergency simulation activities (Form **FO11**).
- ▶ In relation to the results of the consultation activities of the RLSA / third-party companies.
- ▶ Following the prescriptions of the competent authorities for the issuance of authorization documents or inspection / inspection activities in general.
- ▶ For the activities of the internal audit system and management review.
- ▶ On the update of the Safety Report pursuant to Legislative Decree 105/2015 and / or the Risk Assessment Document pursuant to Legislative Decree 81/08.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	<i>INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE</i>			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 270 of 314	Rev. 02

MA	ERP MANAGEMENT
-----------	-----------------------

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 271 of 314	Rev. 02

MA	ERP MANAGEMENT
-----------	-----------------------

MA3 - GLOSSARY

ACP: Advanced Command Post.

CCMC: Country Crisis Management Cell.

CCR: Central Control Room.

CMC: Crisis Management Cell.

CSC: Crisis Support Cell (HQ Paris).

Direttore Responsabile: Director as per D. Lgs. 624/96 for mining areas.

DSSC: Documento di Salute e Sicurezza Coordinato.

ERP: Internal Emergency Response Plan.

ESD: Emergency Shutdown.

FISA: Facts, Impacts, Stakeholders, Action Plans.

Gestore: pursuant to Legislative Decree 105/2015 (Implementation of Directive 2021/18/EU Seveso III), is the natural or legal person who operates or controls the Tempa Rossa Oil Centre establishment.

GMC: General Maintenance Contract.

HSE: Health, Safety and Environment.

HVAC: Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning.

IC: Incident Commander.

ICS: Incident Command System.

ICP: Incident Command Post.

IMS: Incident Management System.

IMT: Incident Management Team.

JT: Job Ticket.

MAC: Alarm Call-point.

MEDEVAC: Medical Evacuation.

OC: Tempa Rossa Oil Centre.

OSC: On Scene Commander.

PA: Public Address - Public voice announcement.

PA/GA: Public Address / General Alarm.


PCA: Posto di Comando Avanzato as per PEE.

PEARL: People, Environment, Assets, Reputation, Liability.

PEC: Certified e-mail.

PEE: External Emergency Response Plan.

POB: Staff on board, i.e., all the people present at a given moment on the site.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 272 of 314	Rev. 02

MA	ERP MANAGEMENT
-----------	-----------------------

PPE: Personal protective equipment.

RLSA: Representatives of Workers for Safety and the Environment.

RSES: Site Safety, Health and Environment Manager.

Sorvegliante: under of Legislative Decree 624/96 for mining areas person in possession of the necessary skills and competences, designated by the owner to supervise the workplace occupied by workers.

TEPIT: TotalEnergies E&P Italia Spa.

VOLUME 2


 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 276 of 314	Rev. 02

LD	LAYOUT AND DATA
----	-----------------

LD3 - F&G DETECTION SYSTEMS LAYOUT

F&G Layout:

IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167300, IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167301, IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167302, IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167303, IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167304, IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167305, IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167306, IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167307, IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167308, IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167309, IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167311, IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167312, IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167313, IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167314, IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167315, IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167316, IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167317, IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167318, IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167319, IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167324, IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167327, IT-TPR-30-EPC1-16729, IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167402, IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167403, IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167700, IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167701, IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167705, IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167706, IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167732, IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167761, IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167762

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 279 of 314	Rev. 02


LD	LAYOUT AND DATA
----	-----------------

LD6 - MAIN PFDs AND P&I

PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAM (PSD)


Available on <https://europe.newprodom.total/>

IT-TPR-10-EPC1-162426	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAM FOR UNIT 10 - WELLSITES PIG LAUNCHER - RECEIVERS - FLOWLINES
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-162411	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAM FOR UNIT 24 PRODUCTION TESTING AND SEPARATION
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-162412	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAM FOR UNIT 25 CRUDE OIL TREATMENT - PART 1
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-162413	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAM FOR UNIT 25 CRUDE OIL TREATMENT-PART 2
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-162414	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAM FOR UNIT 26 EXPORT OIL PIPELINE
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-162415	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAM FOR UNIT 30 INLET GAS COMPRESSION
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-162416	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAM FOR UNIT 31 VRU COMPRESSION
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-162417	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAM FOR UNIT 34 LPG TREATMENT AND DEHYDRATION
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-162418	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAM FOR UNIT 38 LPG EXPORT PIPELINE
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-162419	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAM FOR UNIT 37 SALES GAS EXPORT PIPELINE
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-162420	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAM FOR UNIT 49 FLARE SYSTEM
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-162427	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAM FOR UNIT 44 CLOSED DRAIN SYSTEM
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167735	OIL CENTRE - PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAM FOR UNIT 01 FIREFIGHTING PUMP STATION
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-192439	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAM FOR OBSERVATION BASIN AND FIRE WATER BACK-UP BASIN UNIT - 54
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-192440	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAM CRUDE OIL STORAGE AND EXPORT UNIT - 26
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-192441	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAM FOR UNIT 40 PRODUCED WATER HANDLING
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-192442	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAM FOR UNIT 40 PRODUCED WATER TREATMENT PACKAGE
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-192443	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAM FOR CLOSED DRAINS - OPEN DRAINS UNIT - 44
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-192444	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAM FOR SLOP OIL SYSTEM UNIT - 45
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-192445	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAM WASTE WATER TREATMENT PACKAGE UNIT - 54
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-192446	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAM SKIMMED OIL - SANITARY WATER TREATMENT PACKAGE UNIT 54
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-192447	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAM FOR UNIT 60 FUEL GAS
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-192448	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAM FOR UNIT 61 INSTRUMENT-SERVICE AIR SYSTEMS
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-192449	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAM FOR UNIT 62 NITROGEN GENERATION AND DISTRIBUTION
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-192450	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAM DIESEL OIL STORAGE SYSTEM UNIT - 63
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-192451	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAM FOR UNIT 64 HEAT RECOVERY STEAM AND MAIN POWER GENERATION
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-192452	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAM FOR CHEMICAL INJECTION UNIT - 65
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-192453	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAM FOR COOLING WATER UNIT - 66
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-192454	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAM FOR POTABLE WATER AND DEMINERALIZATION SYSTEM UNIT - 67 POTABLE WATER STORAGE TANK
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-192455	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAM FOR POTABLE WATER AND DEMINERALIZATION SYSTEM UNIT - 67
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-192456	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAM FOR STEAM AND CONDENSATE SYSTEM DEAERATOR UNIT - 68
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-192457	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAM FOR STEAM AND CONDENSATE SYSTEM SRU UNIT - UNIT 68

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 280 of 314	Rev. 02

LD	LAYOUT AND DATA
-----------	------------------------

IT-TPR-30-EPC1-192458	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAM FOR STEAM AND CONDENSATE SYSTEM CONDENSATE RECOVERS UNIT - 68
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-192459	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAM FOR STEAM AND CONDENSATE SYSTEM UNIT 68 - LP STEAM DISTRIBUTION
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-192460	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAM FOR UNIT 68 STEAM AND CONDENSATE SYSTEM BLOW DOWN FLASH DRUMS
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-192468	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAM FOR UNIT 68 STEAM AND CONDENSATE SYSTEM HP-MP STEAM
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-261252	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAM FOR UNIT 32 GSU - AMINE REGENERATION
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-261253	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAM FOR UNIT 32 GSU - HP ABSORPTION
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-261254	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAM FOR UNIT 32 GSU - AMINE FILTRATION AND STORAGE
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-261255	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAMS FOR UNIT 33 SRU THERMAL SECTION
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-261256	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAMS FOR UNIT 33 SRU CATALYTIC SECTION
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-261257	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAMS FOR UNIT 33 TGT SECTION
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-261258	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAMS FOR UNIT 33 TGT ABSORBER
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-261259	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAMS FOR UNIT 33 INCINERATOR SECTION
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-261260	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAMS FOR UNIT 33 TGT REGENERATION SECTION
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-261261	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAMS FOR UNIT 33 TGT AMINE FILTRATION AND STORAGE FACILITIES
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-261262	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAMS FOR UNIT 33 SRU DEGASSING AND STORAGE SECTION
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-261263	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAMS FOR UNIT 36 - DEW POINT CONTROL- FACILITIES
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-261264	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAMS FOR UNIT 36 - DEW POINT CONTROL - REFRIGERATION
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-261265	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAMS FOR UNIT 37 SALES GAS COMPRESSION AND METERING
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-261266	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAMS FOR UNIT 34 - LPG RECOVERY - DEETHANISER
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-261267	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAMS FOR UNIT 34 - LPG RECOVERY - DEBUTANISER
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-261269	PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAM FOR UNIT 35 - GAS DEHYDRATION AND MERCURY REMOVAL
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-394236	IT-TPR-00-EPC1-113029 - PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAMS OF IGF FROTH SKIMMER SCRAPER 30-UL-5404
IT-TPR-30-EPC1-398146	IT-TPR-00-EPC1-113028 - PROCESS SAFETY DIAGRAMS CHEMICAL DOSING AND NEUTRALIZATION SYSTEM - 30-UQ-6701

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 281 of 314	Rev. 02

LD	LAYOUT AND DATA
-----------	------------------------


LD7 – ICP EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ROOM LAYOUT



ICP Emergency Management Room. TEPIT Offices of Guardia Perticara.



Documentation available for ICP Crisis Cell members.


 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	<i>INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE</i>			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 282 of 314	Rev. 02

LD	LAYOUT AND DATA
-----------	------------------------

LD8 - MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEETS

MSDS available on SharePoint link (TEPIT intranet)


<https://totalworkplace.sharepoint.com/sites/SevesoTempaRossa>

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	<i>INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE</i>			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 283 of 314	Rev. 02

LD	LAYOUT AND DATA
-----------	------------------------

LD9 - CARTOGRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF DAMAGE AREAS (from OC Safety Report)

IT-TPR-30-EPC1-167544 - Annex C.4.3.a - Graphic representation of accident scenarios.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 284 of 314	Rev. 02

RE	RESOURCES
-----------	------------------

RE1 - TELEPHONE NUMBERS AND USEFUL CONTACTS

<u>CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER TotalEnergies EP ITALIA</u>	
Nina HOEGH JENSEN	+39 340 3225028

<u>TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE</u>
Strada Comunale della Matina, Contrada Acqua di Maggio, 85012 CORLETO PERTICARA (PZ)


The presence of a holder member of each crisis cell or its substitute is managed through the file:

[Emergency_Cells_On_Duty_Personnel.xlsx](#)

available in the common directory:

[W: \ Entity \ 120-CRISIS MANAGEMENT](#)

[Teams Channel: "Emergency Management Tempa Rossa"](#)


 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 285 of 314	Rev. 02

RE	RESOURCES
-----------	------------------

Internal Contacts ACP crisis cell

ADVANCE COMMAND POST CRISIS CELL	
ACP Emergency Management Room	+39 0971 96 4499
Audio conference phone	+39 0971 96 5638
Satellite Phone	00 87 0772 52 61 75
e-mail ACP	tepit.acp@totalenergies.com

ACP CRISIS CELL MEMBERS		
On-Scene Commander/RSES	G. BOISSON	+39 342 01 70 167
	A. ZACCOMER	
Leader Shutdown degli impianti	F. SCOLA	+39 342 11 52 775
	E. NZIKOU-MBENZE	
Leader d'intervento	D.PARENTE	+39 349 90 88 602
	G. FLACCO	+39 347 44 68 354
Leader Raduno ed evacuazione	Capoturno	+39 340 3585 053
	L. FRUCI	+39 340 3329 579
ACP Event Logger	J. GREEN	+39 344 0197 465
	O. MELOT	+39 340 706 7558
Addetto Processo e Reporting	D. SWOLF	+39 342 115 2775
	P. BOILEAU	+39 347 097 3814

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPRA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 286 of 314	Rev. 02

RE	RESOURCES
-----------	------------------


Tempa Rossa Medical Clinic

Tempa Rossa Medical Clinic
Area N – Oil Centre
347 1507585
Radio: Oil Centre 1 Channel

Internal Contacts ICP crisis cell

INCIDENT COMMAND POST CELL CRISIS CELL	
ICP Emergency Management Room	+39 0971 96 5699
Audio conference phone	+39 0971 96 4445
Satellite Phone	00 87 077 692 7346
ICP email	tepit.icp@totalenergies.com

Incident Commander	B. WELLINDER	+39 345 604 2088
	F. POTTIER	+39 342 093 7061
	G. CASO	+39 345 978 6385
Local/Regional Authorities Liaison	F. FERRUCCI	+39 348 611 3936
	G.P. GAGLIARDI	
	M. SABATELLA	
	F. FARAGALLI	
Assistance for injured/Victims' families	I. CORTONICCHI	+39 335 879 5620
	A. DI STEFANO	+39 342 643 8682
	S. SABATO	+39 345 820 7801
	P. MELFI	+39 335 656 9746
ICP/ACP FOPS Liaison Officer	F. POTTIER	+39 342 093 7061
	F. GUALERZI	+39 340 082 11 52
	V. MUSCAS	+39 338 947 5855
	I. REA	+39 342 914 0483
	C. GUTIERREZ	+39 348 872 5771
Export / Relations with Eni	G. MAGGIO	+39 366 668 8818
Drilling Expert	J. POULSEN	+39 342 854 2924
	S. RAGNES	
ICP Event Logger	D. DEMMA	+39 342 392 0380
	D. MESSUTI	+39 340 230 6864
	F. SALAMAO	+39 342 016 9982
	A. SEMENOV	+39 342 073 8959
HSE Officer	G. LOMBARDI	+39 344 060 8378
	A. M. COPPOLA	+39 346 254 2014
	G. COLUCCI	+39 340 193 6622
Marketing and Shipping Officer	M. MARCHETTINI	+39 342 926 4539
	P. ROMAGNOLI	+39 344 046 4606
Logistic and General Services	B. P.G. DUCOURTY	+39 334 6939019


 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 287 of 314	Rev. 02

RE	RESOURCES
-----------	------------------

Telecom & Informatic Services (IT)	F. MONTANO	+39 331 635 2835
	M. GRANDE	+39 331 635 3997
	A. CAPUTI	+39 334 832 7586
	S. MICCOLI	+39 348 233 0097
Site Finance & Administration Officer	G. GRACI	+39 342 861 0759
	M. DI MARZIO	+39 348 547 0050
	O. OTTAVIANI	+39 342 868 8253
	C. BOVE	+39 338 658 9896
Maintenance and Logistic Support	V. MUSCAS	+39 338 947 5855
	M. TAMBURRI	+39 340 706 7558
	H. APRIADI	+39 349 579 1363

Internal Contacts CMC crisis cell


CRISIS MANAGEMENT CELL - CMC		
CMC Emergency Room	+39 025406 8801	
CMC e-mail	tepit.cmc@totalenergies.com	
CMC Director	D. MAZZONI	+39 335 838 8183
	G. MASCARUCCI	+39 335 632 1694
Joint Venture Partner Relations	S. SCISCIOLO	+39 335 879 5564
	R. TARANTINO	+39 366 6688 821
Finance and Insurance	M. CANFORA	+39 334 631 5387
	P. P. SANSONO	+39 311 718 681

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPRA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 288 of 314	Rev. 02

RE	RESOURCES
-----------	------------------

Internal Contacts Central Control Room


OIL CENTRE CONTROL ROOM (CCR)	
+39 0971 96 5873	
Radio	Canale Oil Center 1
SHIFT SUPERVISOR	
+39 0971 96 5831	
Radio	Canale Oil Center 1

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 289 of 314	Rev. 02

RE	RESOURCES
-----------	------------------


Stakeholders - Partners

ENI / SOM			
Taranto Operating Unit	Fixed Phone	+39 099 47 82 218	
	Fax	+39 099 47 00 487	
Control room - Taranto refinery	Fixed Phone	+39 099 47 82 356	
	Fixed Phone	+39 099 47 82 319	
Shift Supervisor - RPO - Taranto Refinery	Fixed Phone	+39 099 47 82 290	
Switchboard Taranto Refinery	Fixed Phone	+39 099 47 82 111	
Taranto Refinery Director	Fixed Phone	+39 345 67 75 283	
Control room - Val D'agri Oil Centre	Fixed Phone	+39 31 0975 3538	
	Fixed Phone	+39 0975 31 3503	
	Fax	+39 0975 31 33689	
Available Emergency Managers			
	MSP	Mobile Phone	+39 346 001 0518
	MSP-MOV TA	Mobile Phone	+39 342 998 2013
ENI Southern District - District Manager	Fixed Phone	+39 0975 313650	
	Mobile Phone	+39 342 8587 602	
FREE NUMBER ENI R&M EMERGENCIES	Toll Free Number	800 909 119	
SNAM RETE GAS			
CONTROL ROOM CENTER Head of SALVATORE CRIMI	Fixed Phone	+39 0975574093 during normal business hours	
	Mobile Phone	+39 3401765234	
	Fax	+39 0975 57 4107 during normal business hours	
	e-mail	luigiarcangelo.tartaglia@snamretegas.it	
FIRST AID	Toll Free Number	800 970 911	
ENEL			
ENEL DI POTENZA OPERATIONAL CENTER (24 hours a day) - Capoturno	Fixed Phone	+39 080 230 8551	
	e-mail	coepotenza@e-distribuzione.com	
ACQUEDOTTO LUCANO			
Toll Free Number	+39 800 992 293		
Technician in charge	Mobile Phone	+39 334 1078134	
SHELL			
Marco Brun - CEO	Mobile Phone	+39 335 6417591	
	e-mail	marco.brun@shell.com	
Alberto Pelliccia - JV Representative	Mobile Phone	+39 335 5767767	
	e-mail	Alberto.pelliccia@shell.com	
Silvano Suigi - UPC Italy HSE Specialist	Mobile Phone	+39 335 7353573	
	e-mail	silvano.suigi@shell.com	
Matteo Mistri - Senior Project Engineer	Mobile Phone	+39 335 7420720	
	e-mail	matteo.mistri@shell.com	

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 290 of 314	Rev. 02

RE	RESOURCES
-----------	------------------

mitsui			
Stefano Romay - Director & General Manager	Mobile Phone	+39 335 1980847	
	e-mail	S.Romay@mitsui.com	
Alessandro Ajelli - Project Manager	Mobile Phone	+39 366 6926403	
	e-mail	A.Ajelli@mitsui.com	

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 291 of 314	Rev. 02

RE	RESOURCES
-----------	------------------

Public Authorities

CARABINIERI		
National telephone number		112
Provincial Command of the Carabinieri of Potenza - Operational Center h24	Fixed Phone H24	+39 0971 391217
	e-mail	tpz20950@pec.carabinieri.it
Command of the Carabinieri Company of Viggiano	Fixed Phone H24	+39 0975 61080
	Fixed Phone H24	+39 0975 61086
	e-mail	tpz31701@pec.carabinieri.it
Command of the Carabinieri Station of Corleto P.	Fixed Phone	+39 099 47 82 111
	e-mail	tpz27479@pec.carabinieri.it
Command of the Carabinieri Pisticci Company	Fixed Phone H24	+39 0835 445400
	e-mail	tmt25394@pec.carabinieri.it
Command of the Carabinieri Station of Gorgoglione	Fixed Phone	+39 0835 560010
	e-mail	tmt23409@pec.carabinieri.it
Command of the Carabinieri Station of Pietrapertosa	Fixed Phone	+39 0971 983001
	e-mail	tpz20376@pec.carabinieri.it

As part of the External Emergency Plan (PEE), the Carabinieri must be contacted by the ICP Cell in case of an emergency.

The official communication must be carried out through the Communication Models via PEC.

In particular:


- Attention State Activation: Model 1

The Carabinieri have the task of managing and controlling traffic in the areas affected by the emergency and maintaining public order, with the coordination of the Prefecture of PZ

FINANCE POLICE		
Single national telephone number		117
Provincial Command of the Guardia di Finanza of Potenza	Fixed Phone	+39 0971 52899
	Fixed Phone	+39 0971 52346
	e-mail	pz0510000p@pec.gdf.it
Tenenza Guardia di Finanza of Viggiano	Fixed Phone	+39 0975 311008
	e-mail	pz1090000p@pec.gdf.it

As part of the External Emergency Plan (PEE), the Guardia di Finanza is alerted by the Prefecture of Potenza.

The Guardia di Finanza has the task of managing and controlling traffic, i.e., blocking the traffic in the areas affected by the accident.

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 292 of 314	Rev. 02

RE	RESOURCES
-----------	------------------

POLICE		
National telephone number		113
Police Headquarters	Fixed Phone H24	+39 0971 334778
	Fixed Phone	+39 0971 334111
	e-mail	gab.quest.pz@pecps.poliziadistato.it
	email H24	salaoperativa.quest.pz@pecps.poliziadistato.it
Polstrada Command - Power	Fixed Phone H24	+39 0971 654111
	e-mail	polstradacoc.pz@poliziadistato.it
	e-mail	sezpolderada.pz@pecps.poliziadistato.it

As part of the External Emergency Plan (PEE), the Traffic Police is alerted by the Prefecture of Potenza

The Traffic Police has the task of managing and controlling traffic, i.e., blocking the traffic in the areas affected by the accident.

PREFECTURE		
Prefecture - Potenza (Prefecture Civil Protection)	Fixed Phone H24	+39 0971 41911
	e-mail	protocol.prefpz@pec.interno.it
	e-mail	emergenze.prefpz@pec.interno.it
Prefecture - Matera	Fixed Phone	+39 0835 3491
	e-mail	protocol.prefmt@pec.interno.it

As part of the External Emergency Plan (PEE), the Prefecture of PZ must be contacted by the ICP Cell in case of an emergency.


The official communication must be carried out through the Communication Models via PEC.

In particular:

- Attention State Activation: Model 1
- Incident reporting: Model 2

The Prefecture of Potenza coordinates the implementation of the EEP in relation to the different levels of alert.

The Prefecture of Matera could be involved in the management of the emergency where the municipal area of Gorgoglione is involved.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 293 of 314	Rev. 02

RE	RESOURCES
-----------	------------------

FIRE FIGHTERS			
Single national VVF telephone number		115	
Provincial Fire Brigade Power Command	Fixed Phone Switchboard H24	+39 09716 58111	
	Fixed Phone - VOIP Operating Room	+39 09716 54704	
	email H24	com.salaop.potenza@cert.vigilfuoco.it	
	Fixed Phone Operating Room H24	+39 0971 609511	
Regional Directorate of the Basilicata Fire Brigade	e-mail	dir.salaop.basilicata@cert.vigilfuoco.it	
Provincial Fire Brigade Power Command - Detachment of Villa d'Agri	Fixed Phone	+39 0975 352005	
	e-mail	dist.pz04.villadagri@vigilfuoco.it	
Provincial Command Matera Fire Brigade	Fixed Phone	+39 0835 338311	
	e-mail	com.matera@cert.vigilfuoco.it	


As part of the External Emergency Plan (PEE), the PZ Fire Brigade Command must be contacted by the ICP Cell, in the event of an emergency.

The official communication must be carried out through the Communication Models via PEC.

In particular:

- Attention State Activation: Model 1
- Incident reporting: Model 2

In case of activation of the PEE, the PZ Fire Brigade they coordinate technical rescue operations and fire extinguishing, defining. In carrying out the rescue action, they make use of all the company teams and technical bodies that may be useful for managing the intervention.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 294 of 314	Rev. 02

RE	RESOURCES
-----------	------------------

MUNICIPAL SERVICES - Municipality of Corleto Perticara		
Contact center	Fixed Phone	+39 0971 965711
Certified mail	e-mail	comune.corleto@cert.ruparbasilicata.it
Common fax	fax	+39 0971 965717
Mayor	Tel Mob.	+39 339 2535970
Municipal Civil Protection Manager	Fixed Phone	+39 0971 965701
	Tel Mob.	+39 320 4217 263
Municipal police	Fixed Phone	+39 0971 965733
	Tel Mob.	+39 329 3173 404
	Fax	+39 0971 965717
	e-mail	vincenzo.magaldi@pec.corleto.it
MUNICIPAL SERVICES - Municipality of Guardia Perticara		
Contact center	Fixed Phone	+39 0971 964004
Certified mail	e-mail	comuneguardia@cert.ruparbasilicata.it
Common fax	fax	+39 0971 964003
Mayor	Tel Mob.	+39 349 0879179
Municipal Civil Protection Manager	Fixed Phone	+39 0971 964004
	Tel Mob.	+39 320 4217 242
Municipal police	Tel Mob.	+39 320 4217 244
	e-mail	police locale@pec.comune.guardiaperticara.pz.it
MUNICIPAL SERVICES - Municipality of Gorgoglione		
Contact center	Fixed Phone	+39 0835 560078
Certified mail	e-mail	protocol@pec.comune.gorgoglione.mt.it
Common fax	fax	+39 0971 965717
Mayor	Tel Mob.	+39 335 6478358
Municipal Civil Protection Manager	Tel Mob.	+39 345 6045 632


As part of the External Emergency Plan (PEE), the Mayors of the neighboring municipalities (Corleto P., Guardia P and Gorgoglione) must be contacted by the ICP Cell, in the event of an emergency situation.

The official communication must be carried out through the Communication Models via PEC.

In particular:

- Attention State Activation: Model 1
- Incident reporting: Model 2

The Mayors of the neighboring municipalities have, among the defined tasks, the task of informing the population about the accident and communicating the protection measures to be adopted to reduce the consequences through loudspeakers and / or telephone messages, sms and / or faxes, social media , and / or anything else deemed technically effective for the purpose.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 295 of 314	Rev. 02

RE	RESOURCES
-----------	------------------

ARPA BASILICATA		
ARPAB	Fixed Phone	+39 0971 656330
	H24	
	fax	+39 0971 601083
	e-mail	protocol@pec.arpab.it

As part of the External Emergency Plan (PEE), ARPAB will be alerted by the Prefecture of Potenza.

The ARPAB, under the coordination of the Prefecture and / or Fire Brigade, has the task of carrying out any assessment deemed necessary on the state of the environment in the area affected by the event, as well as chemical and / or physical analyzes to evaluate the evolution of the emergency in the most critical areas.

BASILICATA REGION		
Regional Civil Protection Office	Fixed Phone	+39 0971 668 400
	H24	
	e-mail	office.protezione.civile@certregione.basilicata.it
Toll-free number h24	Fixed Phone	800 073 665
	H24	
Operations Room Civil Protection Region	Fixed Phone	+39 0971 668394
	Fixed Phone	+39 0971 668463
	e-mail	sala.operativa@regione.basilicata.it sor.basilicata@cert.regione.basilicata.it
Presidency of the Executive - Potenza Headquarters	Fixed Phone	+39 0971 668136
	e-mail	urppresidenza@regione.basilicata.it


As part of the External Emergency Plan (PEE) the Basilicata Region (Civil Protection) must be contacted by the ICP Cell in case of an emergency.

The official communication must be carried out through the Communication Models via PEC.

In particular:

- Attention State Activation: Model 1
- Incident reporting: Model 2

The Civil Protection Office of the Basilicata Region participates in the coordination of intervention and rescue operations for the management of the emergency.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 296 of 314	Rev. 02

RE	RESOURCES
-----------	------------------

PROVINCE

Province of Potenza	Fixed Phone	+39 0971 417111
	e-mail	protocol@pec.provinciapotenza.it

As part of the External Emergency Plan (PEE), the Province of Potenza will be alerted by the Prefecture of Potenza.

The Province of PZ, under the coordination of the Prefecture and / or Fire Brigade, participates if necessary, in the coordination activities of the intervention operations.

UNMIG – Section of NAPLES

Toll Free Numberber	Fixed Phone H24	800 595812
UNMIG Naples	Fixed Phone	+39 081 551 0049
	fax	+39 081 551 9460
	e-mail	unmig.napoli@pec.mise.gov.it
UNMIG Naples Ing. M. Saralli	Fixed Phone	+39 081 5510049

In the event of an emergency, UNMIG must be contacted by the Responsible Director according to Legislative Decree 624/96.

INAIL


Basilicata Regional Directorate – local branch of Potenza	Fixed Phone	+39 0971 606111
	e-mail	Potenza@inail.it Potenza@postacert.inail.it
Territorial operational unit for certification, verification and research Potenza	Fixed Phone	+39 0971 606111
	e-mail	power-uotcvr@inail.it Potenza-ricerca@postacert.inail.it

INPS

POTENZA Provincial Directorate	Fixed Phone	+39 0971 3351
	fax	+39 0971 1945829
	e-mail	Direction.potenza@inps.it direzione.provinciale.potenza@postacert.inps.gov.it
URP Manager – Nicola AMOROSI	Fixed Phone	+39 081 5510049


MATTM – Ministry of the Environment and the Protection of the Territory and the Sea

Ministry switchboard	Fixed Phone	+39 0971 606111
----------------------	-------------	-----------------

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 297 of 314	Rev. 02

RE	RESOURCES
-----------	------------------

ASSOMINERARY		
Contact center	Fixed Phone	+39 06 807 30 45
	fax	+39 06 807 33 85
	e-mail	info@assomineraria.org

 TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 298 of 314	Rev. 02

RE	RESOURCES
-----------	------------------


Hospitals, ASP

READY HEALTH INTERVENTION - DIRES 118		
Single national telephone number	118	
DIRES 118 Basilicata - Potenza	Contact center	+39 0971 699 200
	fax	+39 0971 699 241
	e-mail	dires@pec.118basilicata.it
Emergency Department Address Potenza	Via Potito Petrone, 6, 85100 Potenza PZ	
Head Nurse First Aid Potenza	Fixed Phone	+39 0971 613 655
Helicopter rescue 118 Potenza	Fixed Phone	+39 0971 613 515
Villa d'Agri First Aid	Viale S. Pio da Pietrelcina, 85050 Villa d'Agri	
	Contact center	+39 0975 312111
	Fixed Phone	+39 0975 352845
	Fixed Phone	+39 0975 312243
Policoro First Aid	Via Salerno, 75025 Policoro MT	
	Fixed Phone	+39 0835 98 6312
	Fixed Phone	+39 0835 986 444
First Aid Matera	Fixed Phone	+39 0835 253212
Territorial Rescue Station 118		
Corleto Perticara (Mon-Fri 20: 00-08: 00; Sat-Sun 24h)	Fixed Phone	+39 0971 96 32 27
Poison Control Center Policlinico Umberto I	Fixed Phone	+39 06 499 78 000

As part of the External Emergency Plan (PEE), DIRES 118 will be alerted by the Prefecture of Potenza.

DIRES 118, under the coordination of the Prefecture and / or Fire Brigade:

- Send personnel to carry out urgent medical assistance
- Acquires the information necessary to identify drugs, antidotes and equipment to counter the health effects of accidents.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 299 of 314	Rev. 02

RE	RESOURCES
-----------	------------------

HOSPITALS		
San Carlo Hospital - Potenza	Address	Via Potito Petrone - 85100 Potenza
	Fixed Phone	+39 0971 611111
	Public relations office	+39 0971 612584
	Toll Free Number	800 006 616
	Emergency Medicine	+39 0971 612 585
	Head nurse	+39 0971 612 628
	Med.D'Urg. e-mail	aosancarlo@cert.ruparbasilicata.it
San Carlo Hospital - Villa d'Agri "San Pio da Pietrelcina Hospital"	Contact center	+39 0975 31211
San Carlo Hospital - Melfi	Contact center	+39 0972 773111
San Carlo Hospital - Lagonegro	Contact center	+39 0973 481111
Health Authority N ° 5 - Policoro	Fixed Phone	+39 0835 986421
	Fixed Phone	+39 0835 986402

As part of the External Emergency Plan (PEE), the San Carlo di Potenza Hospital will be alerted by the Prefecture of Potenza.


The ASP, under the coordination of the Prefecture and / or Fire Brigade, arranges coordination at the San Carlo Hospital in Potenza in direct operation with the hospitals of Villa d'Agri, Lagonegro and Melfi

PROVINCIAL HEALTH COMPANY		
ASP - Power	Contact center	+39 0971 310 111
	e-mail	protocol@pec.aspbasilicata.it
ASM - Matera	Contact center	+39 0835 253111
	e-mail	asmbasilicata@cert.ruparbasilicata.it
Power Level II Health District	Fixed Phone	+39 0971 269 24
Villa d'Agri Level II Health District	Fixed Phone	+39 0975 3124 09

As part of the External Emergency Plan (PEE), the ASP will be alerted by the Prefecture of Potenza.

The ASP, under the coordination of the Prefecture and / or Fire Brigade,


- They receive 118 news and data on the accident from the emergency service for the purpose of alerting the hospitals
- They provide, after consulting the other Health Authorities of the Region, the Province and the Municipalities, the data relating to the entities and the extent of the risk to public health.

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 300 of 314	Rev. 02

RE	RESOURCES
-----------	------------------

Transportation

CAR WITH DRIVER - SHUTTLE		
Rossano Leone NCC	Tel Mob.	+39 340 588 9360
	email	rossano.leone@tiscali.it
Gambioli	Tel Mob.	+39 335 7069355
	Tel Mob.	+39 344 1807217


 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 301 of 314	Rev. 02

RE	RESOURCES
-----------	------------------

Environmental intervention

Note: refer to the Oil Spill Contingency Plan - IT – TPR – GE – SET – 000039.

SEMATAF	Mob. Phone (24/7)
Nicola Massari	+39 345 3633136
Luigi Melfi	+39 328 3908423
Valeria Guida	+39 342 7658285

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	<i>INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE</i>			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 302 of 314	Rev. 02

RE	RESOURCES
-----------	------------------

Neighboring Companies

Refer to the Annex of the EEP:

Annex 7 - Productive Activities Population Contacts - RESTRICTED

A copy of Annex 7 PEE is available in the ICP Emergency Management Room of Guardia P.

RE

RESOURCES

RE2 - DESCRIPTION OF THE EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

FIRE FIGHTING WATER RESERVE



Water reserve - water tank 30-TR-0101

Maximum operating capacity of 22000 m³ of which 21200 m³ useful.

The capacity is:
equivalent to **4 hours** of autonomy, plus a further 4 hours of "supplementary" reserve of fire-fighting water at the project flow rate for the **process plant areas**.

equivalent to **6 hours** of autonomy, plus a further 6 hours of "additional" reserve of fire-fighting water within the design range for the storage areas

PUMPING STATION (main pumps: 3 x 50%)



**Pressurization fire water pumps (jockey) (2)
30-PA-0101 A / B**

- ➔ Design absorbed power: 23.68 kW
- ➔ Project flow rate: 62 m³ / h
- ➔ Maximum Operating Flow: 60 m³ / h
- ➔ Maximum Operating Pressure: 8.4 barg
- ➔ connected to the emergency diesel generator in the event of a general power failure



Electric fire pump

30-PA-0102 A

- ➔ Design absorbed power: 397 kW
- ➔ Project flow: 1330 m³ / h
- ➔ Maximum Operating Capacity: 1325 m³ / h
- ➔ Maximum Operating Pressure: 8.4 barg



TotalEnergies EP Italia

Company Management System

INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE

2-PR-QHSE-022

Date 15/12/2021

Page 304 of 314

Rev. 02

RE


RESOURCES



Diesel Fire Pumps (2)

30-PA-0102 BC

- Design absorbed power: 402 kW
- Project flow: 1330 m³ / h
- Maximum Operating Capacity: 1325 m³ / h
- Maximum Operating Pressure: 8.4 barg
- Minimum diesel autonomy: 12 hours



Fire Pumps Building:

- Fire resistance walls: REI 120
- Overpressure Resistance:
 - Ductility Level Blast
 - DLB = 0.19 barg
 - duration = 100 ms

RE

RESOURCES

NETWORK HYDRANTS, MONITORS AND CONNECTIONS



Water monitor / hydrant

- ➔ Hydrant body size: 6" (DN 150).
- ➔ Each hydrant is equipped with:
 - two 2 ½ "diameter (UNI 70) fittings for the hose,
 - a 4" diameter (DN 100) fitting for the fire truck
 - a 4" diameter flange connecting to the monitor
- ➔ Flow rate: 120 m³ / h at 7 barg,
- ➔ Rotation angle: 360 °
- ➔ Elevation angle: 80 ° up and 45 ° down.
- ➔ Horizontal operating range:
 - with full jet: at least 40 meters
 - with spray jet: 30 meters



Water / foam monitor

Foam tank capacity: 1 m³



Fire hydrants and hoses

- Each hydrant is equipped with:
- ➔ two 2 ½ "diameter (UNI 70) fittings for the hose,
 - ➔ a 4" diameter (DN 100) fitting for the fire truck
 - ➔ a 4 "diameter flange for connecting the monitors, where necessary (e.g. Wheeled monitors)
 - ➔ Hose length: 25 m



TotalEnergies EP Italia

Company Management System

INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE

2-PR-QHSE-022

Date 15/12/2021

Page 306 of 314


Rev. 02

RE

RESOURCES




VVF and flushing connections (2)



RE

RESOURCES

WATER DELUGE SYSTEM



Deluge water system - Deluge activation valve

- Model Bermad FP-400Y "Torrent"
- Automatic activation by fire detection (fusible plugs)
- Control room activation (F&G matrix panel)
- Field activation with blue button
- Field activation with manual valve (trim valve).



Deluge water system - Field deluge activation buttons;



Deluge water system - nozzle section and fusible plugs

Maximum Deluge flow rate: 2391 m³ / h
(subdeluge zone 2.4 activation)

RE

RESOURCES

FOAM SYSTEMS



Foam generation and distribution station (30-UV-0101). Reserve of foaming liquid and distribution system

→ The foam reserve guarantees the following discharge times:

→ Low expansion foam type AFFF-AR 3%
the quantity stored is equal to 40 m3, distributed on 2 tanks of 20 m3 ((30-VZ-0107 and 30-VZ-0108), equivalent to:

- 60 minutes for the basin fire.
- 20 minutes for the generalized fire on the tank.

→ the tanks are also insulated to resist thermal radiation in the event of a fire in the oil tanks




Remote Control Foam Monitors (4)

→ flow rate of each monitor is 240 m3 / h at a pressure of 7 barg

→ 4 monitors around the oil reservoirs (in blue below)


→ activation and operation from the control panel located at a safe distance

→ each monitor has its control panel (4) located in two points (in green below):



RE

RESOURCES



Containment basin foam pourers - Low expansion foam unit

→ for oil tank basins, the discharge, activated manually (by CCR F&G Matrix Panel or locally by the Trim Valve) is possible for each half basin separately

→ Foam flow rate: 340.21 m³ / h (2.5 l / min / m²)
- half basin 30-TF-2601 A

→ Foam flow rate: 341.44 m³ / h (2.5 l / min / m²)
- half basin 30-TF-2601 B

→ Foam flow rate: 51.15 m³ / h (2.5 l / min / m²)
- basin 30-TR-4501

Foam distribution system on the roof of the oil tanks

→ capable of pouring the foam into the space between the mantle / sealing area and the dam on the floating roof.

→ premixed foam

→ automatically activated following the intervention in logic 2oo2 of the 2 thermosensitive cables positioned above the seal

RE

RESOURCES



**Internal foam distributor (sub-surface system)
- slop oil tank**

- ➔ Manual activation from CCR or from local (trim valve 30-SV-0125).
- ➔ Application flow rate: 6.8 m³ / h (2.5 l / min / m²).




Foam deluge system (oil and slop-oil tank walls)

- ➔ Application flow rate: 155.43 m³ / h (15 l / min * m circumference) for 30-TF-2601 A / B.
- ➔ Application flow rate: 21.48 m³ / h (15 l / min * m circumference) for 30-TR-4501.



High expansion foam dispensers for LPG units (zone A, zone B).

- ➔ High expansion foam type AFFF-AR 3%
- ➔ Automatic activation on flame detection (voting 2oo2)
- ➔ Activation from CCR (F&G Matrix Panel)
- ➔ The discharge in the well has a duration of 18 seconds

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 311 of 314	Rev. 02

RE	RESOURCES
-----------	------------------

NEBULIZED WATER SYSTEM - WATER MIST	
	<p>Water mist extinguishing systems.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➔ totally automatic, and are activated following a fire detection ➔ SIL 2
GAS SATURATION SYSTEM - INERGEN	
	<p>Gas saturation extinguishing systems</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➔ Automatic activation upon detection of 200N smoke detectors in the protected rooms ➔ Manual activation with device near the main entrance and exits ➔ The gas used as an extinguishing medium is IG541 - 52% N2 - 40% Ar- 8% CO2 (commonly known as Inergen). ➔ There is a pre-discharge alarm and a delay in the start of the discharge to prevent exposure to the gas. ➔ SS-2 Electrical Substation (Instrument panel room, UPS room, Electrical panel room, Cable room, Battery room) ➔ SS-1 Electrical Substation & Technical Building (Instrument panel room, UPS room, A / B electrical panel room, A / B cable room, Battery room, Telecommunication panel room)
STEAM SHUTDOWN FIXED SYSTEM	
	<p>Liquid sulfur fire extinguishing system</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➔ Fire protection on sulfur storage tank (30-TR-3311) ➔ The system activation procedure is manual via valve 30-HV-332308 positioned near the sulfur tank


RE

RESOURCES


EXTINGUISHERS



12 kg powder fire extinguishers



Fire extinguishers 50 kg powder



CO2 fire extinguishers

RE

RESOURCES

MOBILE FIRE-FIGHTING VEHICLES




Mobile fire truck (pick up)

- Water reserve equal to 370 liters and a reserve of foaming agent equal to 30 liters.
- Equipped with a 50 m long DN12 hose



Triple effect wheeled monitors with predisposition for foaming agent

- n. 5 special fire hoses for massive use in industrial buildings and chemical plants (UNI 70) - 30 meters
- n. 4 three-way dividers (UNI 70)
- n. 4 wheeled monitors:
 - flow rate: 120 m³ / h @ 7 bar
 - jet: maximum 60 m at nominal range (full jet)
 - suitable for use with foam
 - supply connection DN 100
- n. 5 "standard" fire hoses (UNI 70)
- n. 5 fire lances with adjustable jet
- n. 1 two-way divider (UNI 70)

 TotalEnergies TotalEnergies EP Italia	Company Management System			
	<i>INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – TEMPA ROSSA OIL CENTRE</i>			
	2-PR-QHSE-022	Date 15/12/2021	Page 314 of 314	Rev. 02

RE	RESOURCES
-----------	------------------

RE3 - INVENTORY OF INTERVENTION MATERIAL FOR OIL SPILLING

IT – TPR – GE – SET – 000039 - Tempa Rossa Oil Spill Contingency Plan.

<http://wat.corp.local/sites/s485/en-US/Pages/Sistema-Gestione-della-Sicurezza-Seveso.aspx>